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Although time has been seriously contemplated by various philosophies of the 
Western tradition, it remains an underdeveloped topic in Lacanian studies. This 
thesis attempts to provide a comprehensive elaboration of the notion of time in 
Jacques Lacan’s work and to develop an argument to show how it contributes to 
our understanding of subjectivity. By working through various presentations of 
time in Lacan’s writings, this thesis puts forward the idea of dual temporality and 
demonstrates how it supports Lacan’s overall theoretical position. Chapter one 
introduces the idea of dual temporality through a critical examination of Lacan’s 
“Logical Time” essay. It is shown that Lacan’s “perfect solution” to the prisoner’s 
dilemma is logically flawed. It constructs an imaginary temporal experience that 
covers the unresolved tension between two temporal registers, which I name Real 
time and Symbolic time respectively. The two independent temporal registers are 
further explored in the context of the Real body and the Symbolic order. Chapter 
Four discusses how the fundamental desynchrony between these two temporal 
registers initiates the process of subject-formation, which is symptomatic in its 
essence. Chapter five develops a new epistemology of sexed subjectivity built upon 
a fresh reading of the relationship between time and sexual difference. Whereas 
others have thought that time is an intrinsic human experience, the result of my 
work is to show that, on the contrary, time in Lacan’s work is characterised by 
otherness and alterity, experienced by the subject as foreign and alienating. It is 
argued that the very split nature of the Lacanian subject shall be understood 
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This thesis concerns the notion of time in Jacques Lacan’s work.  As one of the most 
influential theorists of the twentieth century, Jacques Lacan addressed a wide 
range of topics in his writings, yet the notion of time has been largely overlooked 
by commentators both inside and outside psychoanalytic circles, who often portray 
Lacanian psychoanalysis as a theory that does not take time into account. The 
experience of time has been studied psychoanalytically mainly through ego 
psychology and classical analysis (Kurtz, 1988), while, as Žižek points out, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is believed to take the ostensible historical account as “a temporal 
projection of the possibilities of variation within the ‘timeless’ structure itself” 
(Žižek, 2006, p.377). Its well-known theoretical debt to the structural linguistics of 
Saussure, which emphasises the primacy of synchronic analysis to understand the 
inner function of linguistics rather than a diachronic approach to the historical 
evolution of languages, leads many critics to restrict their analyses of Lacan to the 
wider philosophical context of structuralism and prevents the reader from 
exploring its temporal dimension. While twentieth-century continental 
philosophy, from Bergson’s intuitionism, German and French phenomenology to 
postmodernism, all witnessed the growing interests in issues revolving around 
time, it is unclear how Lacanian psychoanalysis, which can be situated in the 
continental tradition theoretically, can engage in this conversation and have its 
voice on questions of the temporal nature of meaning, body, language and 
subjectivity. However, I believe that to Lacan, time does matter. It is not a marginal 
topic of concern absent from his basic theoretical structure, nor is it merely a 
technical issue encountered in the practice of psychoanalysis to which he responds 
with the infamous “short session”. Time is a notion of definitive importance in 
Lacan’s theory around which separate discussions in his articles and seminars 
congregate. Through a sustained and systematic reading of Lacan’s work with a 
particular focus on his various presentations of time, I intend to explore Lacan’s 
understanding of the relationship between time and subjectivity, and develop a 
unified Lacanian theory of time that can be taken as the inner logic in a general 




In this introduction, I will first give the reader a sense of the purpose of my writing, 
namely why it is important to understand Lacan’s theory of time in the context of 
Lacan’s own theoretical system and in the broader context of the philosophy of 
time. Then I present the methodology of my reading, explaining several principles 
of interpretation I am going to follow throughout this thesis. The last part will be 
a brief overview of the five main chapters of this thesis. 
 
The reason for highlighting the notion of time among a variety of topics Lacan’s 
writings have covered, I believe, is that it is key to understanding his theory as a 
whole. Problems concerning time were considered by Lacan throughout his 
theoretical development, although not always explicitly. The 1945 article entitled 
“Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism” brought 
out the significance of time in a fully-fledged way. Seminar II made an important 
reference to time when Lacan discussed memory and history, so did Seminar V 
with a delimitation of “the three times of the Oedipus complex” and Seminar XI 
with the chapter “Tuché and Automaton”. By tracking the notion of time across 
different stages, we can endow a sense of continuity to Lacan’s divergent 
theoretical explorations and also provide coherence to his fragmentary style of 
writing. Moreover, I argue that Lacan’s theory cannot be comprehensively 
understood without an appreciation of time at the heart of his conceptual structure. 
Unlike other fundamental concepts that frequently appear in Lacan’s writings, the 
notion of time is discussed in a distinctive way. In most cases, it is not a direct 
object of study, as Lacan seems to be less interested in the ontological status of 
time despite his frequent engagement with many metaphysical theories of time. 
Instead, time is discussed in relation to other concepts in Lacan’s metapsychology 
with the aim of exploring a specific dimension of different forms of human 
experience. It functions as the epistemological ground of Lacan’s theory on which 
crucial psychoanalytic questions can be addressed. In Chapter Two, I explore how 
Lacan reinvents Freud’s idea of the death drive by highlighting its temporal factor. 
In Chapter Three, I discuss the temporal nature of the symbolic order that 
distinguishes Lacan’s theory from static structuralism. As such, the addition of a 
temporal dimension offers new insights into old conceptual models and allows 
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Lacan to develop a more dynamic theory beyond the stereotypical impression of 
structural psychoanalysis.  
 
It is difficult to appreciate Lacan’s contribution to our understanding of time 
without a general understanding of the evolution of the philosophy of time. In fact, 
many discussions of time in Lacan’s writings only make sense if they are 
understood as responses to the philosophical work of others. Here, I will not 
attempt to provide an up-to-date review of various philosophical theories of time 
in history, a task that has been most comprehensively done by Zygmunt Zawirski 
(1994) in L’évolution de la Notion du Temps. However, a brief review of several key 
lines of thinking is necessary. As one of the most fundamental human experiences, 
time has puzzled western philosophers since ancient Greek times. What is time? 
Does it exist independently of human experience or as an attribute of the mind? 
Over the centuries, philosophical theories that attempt to answer these major 
questions concerning the ontological status of time have been resolved into three 
main categories: Idealism, realism, and relationism (Bardon, 2013, p.7). Idealism 
regards time as a kind of idea in mind. The Eleatic school, for example, believed 
that all temporal changes are illusions while the world itself is timeless. St. 
Augustine and Kant held similar views. The former — despite his self-admitted 
ignorance of the nature of time: “What is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish 
to explain it to one that asks, I know not” — provided a theological account of time 
as the extension of the eternal Word of God (Augustine, 1939); the latter developed 
transcendental idealism that takes time as an a priori form of experience. The 
realist views, in turn, are most famously held by Heraclitus, who claimed that 
reality is as endlessly changing as a flowing river; and Newton, who assumed the 
existence of an absolute and uniform time corresponding to the new development 
of natural science he himself advanced. In addition to these two positions, there 
also existed an intermediate position chosen by philosophers including Aristotle 
and Leibniz. They treated time as a set of relations between objects that are “not 
something real in itself, but rather our way of representing or measuring change” 




Divergent as these attempts to understand the “nature of time” may appear, the 
question of what time is nevertheless presupposes time as an object of metaphysics 
whose attributes can be described objectively. It requires philosophers to adopt an 
impersonal viewpoint instead of paying attention to everyday experience and 
sensibility that are so intrinsically related to time. This situation changed in the 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the philosophy of time was 
increasingly characterised by an interest in the subjective experience of time. This 
interest can be seen as a response to the process of modernisation that throws the 
individual into an ever-present flow of production, circulation and consumption. 
What used to be a repetitive experience of time is replaced by unpredictable 
encounters with a series of fragmented moments. 
 
To reflect the distinctive way in which time is experienced in modernity, the 
philosophy of time needs to not only engage with the experienced world more 
actively, but also face the challenge proposed by scientific accounts of time based 
on the development of relativistic physics. The following examples present some 
attempts to situate time back in the phenomenal world and take it as an embodied 
experience beyond mental representation. To Henri Bergson, modern philosophy 
of time “can quite readily admit Minkowski’s and Einstein’s space-time” (Bergson, 
2002, p.217), but the mathematical measurement of time “cannot express all of 
reality”, at least, it fails to cover an experienced time that flows. The continuity of 
change is at the core of Henri Bergson’s theory of duration. Instead of 
distinguishing between past, present and future, Bergson takes an extended 
present, including the actualised past and the immediate future, as the only 
presence that can be captured by intuition rather than intellectual reasoning 
(Bergson, 2002). Husserl’s phenomenological account of time-consciousness also 
privileges the experiencing act as the foundation of a temporally extended sensed 
content, evidence of which can be found in the bodily movement and action of 
infants that reflects an inherent temporality (Gallagher, 2013). In comparison, 
Deleuze goes even further with his theory of the passive syntheses of time and 
attributes the production of our sense of time to the unconscious body. 
Enlightened by Nietzsche’s idea of eternal return, Deleuze reinvents the classical 
11 
 
notion of eternity by substituting the immanent or absolute presence as its original 
meaning with the continuation of bodily intensity. These theories have a strong 
influence on Lacan’s thinking and will be examined further in subsequent chapters.  
 
Situated against this philosophical background, I argue that Lacan’s theory of time 
engages in dialogue with both classical and contemporary continental philosophy. 
Developing his ideas from the practice of psychoanalysis, Lacan certainly 
appreciates the pivotal role embodied experience plays in shaping our conception 
of time, and indeed emphasises the importance of recognising time for an 
authentic understanding of being. However, this does not mean that time to Lacan 
can be reduced to one’s own feelings and therefore means nothing from an 
objective perspective. Insofar as the Lacanian subject is not the ego that sustains a 
false sense of being, its experience of time must not be reduced to temporal 
consciousness or time-awareness produced by the ego’s imaginary construction. It 
is instead a foreign or alienated experience that entails a radical otherness, the 
recognition of which is crucial for subject formation. This thesis will demonstrate 
that, to Lacan, to be a subject means not only to have a place in the Other, but also 
to experience time as the Other that is both independent and embodied. The idea 
of time as otherness deconstructs the opposition between subjective time and 
objective time. It gives rise to a new ontology of time from which we can develop 
important conclusions about subjectivity.  
 
My thesis does not attempt to undertake an exhaustive reading of Lacan. Some 
texts, most of which are Lacan’s articles and seminars from the 1970s, are left 
unattended to. Although the issue of time was not forgotten during this period 
when Lacan’s teaching had been taken up by mathematics and topological images, 
as his last seminar on “Topology and Time” continued to assign time to a position 
of importance, these discussions, most of which are Lacan’s own elaboration, free 
from classic psychoanalytic references, require the dedicated work of exegesis that 
cannot be achieved within the scope of this thesis. Meanwhile, a large number of 
references to Freud’s work are included in this thesis to demonstrate a theoretical 
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continuity and development between these two authors. Freud’s theory is not only 
a significant source that inspires Lacan’s thinking about time, but it also provides 
the necessary context in which Lacan’s own presentation can be understood. 
Lacan’s famous call for the “return to Freud” itself is a perfect metaphor for time 
that does not intend to recollect what was there but to discover what was not there 
in the first place that can only be grasped afterwards. My returning to Freud follows 
the same principle, as I read Freud’s work “not as a domesticated, reassuring 
answer but as an irreducibly uncanny question” (Felman, 1989, p.54), to which 
Lacan’s theory of time is a response.  
 
In terms of methodology, this is an interpretative study of Jacques Lacan’s writings. 
I focus on presuppositions, methods, reasoning and conclusions in Lacan’s work 
that contribute to our understanding of time and deploy an interpretive strategy 
that is in line with the Lacanian interpretation. To Lacan, interpretation is not a 
method to elucidate a pre-existing truth embedded in the text or to delimit a single 
substantive concept of rationality, nor is it, according to postmodernists, a process 
of textual reproduction by readers who complicate and displace the narrative of 
the author in favour of an infinite play of meaning. What Lacan learns from the 
practice of psychoanalysis can also apply to textual analysis and interpretation: 
“There are two dangers in anything related to the understanding of our clinical 
domain. The first is not to be sufficiently curious” (Lacan, 1988b, p.103), as if it is 
only the patient’s (author) own work to remember, while the analyst (reader) 
merely receives the information passively; “the second is to understand too much”, 
which is the case when the analyst (reader) assigns the role of meaning-making to 
one’s own ego. Lacan makes the second point clear in Seminar XI: “It is false to say, 
as has been said, that interpretation is open to all meanings under the pretext that 
it is a question only of the connection of a signifier to a signifier, and consequently 
of an uncontrollable connection. Interpretation is not open to any meaning” 
(Lacan, 1998, pp.249–50). Refusing the idea of multiple interpretations does not 
mean that Lacan is trying to revive the traditional authorship which suppresses 
difference embedded in the flow of signifiers, or to privilege the intentionality of 
the author as the origin of all the work’s meaning. To Lacan, a good interpretation 
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in psychoanalytic treatment must have the effect of isolating “in the subject a 
kernel, a kern, to use Freud’s own term, of non-sense” (ibid.). It is this nonsense 
that has been given a particular role in exploring the truth of the unconscious. By 
confronting the irreducible, traumatic and non-meaning to which he is subjected, 
the subject can work through the imaginary and re-arrange its relationship with 
the symbolic. 
 
If the purpose of Lacanian psychoanalysis is to uncover the kernel of non-meaning 
at the heart of subjectivity, then the Lacanian interpretation, as I argue, is able to 
provide an alternative to both the traditional and the postmodern interpretative 
models. It aims not to decipher a hidden meaning or to disentangle many potential 
meanings, but to disrupt the whole meaning-making process. My reading intends 
to apply Lacan’s insight to his own work by following several principles. To start 
with, I take the actuality and potentiality of the text, rather than the intentionality 
of the author, as a basis for the act of interpretation. As Lacan says in Seminar II: 
“Man is always cultivating a great many more signs that he thinks” (Lacan, 1988b, 
p.122). Words and sentences Lacan wrote down may associate and interact in many 
ways beyond Lacan’s own expectation. In the present case, it means that I focus on 
what Lacan’s words express by themselves and provide various materials in Lacan’s 
texts from which my arguments could be made. I am not concerned with whether 
Lacan has come to the same conclusion in his mind, since it is a claim that can 
never be verified, yet the theory of time I formulate is indeed consistent with 
Lacan’s fundamental viewpoint that emphasises the split nature of the subject 
while exposing the imaginary coherence of the ego. In so doing, I try to inhibit 
some all-too-familiar characterisations of Lacan’s theoretical structure and 
contribute to a new perspective in Lacan scholarship.  
 
Secondly, throughout the thesis, my analysis and interpretation are loosely guided 
by a unifying concern with the notion of “contradiction”. I am particularly 
interested in those crucial points in Freud’s and Lacan’s texts where different lines 
of thinking go against each other and ostensible reasoning processes fail to work 
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out. Contradiction here is understood not in the Hegelian sense as a dialectical way 
to absorb oppositions and move towards the unity of reason. It corresponds to 
what Lacan calls “the nonsensical” that breaks the flow of meaning and challenges 
the normative reading. In the practice of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the unconscious 
truth interrupts our consistent everyday experience and reveals its contradictions. 
The same principle applies to the field of textual analysis where identifying the 
contradiction becomes the necessary condition of new possibilities of 
interpretation. As Lacan states in Seminar VI: “It is in the nature of what is said to 
confront us with a very particular difficulty which at the same time opens up very 
special possibilities” (Lacan, 1959, p.64). In fact, all my following chapters offer 
some analyses of contradictions that give rise to a different understanding of time.  
 
Thirdly, as a study questioning the meaning of time, this thesis will not interpret 
Lacan’s work in developmental order. Although an attempt at periodisation is 
common in many commentaries of Lacan’s teaching, in my view, it provides too 
simplistic a conceptualisation of Lacan’s complex theory in which ideas often make 
sense retrospectively, as if they “were there all the time and had only to be picked 
up” (Lacan, 1998, p.216). In the following chapters, I will argue with respect to each 
significant point about time made by Lacan across different stages of his theoretical 
development, but I will not organise multiple figures of time in Lacan’s work 
chronologically, nor will I present them only as a “diachronic heterogeneity”, in the 
same way André Green treats Freud’s different hypotheses on time (Green, 2002). 
Such an approach does not explain why Lacan took up a certain opinion at a given 
moment, and thus fails to reveal Lacan’s basic line of thinking from where his 
discussions of time on various occasions can be brought together. Contrary to 
these readings, I argue that time to Lacan is fundamentally characterised by 
otherness without which it cannot condition human subjectivity. By focusing on 
the character of time with which Lacan is especially concerned and to which his 
texts always come back from different angles, I argue that it is possible to work on 
separate segments of Lacan’s discussion of time and develop a logically coherent 




Fourthly, my interpretation will bring Lacan into contact with a range of 
philosophers, not only because Lacan himself often comments on other 
philosophers and constantly borrows ideas from phenomenology, existentialism 
and constructionism in his teaching, but also because Lacan’s understanding of 
time offers a response to contradictions in other lines of investigation undertaken 
by philosophers both before and since. In Chapter Two, I put Lacan’s arguments in 
dialogue with Kant’s philosophy of time and attend to the problem of a passive 
synthesis of time that troubles the latter; while in Chapter Five, I examine some 
feminist readings of the relationship between time and sexuality that have emerged 
since Lacan’s time, yet failed to provide a satisfactory answer. It is not my intention 
to explicate Lacan’s theory of time only on its own, as I always put it in a web of 
signifiers where questions, presuppositions and results of other philosophies of 
time have already existed. I do this to prove that Lacan’s theory of time not only 
has its roots in the history of philosophy but also remains relevant to contemporary 
continental philosophy.  
 
The thesis includes five chapters. In Chapter One, I provide what I take to be the 
basic argument of the thesis through a careful reading of Lacan’s essay “Logical 
Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism”, published in 
1945. As one of Lacan’s earliest works directly commenting on time, the “Logical 
Time” essay uses a three-prisoner game as an example to demonstrate how a sense 
of time is experienced by the subject through interpersonal anticipation, judgment 
and reconsideration. Every prisoner’s decision to move depends on the action of 
others, suggesting that the temporal experience does not merely represent the 
relationship between the subject and the objective world, but also includes the 
desire and the intentionality of the Other. It is generally believed that Lacan in this 
essay uses a logical model of intersubjectivity to understand time (Hook, 2013a, 
2013b; Williams, 2013), yet by working through the steps of Lacan’s analysis of the 
three-prisoner game, I argue that we should not accept Lacan’s account at face 
value. The logic Lacan applies to the three-prisoner game turns out to be the logic 
of its failure, as I demonstrate that the prisoner cannot obtain the temporal 
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experience of duration/hesitation and follow the logical reasoning process at the 
same time.  
 
However, the failure of “logical time” does not come to undermine the whole 
project, nor does it mark the failure of Lacan’s understanding of time. I take one 
step further by arguing that the contradiction that prevents us from theorising 
time in a logical mode is the contradiction within time. We perceive time as a 
whole in our representational consciousness, but it does not mean that time should 
remain the same outside of representation. In fact, the failure of “Logical time” 
reveals precisely the true essence of time as conflicted and disjointed when a 
conscious representation of time falls apart. Time is a difference-in-itself that 
constantly dislocates the individual’s subject position. My analysis of the last 
section of the “Logical Time” essay allows us to see how Lacan inverts his 
arguments by returning from a logical form of assimilation to the essential 
determination of the “I”. I argue that this conclusion only makes sense if we 
introduce the idea of dual temporality. The logical process that determines the 
individual’s movement is shown to correspond to what I call “Symbolic time”; while 
the moment in which the subject’s self-determination takes place is a moment of 
“Real time”. The so-called “logical time”, therefore, is only a fantasy of time that 
attempts to reconcile the tension between these two underlying temporal registers. 
At the end of this chapter, I show how the idea of dual temporality plays itself out 
in other themes of Lacan’s theory and prepare the reader for the analysis of each 
temporal register that follows. 
 
Chapter Two explains the meaning of “Real time” and how it fits into Lacan’s 
overall theoretical structure. The concept of the Real is crucial in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, which has been examined systematically in many commentaries. 
Yet few discussions have touched upon the relationship between time and the Real. 
In this chapter, I understand Real time as the time of the Real body and argue that 
a Lacanian metaphysics of bodily time can be developed from his reworking of 
Freud’s theory of metapsychology. The idea of bodily time is rooted in Freudian 
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psychoanalysis, which claims that “the true essence of what is psychical” can be 
found in the somatic process (Freud, 1938, p.157). Following the same principle, it 
is not surprising for us to find that time as an embodied experience exists in Freud’s 
metapsychology. I develop a Freudian metaphysics of time in the first part of this 
chapter, an interpretation that has not been attempted before. I read Freud’s 
unpublished Project for a Scientific Psychology through Kant, whose theory of the 
three syntheses of time provides a useful framework to understand the ontology of 
time. It turns out that the syntheses of the present, the past and the future are 
undertaken by the body process rather than the subject of thought in Freud’s work. 
This Freudian metaphysics of time introduces the crucial idea of passive synthesis 
and lays the foundation for Lacan’s Real time. In the second part, I focus on Lacan’s 
early seminars where he comments on Freud’s metapsychology. By putting forward 
the idea of the “consciousness without the ego” and reformulating the notion of 
“death drive”, Lacan eliminates the residue of active representation in Freud’s 
metaphysics of time and thus completes a theory of Real time firmly grounded on 
the body process, a theory that enables the possibility of liberation from the 
established temporal order.  
 
Chapter Three moves from the theorisation of time on an organismic level to 
another passive synthesis of time that takes place on the unconscious level. I intend 
to add something new to the account of the symbolic order that has been an 
essential part of most secondary literature on Lacan. It is generally believed that to 
Lacan, the symbolic order is constituted in the field of language. It is the realm of 
pure difference between signifiers that present to the subject synchronically. 
However, a temporal dimension is also essential in Lacan’s understanding of the 
symbolic order. To argue that the unconscious belongs to the symbolic order, one 
must accept the precondition that the symbolic order is able to account for the 
time of the unconscious, a time, which, as my interpretation of Freud’s argument 
“the unconscious is timeless” suggests, is outside representation. Lacan’s 
theorisation of the time of the symbolic order is made possible by the theory of 
cybernetics, which introduces the notion of the machine as an impersonal agent 
that sets the symbolic order in motion. This means that the symbolic order not 
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only determines one’s subject position at a given moment but also structures one’s 
life trajectory through a flow of signifiers. This conclusion is supported by Freud’s 
analysis of the Wolf Man case and Lacan’s reading of Hamlet, in both of which we 
confront the time of the Other that is entirely autonomous and at the same time 
conditions the subject’s unconscious desire.  
 
Having clarified the meaning of Real time and Symbolic time respectively, Chapter 
Four and Chapter Five focus on specific themes in Lacan’s theory to which the idea 
of dual temporality can apply. Chapter Four considers the assumption of time 
underlying Lacan’s construction of the process of subject-formation. I use 
“symptomatic time” to name the time of subject-formation as I argue that if the 
subject to Lacan is a symptomatic being-in-the-world, subjective time must also 
be experienced in a symptomatic way. By working through the Freud-Rank debate 
and investigating the meaning of primal repression, I argue that there is not a linear, 
developmental order that can explain the process of subject-formation, and any 
theory that takes this traditional assumption of time as granted will find difficulty 
in solving the problem of the origin that has troubled psychoanalysis since Freud’s 
time. I revisit Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage and identify the presence of both 
Real time and Symbolic time without which imaginary identification of the ego 
cannot be achieved. It is shown that the split of the subject is first and foremost a 
split between two temporal registers during its formation. This chapter concludes 
with an explanation of the interplay between Real time and Symbolic time that 
Lacan’s writings present as separation and alienation.  
 
Chapter Five uses the notion of dual temporality to take a comprehensive look at 
Lacan’s theorisation of sexed subjectivity. The emphasis of this chapter is on the 
development of “sexed time” as a new epistemology through which the 
construction of sexual identity and the meaning of sexual difference can be 
understood. In other words, I am interested in how a psychoanalytic knowledge of 
sexuality is produced and what implicit assumption is required to theorise 
sexuality in a certain way. It is shown that the popular reading of the Freudian-
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Lacanian theory follows a logic of spatialisation and overlooks the role of time. So-
called sexual development does not really designate a process of becoming since 
the penis/phallus functions as an indicator of spatial demarcation through which 
masculinity and femininity as two opposed sexual categories have already been 
defined. My reading of Freud’s Oedipal narrative reveals not one but two 
epistemological approaches to the problem of sexual difference, the second of 
which can be characterised by Lacan’s idea of the future anterior. Through a radical 
interpretation of the formulas of sexuation in Lacan’s Seminar XX as a general 
theory of what becoming a sexed being means in the Symbolic and the Real, I 
further develop this new epistemology which situates sexed subjectivity not against 
a background of absence or presence but between two temporal registers. 
Following this line of work, we can think about sexual difference beyond different 





1. Logical Time 
 
First published in the 1940s, the essay “Logical Time and the Assertion of 
Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism” was one of Lacan’s earliest attempts to deal 
with the problem of time. It was constantly revived throughout his career. Even in 
the 1970s, when mathematics and topology, gradually replacing structural 
linguistics, dominated his thinking and further led to a spatialised formalisation of 
his theory, Lacan still reminded his audience of this early essay and the connection 
between the “time-function” it emphasised back then and the “surface-function” 
he was trying to formulate now (Lacan, 1973, pp.45–47). Therefore, a reference to 
this essay is necessary to any attempt to answer how Lacan understands time and 
how crucial a temporal dimension is to his theory. In this chapter, I have restricted 
my analysis almost exclusively to the “Logical Time” essay because I believe it 
encompasses Lacan’s fundamental argument about time that will determine the 
structure of the thesis.  
 
When reading “Logical Time”, one is often relieved to find that the density and 
obscurity of Lacan’s writing style, as a typical obstacle to our understanding of 
Lacan’s many other texts, is not a problem here. Instead, Lacan uses a vivid 
example to illustrate his ideas and clearly names three logical times as his 
theoretical achievement. However, in my view, the difficulty of the “Logical Time” 
essay lies elsewhere. Because it is so tempting to accept what Lacan says at face 
value, many commentaries fail to critically engage with the text and work out 
Lacan’s subtle ideas beneath the ostensible account of reasoning. Through a close 
examination of the “Logical Time” essay and related literature, I suggest that 
despite its perceived importance, Lacan’s theory of logical time has not yet been 
comprehensively explored, nor has its possible implication for understanding 
Lacan’s other concepts been fully realised. In other words, while it is believed that 
the idea of logical time has given Lacan “a certain amount of fixed intellectual 
capital in this area of psychoanalytic theory and practice, capital which he was 
never to allow to be foreclosed” (Forrester, 1991, p. 192), the exact nature of this 




This chapter intends to address this issue with the following steps: To begin with, 
I replay the three-prisoner game Lacan asks the reader to imagine for the exercise 
of thought, and examine how Lacan solves it with his “perfect solution”, through 
which the idea of logical time is introduced. However, unlike many secondary 
sources that take Lacan’s account at face value, I question the rationality of the 
“second moment of hesitation” and thus expose an illogical point in a logical 
process. Then in the following section, I examine Alain Badiou’s interpretation of 
“Logical Time” which further challenges Lacan’s solution. Badiou draws our 
attention to the absolute reciprocity between three prisoners as a fundamental 
assumption underlying the whole logical game, which he regards as an elimination 
of all subjective temporal experiences. The possibility of intersubjective 
heterogeneity problematises the idea that a prisoner must take the other as an 
imaginary image of oneself, thinking what the other is thinking at the same 
moment. This leads to a radical reconsideration of the relationship between 
subjectivity and the symbolic rules prefigured by the warden as the big Other. 
Based on this reading, I conclude that Lacan’s “perfect solution” is logically 
untenable. Meanwhile, Badiou’s notions of “subjective process” and 
“subjectivisation” provide two possible yet opposite solutions to the three-prisoner 
game: one that eliminates subjectivity and replaces three prisoners with three 
logical machines reasoning according to prepared scripts, the other that maintains 
the subjective experience of time but only ends up with a self-confirmed subject 
who breaks with symbolic rules in pursuit of the truth. By analysing how these two 
solutions are hidden in Lacan’s writings, I argue that there are not one, but two 
temporal registers in which the subject lives, an idea supported by the way Lacan 
concludes his “Logical Time” essay, the idea of “two clocks” he puts forward in 
Seminar II, and the distinction he makes between tuché and automaton in Seminar 
XI. I believe that the idea of dual temporality is fundamental to Lacan’s 
understanding of time and thus take it as a point of departure that leads to my 




1.1 The Imperfection of Lacan’s “Perfect Solution”   
The “Logical Time” essay opens with a three-prisoner game that I will first examine. 
A warden announces to three prisoners that they are going to undergo a test. The 
prisoners are informed that there are five disks differing in colour, three white and 
two black, but only three of them will be used in this test. They will stand in a circle, 
and one disk will be placed between the shoulders of each prisoner in such a way 
that it is out of his own line of vision but can be seen by others. When the test 
starts, each prisoner needs to logically deduce the colour of his own disk from the 
colour of the other two disks he sees. The one who first figures out the correct 
colour and passes through the exit door will be given freedom. Having said that, 
the warden then places a white disk on all three prisoners. When they open their 
eyes, each prisoner will see two white disks in front of him. The question Lacan 
asks is: how can the subjects solve the problem?  
 
To answer this question, I reframe the “perfect solution” Lacan gives, which is 
exemplified by prisoner A but also works for prisoner B or C: “I see two white disks. 
If I had a black disk, B and C would have seen one black and one white. Therefore, 
each of them would think: ‘If I had a black, the other one who bears the white disk 
would have seen two blacks, then he would have left immediately for knowing 
himself as a white. Since he hasn’t moved, I am not a black and I can leave.’ Since 
B and C still haven’t moved, I must also bear a white disk.” As all three of them 
process the same logical reasoning, they will all exit simultaneously with the 
correct conclusion.  
 
As we can immediately see, Lacan’s “perfect solution” is fascinating for its 
incorporation of a temporal dimension, as one’s decision to move relies on the fact 
that others haven’t moved, which requires a moment of hesitation, or a suspensive 
scansion. This characteristic reveals Lacan’s ambitious aim behind the “Logical 
Time’ essay, that is to put forward a new “temporal logic” as a challenge to classical 
logic, “whose eternal prestige reflects an infirmity which is nonetheless recognised 
as their own – namely, that these forms never give us anything which cannot 
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already be seen all at once” (Lacan, 2006b, p.166). In classical logic, one certainly 
needs time to solve a logical puzzle, but this type of time has no subjective meaning 
to the subject. Time spent by an individual to reason is not part of the logical 
reasoning process in classical logic, nor would time others spend to work out the 
same puzzle influence one’s own deduction. To solve the three-prisoner game, 
however, time must be considered as an inherent factor in the logical process. The 
correctness of the subject’s conclusion very much depends on how the duration of 
the other two prisoners’ thinking is perceived by himself. Lacan goes even further 
to isolate specifically “three evidential moments” in the three-prisoner game, 
“whose logical values prove to be different and of increasing order” (Lacan, 2006b, 
p.167). Nonetheless, are these moments authentic enough to sustain an entirely 
different logic that indeed makes use of one’s experience of time? To answer this 
question, we should put ourselves in the prisoner’s shoes and first consider all 
possible scenarios one might face in the test. Since there are three white disks and 
two black disks and only three out of five will be actually used, each prisoner 
should be prepared to see three possible combinations of disk colours when he 
opens his eyes at the beginning of the test: two blacks, one black and one white, or 
two whites.  
 
In the first scenario (S1), prisoner A sees two black disks, which immediately leads 
him to the absolute certainty that he is a white, given the impossibility of having 
three black disks. In this case, there is no time for comprehending and hesitation. 
The instant of the glance is conflated with the moment of concluding: “we see the 
instantaneousness of its evidence – its fulguration time, so to speak, being equal to 
zero” (Lacan, 2006b, p. 167). 
 
In the second scenario (S2), prisoner A sees one black and one white. The instant 
of the glance is no longer sufficient for A to reach a conclusion. He needs to make 
an “authentic hypothesis” of himself being a black, thus imaginarily recreating the 
first scenario for B, the one he sees with a white disk. In that scenario, B would 
have already left because he sees two black disks. Now A faces two possibilities: 
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Either the reality corresponds to his imagination, which confirms his hypothesis 
that he is a black; or B hasn’t moved, which enables A to refute his hypothesis and 
know he is a white without any question. Therefore, in S2, A’s reasoning can be 
summarised as follows: “were I a black, the one white that I see would waste no 
time realising that he is a white”. The time for comprehending this logical process 
will be manifested as a period of hesitation, and one’s conclusion depends on 
whether the prisoner he sees with a white disk has hesitated or not.  
 
In the third scenario (S3) which is the most complex situation, prisoner A sees two 
whites. A needs to hypothesise that he bears a black disk, thus imaginarily 
recreating the second scenario for B and C, in which both would have seen one 
black and one white. Therefore, in A’s imagination, B and C would reason 
according to S2 and should have already concluded. If in reality, they haven’t 
moved, A’s hypothesis can be refuted, and thus A can conclude that he is also a 
white. Lacan summarises the logical process in the third scenario as “were I a black, 
the two whites that I see would waste no time realising that they are white” (Lacan, 
2006b, p.168). However, this summary is not accurate enough, because even if B 
and C see A as a black, they still need a moment of hesitation to confirm each other 
that they are all whites. A better formulation, as I would suggest, is “were I a black, 
the two whites that I see would waste some time realising that they are white, but 
they would definitely not waste as much time as I have already wasted”. The fact 
that A needs to first assume that he is a black in order to start thinking what B and 
C are thinking whereas B and C don’t need to do so if they actually see A as a black 
will make A fall behind the other two, in the same way that B has got the jump on 
A in S2 if he does see A as a black: 
 
If his hypothesis is correct – if, that is, the two whites actually see a black 
– they do not have to make an assumption about it, and will thus precede 
him by the beat he misses in having to formulate this very hypothesis 




Therefore, if A completes his thinking and finds out that B and C haven’t moved, 
it would suggest that A hasn’t fallen behind thus confirming his identity as a white. 
In this case, the time for comprehending in S3 will still be manifested as a period 
of hesitation, but longer than in S2, and one’s conclusion depends on whether the 
other two have hesitated for the same amount of time as he has.  
 
Now we can go back to the original story, in which the warden places a white disk 
on each prisoner. As a result, every prisoner will find himself dealing with S3, and 
the fact that not one of them left first allows all of them to conclude that they are 
all whites. Equal duration of hesitation would suffice to convince them of this 
conclusion, which proves the experience of time as intrinsic to the whole logical 
process. So far, the solution Lacan presents appears to be solid, but a twist that 
follows complicates the situation, as Lacan goes on to point out the existence of 
the mysterious “second moment of hesitation”: 
 
If A, seeing B and C set off with him, wonders again whether they have not 
in fact seen that he is black, it suffices for him to stop and newly pose the 
question in order to answer it. For he sees that they too stop: since each 
of them is really in the same situation as him (Lacan, 2006b, p.164). 
 
Assuredly, but logical progress must have been made in the interim. For 
this time A can draw but one unequivocal conclusion from the common 
cessation of movement: had he been a black, B and C absolutely should 
not have stopped. Their hesitating a second time in concluding that they 
are whites would be ruled out at this point: Indeed, a single hesitation 
suffices for them to demonstrate to each other that certainly neither of 
them is a black. Thus, if B and C have halted again, A can only be a white. 
Which is to say that this time the three subjects are confirmed in a 
certainty permitting of no further doubt or objection (Lacan, 2006b, p.165). 
 
As Lacan explains, the reason for three prisoners to hesitate again after they all set 
off at the same time is that each of them will start to doubt whether the other 
prisoners move because they have completed the same logical process as he has, 
or because they see him as a black. However, based on our discussion, there is no 
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sufficient reason to support this doubt, for if the other two prisoners do see A as a 
black, they would only need to deal with S2 rather than S3. Therefore, they should 
have already left when A is still thinking. In this case, the last thing A would do is 
to hesitate again since both B and C are moving ahead of him. So why would A 
suddenly worry about something he has no reason to worry? Is this really an 
authentic temporal experience required by the logical process? Examining some 
explanations provided by secondary sources fails to generate a satisfactory answer. 
For example, Alexander Williams suggests: 
 
Seeing the other two begin to move, A hesitates and pauses for a moment, 
unsure about his decision. Why does he hesitate? Well, recall that A has 
based his conclusion on the fact that both B and C paused at the outset; 
his reasons for heading toward the door were thus based on B and C 
remaining stationary. In other words, when they cease to be stationary his 
reasoning loses its basis (Williams, 2013, p. 183). 
 
This explanation fails because it is built upon a false assumption of the reason A 
makes his move. In S3, A bases his conclusion not “on the fact that both B and C 
paused at the outset”, but on how long they have paused. Hence, when B and C 
cease to be stationary the moment A starts moving, A’s reasoning will not lose its 
basis, but rather be reinforced. Lacan has made this point quite clear, that it is not 
the others’ departure, but rather their waiting in relation to the following departure 
that determines the subject’s judgment. Ironically, by suggesting that the 
movement of B and C has the same significance for A whenever it happens, 
Williams makes a mistake which is precisely the one Lacan tries to avoid in the 
“Logical Time” essay, that is, depriving the logical process of the temporal 
experience and regarding human behaviour as signs with fixed meaning rather 
than signifiers that can only be interpreted in relation to other signifiers.  
 
The second moment of hesitation has been commonly read as a necessary 
requirement for the objectification/de-subjectification of the certainty prisoners 
acquire from the first hesitation, so that “in the end the conclusion is no longer 
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grounded on anything but completely objectified temporal instances” (Lacan, 
2006b, p.171). To Bruce Fink, without the second hesitation, the prisoner’s certainty 
of the colour of his disk cannot be transformed into the truth about what the colour 
really is: “Subjective certainty already exists at the moment of concluding, but its 
status as objective truth has in no sense yet been ascertained” (Fink, 1996a, p.379). 
Similarly, Derek Hook regards the second moment of hesitation as a solution to the 
indecision caused by the other prisoners’ gestures: “If each of the three rises at the 
same time, how are they to interpret the reactions of the other prisoners? The 
meaning of the actions of their fellow prisoners permits for more than one 
explanation. They will each need to ask themselves whether the other prisoners 
have arrived at the same logical conclusion as they have, or whether they stood up 
simply because they saw a black disk?” (Hook, 2013, p.16). However, this account of 
reasoning, whose similar versions can be found in almost every reading of the 
“Logical Time” essay, does not stand up to scrutiny. My examination has shown that 
the fact that others have not moved earlier than me is the only proof a prisoner needs 
to ascertain his decision, the ground of which is not the first hesitation of other 
prisoners but the duration of that hesitation. So, what does this second moment of 
hesitation tell us, if it is merely a redundant moment that undermines rather than 
supports logical time? 
 
1.2 Time against Logic 
Among various readings of “Logical Time”, Alain Badiou has provided an 
interpretation that is both theoretically novel and logically convincing. In his 
seminars in the 1970s, Alain Badiou devoted two successive sessions to discussing 
“Logical Time” in relation to what he called “subjectivisation and subjective 
process”. His attitude towards Lacan’s own solution is critical, as he argues that in 
order to contain the “asymptotic effects of time”, including suspension, 
anticipation and retroaction as Lacan describes in the solution to the three-
prisoner game, “something else would actually be needed than the axioms with 
which Lacan regulates his game” (Badiou, 2009, p.252). In other words, either there 
are some other preliminary conditions which Lacan fails to tell the reader, or these 
temporal effects do not exist at all. To support this argument, Badiou distinguishes 
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three reasonings in terms of the length - R1 for comprehending S1, R2 for 
comprehending S2 and R3 for comprehending S3 – so that they will constitute a 
chain of inclusion. R1 is contained within R2 and R2 is contained within R3. For 
example, when A sees two whites, he will accomplish R3 by presuming himself as 
a black so that B and C in his imagination will accomplish R2. This makes it clear 
that R3 requires more time to process than R2 since R2 is an internal piece of R3. 
After the work of periodisation, it cannot be more obvious that three prisoners will 
simultaneously leave with absolute certainty that they are all whites after 
reasoning out R3 if they are indeed logical subjects and reasoning in an identical 
way. In this case, as Badiou says, “there is neither anticipation nor retroaction” 
(Badiou, 2009, p.254), and certainly no need for the second moment of hesitation. 
More importantly, there appears to be no space for subjectivity in this scenario, as 
three prisoners can be easily substituted by three logical machines which follow 
prefigured R1, R2 or R3 strictly and the logical process can still be unfolded in the 
same way with the same result. Time becomes a fixed variable and intersubjectivity 
is replaced by a simple replication of artificial intelligence: “by granting too much 
to the algebra, there ends up being no more place for the outplace nor any time for 
the outtime” (ibid., p.253). 
 
To avoid this possibility, Badiou suggests that “the differential heterogeneity of the 
other” must be reintroduced into the three-prisoner game. In Lacan’s original 
account, three prisoners are equally intelligent, which is the fundamental premise 
of the logical game. Why do we need this setting to make the three-prisoner game 
work? In Seminar II, when an audience confronts Lacan with this problem, he 
replies that “the problem is only interesting if you assume the times for 
understanding to be equal. If the times for understanding are unequal, not only is 
it an uninteresting problem, but you will see how complicated it gets” (Lacan, 
1988b, p.290). However, the presupposition that there is “an absolute reciprocity, 
a strict logical identity between the three prisoners” (Badiou, 2009, p.251) puts 
every prisoner in a mechanical routine where no temporal experience is needed. 
The other cannot be a pure reflection of the subject. The fact that the other could 
and should be qualitatively heterogeneous to me indicates the existence of a 
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different type of interpersonal network that Badiou terms “topology”. In “Logical 
Time”, each prisoner is a subject and thus is entitled to recognise the heterogeneity 
of the other and take the possibility “that there are different ‘speeds’ of reasoning” 
(Badiou, 2009, p.254) into account. In this case, Badiou is able to defend Lacan’s 
idea that there exists a second moment of hesitation: the moment A starts moving 
and sees that B and C are doing the same thing, an idea emerges in his head which 
forces him to stop: “what if B and C are knuckleheads?” To be more specific, what 
if they do not think as quickly as I do, and thus spend the time I accomplish R3 
only accomplishing R2? So maybe they do see me as a black, despite our moving at 
the same time. This thought would indeed lead another hesitation, for if B and C 
also hesitate, it means that they are equally intelligent and now share the same 
doubt with me; if they continue moving without hesitation, it means that they are 
knuckleheads who have just accomplished R2. Therefore, A must change his 
conclusion and catch up with them.  
 
However, this solution is still problematic, since there is no reason to assume that 
A’s idea that others may reckon at a different speed will only emerge after he starts 
moving. In fact, Badiou admits that “(this difference of intellectual force) must 
structure the entire field from the start, as the necessary concept of the subject” 
(Badiou, 2009, p.255), yet this new assumption has some serious consequences that 
make the three-prisoner game almost unsolvable. In the “Logical Time” essay, the 
idea that certainty can only be achieved through an anticipatory act is the central 
point Lacan seeks to make, but the way he explains it is overall confusing. Do three 
prisoners hurry up because only the first person who reaches the exit will be given 
freedom? Lacan’s answer is no, as he claims that “it is thus not because of some 
dramatic contingency, the seriousness of the stakes, or the competitiveness of the 
game, that time presses; it is owing to the urgency of the logical movement that 
the subject precipitates both his judgment and his departure” (Lacan, 2006b, p.169). 
The so-called “urgency of the logical movement” is placed by Lacan in the moment 
of concluding, but it is not after obtaining certainty that the subject acts in a hurry 
in order to beat out other subjects. Instead, the subject worries that he may never 
arrive at the conclusion: “if, on the contrary, he let the others precede him and, in 
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so doing, convince him that he is a black, he cannot doubt whether he has grasped 
the moment of concluding precisely because he has not subjectively appropriated 
it” (Lacan, 2006b, p.171). We can cite the syllogism Lacan uses to conclude the essay, 
which explains the same point in a more succinct way: “I declare myself to be a 
man for fear of being convinced by men that I am not a man” (ibid., p.174). But 
why? On the one hand, on the basis of the homogeneity between subjects Lacan 
has insisted on throughout the essay, if no one is smarter or more stupid than the 
other, the possibility that “others may precede me” simply does not exist; On the 
other hand, according to the heterogeneity between subjects Badiou has 
introduced, even if others have preceded A, it cannot convince him that he is a 
black. For the same reason as in A’s second moment of hesitation later, he is 
entitled to doubt now: “Do B and C move earlier because they only need to 
accomplish R2, or because they are smarter than me thus spending less time 
accomplishing R3?” 
 
A does not have enough information to eliminate this doubt and arrive at a 
conclusion. If the difference of the temporal length used to be the only standard 
that separated R1, R2 and R3, then the introduction of the possible “qualitative 
difference” of intellectuality would easily blur the boundary between them and 
thus collapse all the logical articulation a subject can possibly make. In an 
extremely ridiculous but logically possible scenario, seeing that others have 
hesitated, A cannot even rule out the possibility of R1. It is true that if one person 
sees two black, he should immediately leave without hesitation, but what if they 
are so stupid that they cannot even work out this easiest puzzle? 
 
How could I have, since the extent of my difference from the other, 
topologically constituted, does not fall under any stable temporal measure 
and always leave me guessing when it comes to knowing whether the 
supposed knucklehead may not be about to get lost in the most 




Therefore, Badiou is forced to make the only possible conclusion his premises have 
permitted: 
 
During the first moment of my reasoning suspense, no conviction 
regarding the different forces involved serves any purpose, for lack of 
falling under some reasonable calculation of its inscription in duration. 
(emphasis added) (ibid.) 
 
It turns out that the first moment of hesitation after every prisoner opened his eyes 
has no meaning for each other. Badiou’s introduction of the immanent topology 
logically nullifies any attempt to think what the other is thinking or to project one’s 
own thinking onto his opponents. The meaning of the other’s stillness or movement 
can be interpreted in infinite ways. The belief that they are thinking exactly what I 
suppose them to think leads me to the certainty that is built upon an illusion rather 
than logic. The time for comprehending is indeterminate not only for an outsider 
but for an insider as well. In Badiou’s version of the three-prisoner game, each 
subject faces the other whose thought and desire are incomprehensible and 
unrecognisable, whose subjectivity cannot be assimilated by the process of 
identification. It is precisely in this case that time can be experienced. The subject 
knows that the “right moment” for him to make the conclusion will never come. 
The game designed by the warden, the big Other, may contain a line of reasoning, 
but this reasoning will never work for the subject. The more time he wastes on 
speculation and doubt, the less likely he will subjectively grasp the answer. Having 
realised that, the subject hastens to move, not because, as Lacan suggests, that 
others who precede him will convince him that he is a black, an explanation that is 
still trapped by one’s own imaginary projection and introjection. Instead, the act of 
moving is a radical break with the line of reasoning prefigured by the Other, “for 
the simple reason that being the first to exit is the only real that matters. The act 
takes precedence over the reasoning” (ibid., p.257). 
 
At first glance, the temporal experience of haste and anticipation Badiou has 
articulated is not fundamentally different from what Lacan intends to say despite 
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some nuances. By hastening to the exit, the act of the subject precedes the line of 
reasoning that should have led him to his certainty. As Dominiek Hoens and Ed 
Pluth comment, “according to Badiou, Lacan’s text tries to make the right point 
about the act - it should possess an anticipatory certitude - but it does not set about 
doing so correctly… Despite this difference between Badiou and Lacan, they both 
want to stress the same point: anticipatory certitude is a hallmark of this type of 
act” (Pluth & Hoens, 2004, p.185). Both of them appear to subvert the linear 
causality of the classical logic that runs from the premise X to the conclusion Y by 
jumping directly to Y as a symbolic declaration of subjectivity. However, a careful 
reading would suggest otherwise. It is true that Lacan has said that “what makes 
this act (the act of concluding) so remarkable in the subjective assertion 
demonstrated by the sophism is that it anticipates its own certainty owing to the 
temporal tension with which it is subjectively charged” (Lacan, 2006b, p.171), but 
the reader should not make a judgment so hasty as Lacan’s writing continues: 
 
And that, based on this very anticipation, its certainty is verified in a 
logical precipitation that is determined by the discharge of this tension - 
so that in the end the conclusion is no longer grounded on anything but 
completely objectified temporal instance, and the assertion is 
desubjectified to the utmost. 
 
As we can see, the prisoner in Lacan’s original account not only anticipates the 
conclusion but more importantly, he also anticipates the subsequent retrospective 
verification which will ultimately objectify his conclusion. Here we shall 
reformulate prisoner A’s thinking at the moment of concluding to make this point 
clear: “I must move now, because if I don’t move and let B and C precede me, I will 
be convinced by them that I am a black, which may be wrong; but if I move now 
without being one hundred percent sure that I am a white, don’t worry, I will get a 
second chance to verify my conclusion later.” As a result, all three prisoners start 
moving with the belief that “I may be uncertain about my conclusion now but I will 
definitely be certain later”, as the second moment of hesitation “will have it 
confirmed without fail if it was correct, rectified - perhaps - if it was erroneous” 
(Lacan, 2006b, p.171). But an authentic act of anticipation, as I would argue, involves 
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the imaginary actualisation of some future possibilities, the belief that a certain 
event will take place without knowing for sure. It is the other side of such an 
anticipation that makes it a mark of subjectivity, that is, the courage to take the risk 
when the future possibilities turn out to be impossible, when the subject confronts 
something unanticipated and unanticipatable in the future. Judging by this 
standard, the apparent anticipated certainty in “Logical Time” is a pseudo-
anticipation at most, or rather the certainty of a will-be-retrospectively-verified 
anticipation that involves no risk at all. In the context where subjects are 
homogeneous, prisoners act as if they have experienced a sense of haste which in 
fact is only their fantasies of time; they simultaneously run to the exit thinking the 
certainty they have ascertained is an achievement of subjectivity, which in fact is 
only the result of a mechanic articulation, the same result that will be deduced 
every time the test runs.  
 
In his analysis of the “Logical Time” essay, Adrian Johnston is correct to point out 
that these temporal instances Lacan presents only reflect a false time: “a staged time 
in which the diachronic unfolding of crucial moments is immanent to the 
synchronic script of the Grand Autre” (A. Johnston, 2005, p. 33). In Žižek’s famous 
example, the “close door” button in the elevator provides the same false 
consciousness of time as we witness in “Logical Time”: By pushing the button, 
individuals gets the impression that they are somehow making a subjective 
contribution to the speed of the elevator journey, that they are “making things 
happen” rather than “letting things happen”, whereas in fact the door closes in the 
same time as when individuals only press the floor button (Žižek, 2013, p.259). What 
appears to be a moment of urgency turns out to be always-already encoded in the 
logical script prefigured by the big Other. 
 
The experience of haste and anticipation in Badiou’s version of the three-prisoner 
game where subjects are heterogeneous, on the other hand, is different. In Badiou’s 
analysis, a prisoner may leave “without giving any thought to the qualitative 
difference of the other” (Badiou, 2009, p.257). In this case, by reasoning according 
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to R1, R2 or R3, the subject falls into a subjective process in which “I no doubt 
subjectivise but purely according to the effect of a stiffened and lifeless algebra” 
(ibid.). In so doing, the prisoner surrenders himself to the symbolic rules given in 
advance by the warden, from whom he seeks for recognition and begs for freedom. 
But there is another option, which confers the contrary, more radical type of ethical 
attitude: the subject abandons the line of reasoning that he is supposed to follow, 
thus making his own decision about whom he is without even attempting to reach 
an objectively grounded certainty. After all, why must the subject first make an 
assumption that he is a black only to imaginarily construct an “easier” scenario for 
others which in turn leaves himself at a disadvantaged position?1 The belief that I 
must think of myself as a black and others must think in the same way is an illogical 
premise that makes all the following logical articulation possible.2 Having realised 
                                                          
1  Bruce Fink explains that such an hypothesis “reflects Lacan’s early notion of 
underlying paranoia at the root of personality: the other two are alike, I must be 
different” (Fink, 1996a, p.364). Although its innocent intention to secure a 
psychoanalytic foundation for a logical assumption is appreciated, this explanation 
is untenable because even in S2 where a prisoner sees one black and one white, he 
is still supposed to assume that he is a black. In fact, by making this assumption 
which the other who really sees him as a black never needs to make, the subject 
completely gives away the possibility that he can win this game alone: either he is a 
black and loses, or he is lucky enough to be a white thus leaving together with others. 
But nothing can stop the reader from easily imagining a cleverer prisoner who does 
not put himself in such a vulnerable position. For example, seeing one black and 
one white, instead of waiting and making an abundant assumption, A immediately 
moves by reasoning in this way: “If B who I see as a white moves at the same time, I 
know that he must see two blacks so I can claim that I’m a black; If B sees one black 
and one white, he will play by the book and reason according to R2. In this case, my 
movement without hesitation must mislead him to think that I see him as a black, 
thus closing his reasoning process and propelling him to catch up with me as quickly 
as possible. Therefore, seeing him moving after me would be suffice for me to 
conclude that I am a white.” The obvious advantage of this superior line of reasoning 
is that A will never lose: either he is a black and leaves together with B, or he is a 
white and wins alone since the other white has been misled to believe that he is a 
black. 
  
2 Based on this reading, I oppose Bruce Fink’s association which links the logical 
reasoning of three prisoners to the effect of castration. By using a psychotic who 
bases his conclusion on the fact that others look at him in askance as a 
counterexample, Fink argues that “had he not already succumbed to the blow of 
castration, he would never have precipitated the conclusion that he was white” (Fink, 




that, the subject comes to the conclusion that it is not the symbolic, but the real 
that “defines the stake, that is, the subject itself qua free subject” (Badiou, 2009, 
p.256). The subject then moves in a hurry. This kind of haste, as Badiou makes it 
clear, “cannot be inferred from the symbolic”, but “is the mode in which the subject 
exceeds the latter by exposing itself to the real” (ibid.). 
 
In Lacan’s original account, the temporal experience of haste comes from a 
paranoiac imagination that others may leave before me and a fear “of being 
convinced by men that I am not a man”. Following Badiou’s interpretation, we come 
to see another experience of haste which is driven by the purest desire to win, as 
“victory belongs to the one who gains the upper hand by thinking on the go” (ibid., 
p.258). In contrast to the subjective process, the moment the subject acts by taking 
precedence over the reasoning is defined by Badiou as the moment of 
subjectivisation. Whereas the former is ultimately sustained by the law, the latter 
“designates the event of Truth that disrupts the closure of the hegemonic 
ideological domain and/or the existing social edifice (the Other of Being) ” (Žižek, 
2000, p.183). Truth mentioned here does not equal fact, which in the case of the 
three-prisoner game is the correct answer about the colour of the disk on the 
individual’s back that can only be confirmed by the warden as the Other. Truth 
instead indicates that the subject stands for its own desire and takes responsibility 
for its own choice. To put it bluntly, the prisoner may get the colour wrong. He may 
not be able to earn the freedom as a reward for his subordination to the law, but 
this is the risk a subject is willing to take when he anticipates the certainty by 
“exposing myself to the real without resorting to the immobile time of the law” 
(Badiou, 2009, p.258). Insofar as obtaining the correct answer requires the subject 
to desubjectify or even dehumanise himself to the extent that he must faithfully 
                                                          
psychoanalytically understood as a symbolic act which reveals the lack in the subject 
and thus sets its desire in motion, the line of reasoning a prisoner is supposed to 
follow is precisely the opposite of castration: by showing not the impossibility but 
the only possibility a person would grasp (“Assume that you are a black at the 
beginning!”), the so-called logical solution eliminates desires and dehumanises the 
subject by reducing him to a logical machine.   
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occupy a symbolic position assigned by the law, the freedom he is promised to have 
is only a pseudo-freedom that will continue to imprison the subject.  
 
With the distinction between the subjective process and the moment of 
subjectivisation, we are able to see that the only possible subjective experience of 
time, which Badiou does not directly discuss here but can nevertheless be derived 
from his reading, fails to match the one Lacan describes in “Logical Time”. Even 
though the same movement resulted from the same genuine belief that “I must 
seize this moment”, haste in Lacan’s original version is essentially a false 
consciousness of autonomy experienced by the subject who is sucked in by a logical 
procedure that works in its own way, whereas in Badiou’s case it reflects the 
subject’s free will to break with the rules altogether: “its subjectivising essence lies 
in this very interruption, by which the place, where the rule is deregulated, consists 
in destruction” (Badiou, 2009, p.259). In fact, the unresolvable, inherent conflict 
between logic and time revealed by Badiou’s reading leads us to reframe “logical 
time” as “time against logic”: either we have “logic without time”, since the final 
cause of the logical operation cannot be attributed to an agent of thought but is 
internal to the symbolic law; or we have “time without logic”, a time experienced 
by the subject who refuses to follow prefigured logical steps but instead defines its 
own moment of freedom. In either case, it is impossible for the prisoner, as Lacan 
indicates in his text, to paradoxically “subjectively desubjectify” oneself so that he 
can be subjectively true and objectively correct at the same time.  
 
1.3 Dual Temporality 
After a close textual analysis, we now find ourselves in an awkward situation: Our 
desire to develop a theory of time from an original text ends up with a refusal of the 
author’s argument. It seems that Lacan’s intention to integrate the subjective 
experience of time into classical logic turns out to be no more than a fantasy. One 
is compelled to ask: Does “Logical Time” simply fall short of the goal it intends to 
achieve and thus is no longer worth consideration when reviewing Lacan’s 
theorisation of time? Or is there any specific significance that can be grasped from 
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this unacknowledged contradiction embedded in Lacan’s text, which may still 
matter when we work through his other writings? Lacan’s own attitude is 
ambivalent. Despite the fact that in the early 1950s Lacan spoke highly of “Logical 
Time” for establishing “intersubjective logic and the time of the subject” as the new 
scientific foundation for psychoanalysis (Lacan, 2006j, p.239), the idea of 
“intersubjective logic” itself soon fell out of favour with Lacan, as he later privileged 
the symbolic over the imaginary, and thus became more sceptical about the idea of 
intersubjectivity which seems trapped by the Hegelian model of imaginary 
recognition. In fact, the tendency to periodise Lacan’s teaching – the early Lacan 
who focused on the elaboration of the Imaginary; the middle Lacan who was 
occupied with issues of the Symbolic; and the Late Lacan who shifted to the Real in 
the 1970s (Eyers, 2011b) – may lead many to believe that the “Logical Time” essay 
published in the 1940s only reflected Lacan’s “immature” thinking of time at that 
time. 3  However, I reject this convenient solution which attributes the inner 
                                                          
3 An illustrative example of this point can be found in Adrian Johnston (Johnston, 
2005). He claims that the 1940s emphasis on the logical genesis of the “I” through 
“Logical Time” should be read as a priori underpinning of “imaginary developments 
in Lacan’s thought – heralds the explicit glorification of the symbolic in the 
structuralist period of the 1950s” (p.35). He further suggests that Lacan gave up his 
original point of view in the eleventh seminar of 1964 by returning to the Freudian 
idea of the timeless unconscious: 
 
Eighteen years after the original argument, Lacan stealthily changes his 
tune on the significance of time in the prisoners’ dilemma. Whereas in 1946 
he erroneously asserts that his three logical times challenge the spatial 
simultaneity (“d’un seul coup”) of “classical logic,” in 1964 he transforms 
the necessary failure of this challenge into a conceptual virtue. In other 
words, the disc game is exemplary in demonstrating why the Freudian 
unconscious is timeless, why its apparently temporal unfolding is, in fact, 
an epiphenomenal effect dictated by structures that are out of joint with 
time (ibid., p.37).  
 
However, this theoretical break is not as clear as Johnston has claimed. Although 
there may be a difference in Lacan’s understanding of time derived from his writing 
at different times, we must also recognise the consistency: in Lacan’s later work, the 
idea of logical time has not been eliminated completely but continues to inform his 
thinking. For example, even Johnston himself has to admit the similarity between 
logical time and the late Lacan’s use of topology, which leads him to an awkward 
conclusion that “the late Lacan’s vision is similarly fooled by the imagery of 




contradiction of logical time to the slip of the author. This explanation 
oversimplifies Lacan’s complex view of time in this essay. As I will demonstrate in 
this section, there are sufficient reasons to believe that this contradiction is not 
accidental, but rather a sustained and cultivated one, an unresolved tension 
internal to time per se. In this sense, this slip should at least be understood as a 
Freudian slip, whose occurrence is symptomatic in the psychoanalytic sense. If the 
symptom is a compromise-formation between two trends in which both have found 
an incomplete expression, then Lacan’s “perfect solution” may equally be 
understood as a compromise between two unrepresentable temporal registers of 
which he is fully aware.   
 
To elaborate this argument, I go back to the “Logical Time” essay, whose ending 
has not yet been carefully examined. The last section of this essay is dedicated to 
the discussion of the possible implication of logical time, beginning with Lacan’s 
argument that the logical solution he puts forward which incorporates a temporal 
reference is appropriate to the psychoanalytic understanding of collectivity. 
Collectivity, according to Lacan, “is defined as a group formed by the reciprocal 
relations of a definite number of individuals” (Lacan, 2006b, p. 174). Here Lacan 
makes a reference to Freud’s “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” 
written in 1921, a key paper that shall be first reviewed in order to provide further 
grounds on which Lacan’s contribution can be made visible.  
 
The central question Freud put forward at the beginning of “Group Psychology” is 
the psychological function of the group, namely, how does a group “acquire the 
capacity for exercising such a decisive influence over the mental life of the 
individual? And what is the nature of the mental change which it forces upon the 
individual?” (Freud, 1921, p.72) Having observed the surprising fact that individuals 
in the group feel and act in quite a different way from what would be expected of 
individual psychology, Freud suggests that group psychology embraces “an 
                                                          
same river twice”, or because there is another reading of logical time implied by 
Lacan which escapes the reader’s attention? 
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immense number of separate issues” which individual psychology is inadequate to 
handle. Through his analysis of two artificial groups, the church and the army, 
Freud portrays a libidinal structure of groups in which the individual “gives up his 
ego ideal and substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader” (ibid., 
p.129) It is through identification as libidinal bonds that different individuals are 
able to unite together and have a share of the common emotional quality. However, 
does every individual go through this process in the same way? Freud has certainly 
realised this problem, as he quickly adds that “the prodigy is not equally great in 
every case. In many individuals, the separation between the ego and the ego ideal 
is not very far advanced.” But in so doing, Freud simply regards the heterogeneity 
between individual subjects as a difference-in-degree rather than a difference-in-
kind, which needs no further consideration. Since the group leader takes the place 
of the ego ideal for every individual in the same way, the psychological function of 
the group has been reduced to the psychological experience of the individual in a 
group setting, and further reduced to a pure analysis of the ego in which the 
actualised group is not necessarily required. To Freud, it is the ego, which is built 
upon identification with others in order to reexperience primary identification with 
one’s own image, that facilitates the transformation of an individual into a member 
of the group. Ironically, whereas Freud’s original intention is to investigate the 
overlooked field of group psychology, the paper ends up providing an elaboration 
of individual psychology that treats in-group phenomenon as the externalisation of 
one’s inner psychological mechanism. 
 
In many ways, collectivity in Lacan’s “Logical Time” can be seen as a continuation 
of Freud’s discussion. Even though Freud believes that the group setting can 
profoundly alter an individual’s mental activity (p. 88), the subjective experience of 
time as one type of mental activity is not covered within his vision. Lacan goes a 
step further by arguing that for an “I” to be situated in relation to others in a group, 
a certain time of comprehending is required, “which proves to be an essential 
function of the logical relationship of reciprocity” (Lacan, 2006b, p. 173). In order 
to reach a collective certainty, subjective experience of time must be objectified so 
that his conclusion can be as solid as a rock. Whereas Freud’s group is a collective 
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homogeneity, a multiplicity of single relations, where interpersonal difference has 
been eliminated or repressed, the three-prisoner group presented by Lacan is not 
much different. One’s temporal experience in its essence is individually unique, but 
in this specific game, three prisoners are forced to experience hesitation, 
anticipation and haste in coordination at exactly the same time. The strict logical 
process does not tolerate separate temporal experiences but organises them into a 
single time-unconsciousness that is unknown to prisoners but nevertheless 
determines their behaviour. However, this is not Lacan’s final consideration of 
logical time. The ending sentence introduces a nuance that many have apparently 
missed: 
 
This movement provides the logical form of all “human” assimilation, 
precisely insofar as it posits itself as assimilative of a barbarism, but it 
nonetheless reserves the essential determination of the “I” (Lacan, 2006b, 
p.174). 
 
If “the logical form of all human assimilation” can still be understood as the logical 
requirement of de-subjectivisation, which is associated with a barbarism in terms 
of the primal horde used by Freud in “Group Psychology” as the archetype of 
modern group formation, then how shall we make sense of the final twist, in which 
the essential determination comes from the singular “I”? Meanwhile, what does 
Lacan mean in the footnote to this sentence, where he says that “the collective is 
nothing but the subject of the individual”? Is this merely a repetition of Freud’s 
reduction of group psychology to individual psychology, or a confirmation of 
individual specificity that is impossible to be homogenized in the collective? 
Following Jacques-Alain Miller’s interpretation, I accept the second possibility that 
maintains Lacan’s distinction between subject and individual: 
 
This is Freudian. This is Lacan’s reading of the Freudian text. The 
individual is not the subjective. The subject is not the individual, is not at 
the level of the individual. What is individual, is a body, is an ego. The 
subject-effect which is produced through it and which disturbs its 
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functions, is articulated with the Other, the big Other. It is this that is 
called the collective or the social (Miller, 2000, p.3). 
 
The subject is indeed not an ego. According to Lacan’s theory, whereas the ego is 
born out of a mirror image misrecognised as the unity of the body and thus 
maintains an illusion of sameness between the self and the other through 
imaginary identification, the subject, on the other hand, is split “between an 
ineluctably false sense of self and the automatic function of language in the 
unconscious” (Fink, 1996b, p.45). What Lacan calls “the ontological form of anxiety” 
(Lacan, 2006b, p.169) is intrinsic to subjectivity as the subject must constantly 
confront radical otherness both outside and within itself. By defining the collective 
not as “the ego of the individual” but as “the subject of the individual”, Lacan has 
dramatically advanced Freud’s notion of collectivity, which is no longer situated at 
the imaginary level but at the symbolic level. Such an essential difference might 
have already been implied by examples they use. Whereas Freud is fascinated by 
the group organised around a leading figure as an object of identification, be it 
actual in the case of the army, or imaginary in the case of the church, Lacan’s group 
is constituted exclusively by symbolic rules – the rules of the game. The three-
prisoner game is determined by the possible combinations of different signifiers 
(the white disk and the black disk), under the control of the Other with which the 
subject cannot imaginarily identify. Moreover, by concluding his work of collective 
logic, paradoxically, with the essential determination of the “I”, “Lacan returns each 
one to his loneliness as a subject, to the relation that each one has with the master-
signifier of the Ideal beneath which he places himself. In the very moment when 
Lacan institutes a collective formation his first words are to dissociate, and bring 
forward the subjective loneliness” (Miller, 2000, p.4). This “subjective loneliness”, 
which emerges from one’s encounter with the symbolic Other and cannot be 
possibly covered up by one’s feeling of togetherness with reflective others, 
dovetails perfectly with the radical experience of time Badiou has articulated, when 
the subject decides to expose himself to the real without resorting to the time of 




This new knowledge brings us to a possible response to the popular critique of the 
“Logical Time” essay, which accuses it of assuming an absolute reciprocity between 
the self and the other. One should ask: has Lacan not already deconstructed this 
assumption by himself with this unexpected ending, as a typical Lacanian 
punctuation that fixes the constant flow of signifiers, retrospectively renews the 
meaning of the sequence of words before and upsets the reader’s anticipation of 
“what this text should be like”? By privileging the determination of the “I” at the 
end of his essay as his last word on this issue, Lacan changes the meaning of his 
previous narrative within the same horizon. In his analysis of fantasy, Žižek makes 
an important distinction between two types of intersubjectivity in Lacan’s writing, 
each belonging to a different period. The early Lacan is said to insist on imaginary 
intersubjectivity which reproduces the Hegelian-Kojevian mode of the struggle for 
recognition, “of the dialectical connection between recognition of desire and desire 
for recognition” (Žižek, 1999, p. 194). The late Lacan, however, replaces this idea 
with radical intersubjectivity as the relation between the subject and the Other in 
the symbolic field. Instead of identifying the desire of the other in fantasy as the 
subject’s own, the subject is now confronted with “the enigma of the impenetrable 
desire of the Other, epitomized in the phrase Che Vuoi? (What do you want?)” 
(ibid.). Žižek’s analysis is insightful, but his periodisation appears to be a little hasty. 
As we have seen in “Logical Time”, two types of intersubjectivity may have already 
co-existed in Lacan’s early writing. Not only does the prisoner encounter other 
prisoners in terms of identification, that is, putting himself in the position of the 
other and seeing this other as his pure reflection, but he also encounters the Other 
at a different level. Being forced to participate in the game, the subject finds itself 
captured by a complex network of signifiers whose logic of time is beyond its 
apprehension. More importantly, it is precisely the traumatic encounter with the 
Symbolic Other that makes one’s imaginary construction of one’s encounter with 
the other necessary. The false consciousness of time shared by all subjects in the 
game thus can be understood: It is indeed a fantasy of time, a fantasy, as Žižek has 
suggested, that “provides him with an answer to this enigma – at its most 




Having extensively examined “Logical Time” and the confusing way in which Lacan 
discusses time, I present Lacan’s explanation of the three-prisoner game as a 
narrative with rich meaning and multiple layers that must not be taken at face 
value. What Lacan says literally is troubled and disrupted by the unsaid and the 
not yet said. Previous readings we have reviewed, which either genuinely believe 
that Lacan has elaborated a logic of time, or totally dismiss this work by arguing 
that ‘Lacan falls prey to a perspectival illusion” (Johnston, 2005, p.35), or radically 
subvert Lacan’s solution by positing a different dimension of time experienced by 
the free subject, all partially make sense but are no longer sufficient for us to grasp 
the whole picture in which Lacan struggles to maintain a temporal tension. This 
temporal tension, I argue, is not between individuals who experience time 
differently, nor is it an iteration of the philosophical debate between objective time 
(chronological time) which is out there in the world on the one hand, and 
subjective time through which we directly experience ourselves as being and 
becoming on the other. It is the tension between two different temporal registers 
out of sync with each other, which I would name respectively as “Real time” and 
“Symbolic time”. The contradiction embedded in Lacan’s “perfect solution” reflects 
the irreconcilability between these two temporal registers: Real time does not 
subordinate to the symbolic order or the logical articulation, but creates a founding 
moment for the subject that disrupts the rule; Symbolic time, on the other hand, 
is a temporal order entirely deprived of subjectivity. It has its own logic that 
captures the subject without being fully comprehended by the latter. The subject 
we witness in the three-prisoner game, therefore, is split between these two times: 
He is too afraid to have his own moment of subjectivisation in Real time, as the 
warden’s recognition has been taken as the sole criteria for evaluating his existence; 
meanwhile, he faces the danger of remaining indecisive forever, since the “right 
moment” in Symbolic time always eludes his apprehension. As a result, the choice 
he makes is imaginary in its essence which contains both the illusion of absolute 
reciprocity and the fantasy of anticipated certainty. It is “the imaginary exit from 
the master’s prison in accordance with certain scansions, with a certain timing” 




The idea of dual temporality I put forward is not only the result of an 
unconventional reading of the “Logical Time” essay. Several lines of continuity can 
be traced between this idea and the way Lacan understands time in his other 
writings. Lacan’s 1954-1955 seminar on Freud’s psychoanalytic technique contains 
a similar idea. In response to the privileging of the rationality of scientific method 
as well as the increasing scientification of human interaction, Lacan provides a 
critique of the contemporary attempt to decipher the secret of “the great clock of 
nature”, which is “one of the most decisive steps in the constitution of exact science” 
(Lacan, 1988b, p.298). To Lacan, the great clock is devoid of subjective meaning 
but keeps man in check: 
 
From the moment man thinks that the great clock of nature turns all by 
itself, and continues to mark the hour even when he isn't there, the order 
of science is born. The order of science hangs on the following, that in 
officiating over nature, man has become its officious servant. He will not 
rule over it, except by obeying it. And like the slave, he tries to make the 
master dependent on him by serving him well (ibid.). 
 
In the course of refuting the exact science within a broadly cybernetic framework, 
Lacan recreates a scenario familiar to the reader of the “Logical Time” essay. The 
master-slave relationship between the great clock of nature and man clearly 
resembles the relationship between the warden as the representative of the 
symbolic law and the prisoner whose desperate attempt to find his own secret in 
the Other ends in vain. However, rather than resorting to an imaginary solution, 
here Lacan points out what remains unsaid in “Logical Time”: Symbolic time 
cannot fully account for subjectivity. “Man must have his clock, his watch.” (Ibid.) 
The completion of the subjective process does not take the form of an 
individualised assertion of anticipated certainty at the moment of concluding, but 
becomes “the encounter of two times in nature.” Although the determinist effect 
of the symbolic order on subject formation – “My loved one always makes the 
rendezvous, because when she doesn’t come, I no longer call her my loved one” – 
forces man to synchronise his watch with the great clock in order to show up on 
time, Lacan nevertheless challenges this fantasmatic “exactitude” by asking “is it 
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man who is on time?” In other words, does man who submits his Real time to the 
rule of Symbolic time continue to be man, or, as the prisoners in “Logical Time”, 
become a part of the symbolic mechanism in the guise of pseudo-subjectivity? In 
fact, the primary aim of Lacan’s idea of dual temporality is precisely to keep the 
minimal gap between man’s own watch and the great clock open, to make one 
either come too early or too late for the rendezvous, and to withhold a possibility 
of breaking away from the subjective process in pursuit of a moment of 
subjectivisation.  
 
Seminar II is not the only place where the idea of dual temporality has been made 
clear, further evidence can be found in Seminar XI, where Lacan makes use of the 
Aristotelian division between tuché and automaton to further elaborate 
psychoanalytic causality. In Aristotle’s usage, tuché means “chance modelled on 
human/natural intentionality”. It only applies to a restricted domain of events 
affected by an agent “capable of choosing”. By contrast, automaton applies “to the 
animals other than man and to…inanimate objects.” According to Mark Hansen’s 
explanation, Aristotle’s automaton lacks a “purpose-in-itself”. Therefore it is 
opaque to thought and can only be rendered meaningful through mediation 
carried by an intentional agent (Hansen, 2000, p.99). By way of analogy, Lacan 
imbues these philosophical terms with psychoanalytic meaning. Tuché, as “the 
encounter with the real” (Lacan, 1998, p.53), denotes a disruptive moment in the 
subject’s life when he is fully living-in-the-now by leaving behind both his reliance 
on the past and his expectation of the future. On the other hand, Lacan’s 
interpretation of automaton as “the return, the coming-back, the insistence of the 
signs” (ibid., p.54) inherits Aristotle’s idea of para physin (“contrary to nature”, a 
radical break with the model of internal meaning). It designates the temporal 
movement of the signifier within the network of the signifying chain through 
which the subject is constituted. Once again, old contents have been given new 
forms. The idea of dual temporality is fully in bloom here. Lacan not only reaffirms 
the existence of two different temporal registers but also adds some nuances to this 
logic. If the idea of “two clocks” in Seminar II demonstrates the impossibility of 
living in synch with Symbolic time, Lacan in Seminar XI highlights another 
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impossibility, that is to experience Real time without any reference to the great 
clock: “The function of the tuché, of the real as encounter – the encounter in so far 
as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter” (ibid., p.55). 
Only the after-effect of this encounter can be experienced by the subject. Like the 
prisoner in “Logical Time”, he is destined to miss the moment of subjectivisation 
because this moment has always-already been retrospectively assimilated by the 
subjective process. 
 
To conclude, the aim of this chapter is not only to provide a novel reading of 
“Logical Time”, but uses this reading as a starting-point that leads to further 
exploration of Lacan’s understanding of time in different directions. My analysis 
departs from many secondary resources that accept Lacan’s “perfect solution” as a 
logical description of the way time is perceived interpersonally. On the contrary, 
enlightened by Badiou’s reading, I argue that the experience of hesitation, haste or 
anticipation presented by Lacan is illogical, and should be regarded as an 
imaginary construction which covers the unresolved tension between two different 
temporal registers. Time is not unitary as the “Logical time” essay appears to 
suggest, which arranges various temporal experiences (the instant of the glance, 
the time for comprehending, and the moment of concluding) in a linear sequence. 
The fact that time can often be experienced as a loss of simultaneity in the sense 
of “too early” or “too late” implies the existence of two temporal registers that 
conflict with each other. My examination of Lacan’s idea of “two clocks” in Seminar 
II and his distinction between tuché and automaton in Seminar XI further proves 
that the idea of dual temporality remains critical in Lacan’s theoretical 
development. In the following chapters of my thesis, I will analyse these two 
temporal registers respectively and explain how the idea of dual temporality 




2. Real Time 
 
Having deduced the existence of two temporal registers in Lacan’s “Logical Time” 
essay, both of which, through their relations with the Imaginary, become essential 
for generating the prisoner’s temporal experience, I will now start to investigate 
them separately. This chapter will focus on the nature of the moment of 
subjectivisation (tuché), when the individual is freed from the temporal constraint 
in accordance with “the great clock of nature” and looks for a time of his own. What 
does the individual’s “own watch” tell him, and how does it constitute a 
fundamental layer of his temporal experience? I suggest that we can answer this 
question by extracting a distinctive temporal register from Lacan’s writings, which 
I call “Real time”. 
 
Speaking of “Real time”, I have no intention to invoke the idea of “objective time”, 
namely time flowing independently from the human subject and measured by 
watch, clock or calendar. Real time is not a measurement of reality, since in Lacan’s 
vocabulary, reality as the product of mental representations is the opposite of the 
Real. The Real, as part of Lacan’s Symbolic-Real-Imaginary triad, is crucial to the 
formation of the whole intrapsychic realm. It designates various ineffable and 
unnameable phenomena that resist both imaginary construction and 
symbolisation. In Lacan’s writings, imaginary antagonism, the material insistence 
of the signifier and the breakdown of meaning in psychosis have all been 
understood in terms of the Real (Eyers, 2011a). In this chapter, I restrict my analysis 
to the material substance of the Real, i.e., the Real body. The Real body is the 
cornerstone of Lacanian psychoanalysis, as Lacan once said: “For, of course, 
psychoanalysis involves the real of the body and the imaginary of its mental 
schema” (Lacan, 2001, p.230). Differentiated from the body as the object of natural 
science, the Real body stands for the mysterious “material metabolisms” deprived 
of mental representation, “which caused him (the subject) to come forth into this 
semblance of existence which is life” (Lacan, 1988b, p.283). It is a body that cannot 
be discursively constructed or fantasmatically projected. As a result, Real time in 
my thesis equals organismic time or bodily time. As I will show in the course of 
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this chapter, the idea that a temporal register originates not in the mind but in the 
body which passively processes excitations of various intensities is latent in 
Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis. In drawing upon those underdeveloped 
materials, I present Real time as a Lacanian metaphysics of bodily time. 
 
Although Lacan fails to provide a sustained discussion of the relationship between 
time and body, as most of his references to time are related to the movement of 
the signifying chain (which I will discuss in the next chapter), it does not mean 
that the temporal register I propose using this term to indicate cannot be detected 
in Lacan’s work, particularly in his reading of Freud’s metapsychology, where a 
psychoanalytic understanding of the body process is most comprehensively 
formulated. Therefore, I structure my discussion in this chapter by following 
Lacan’s project of “a return to Freud” (Lacan, 2006i, p.336). In the first section, 
against the mainstream opinion that regards Freud’s metapsychology as 
historically outdated and scientifically discredited, I explain why Freud’s theory of 
energetics is still valuable and how Lacan’s reinterpretation, by introducing the 
idea of the machine, makes it a legitimate theoretical construction. I suggest that 
we can find in Freud’s metapsychology the answer to a crucial problem in the 
philosophy of time. In the second section, I provide a novel reading of Freud’s 
Project from a philosophical perspective, primarily influenced by Kant’s theory of 
the three syntheses of time. Although I will not address the detail of Kant’s text, it 
will be used as a spur to reading Freud. Freud’s neurology introduces different 
systems of neurones that are shown to give rise to syntheses of the present, the 
past and the future. Unlike Kant’s theory that regards all syntheses of time as active 
syntheses conducted by the logical subject of thought, Freud’s work demonstrates 
how time is fundamentally synthesised by the organism through energy charge and 
discharge as part of the body process. In the next two sections, I discuss how Lacan 
criticises and develops Freud’s metaphysics of time in two aspects. On the one 
hand, Lacan identifies the problem of consciousness in the Freudian synthesis of 
the past. He rejects Freud’s attempt to reduce consciousness to a by-product of the 
ego’s active synthesis and puts forward the notion of the “consciousness without 
the ego” that accounts for the passive synthesis of the Real past; on the other hand, 
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while the future in Freud’s theory remains as an active representation of the mind, 
Lacan restores the power of synthesis to the body by reinventing the notion of the 
“death drive”. This passive synthesis of the Real future opposes the teleological 
view of time. It is not the anticipation but the return of the future that confirms all 
possible outcomes as the expression of subjectivity.  
 
2.1 From Freud’s Energetics to Lacan’s Body-Machine 
Among Freud’s various approaches to revealing the secrets of the human psyche, 
metapsychology is his most distinctive and controversial attempt. Freud’s 
metapsychology consists of three viewpoints: the dynamic, the topographic and 
the economic. Among them, the economic viewpoint is of exceptional importance. 
It is based on Freud’s theory of energetics, the most hypothetical part of 
metapsychology, which assumes the existence of certain psychic energy and 
regards psychical processes as the circulation and distribution of this energy. The 
other two viewpoints are built upon the economic: The dynamic viewpoint 
explains psychical phenomena in terms of the conflict and combination of forces, 
whose ultimate origin is psychic energy; while the topographic viewpoint provides 
a descriptive account of the differentiation of psychic systems through binding, 
transformation, discharge and cathexis of psychic energy. First appearing in his 
letters to Fliess, metapsychology was regarded by Freud as a scientific endeavour, 
which would transform metaphysics into a genuine science of the unconscious and 
legitimise psychoanalysis after all. From his early unpublished work the Project for 
a Scientific Psychology (1895) to his late overview of his career in An Outline of 
Psychoanalysis (1938), Freud remained confident about his metapsychology and 
his assumption that “as other natural sciences have led us to expect……in mental 
life some kind of energy is at work”, even though “we have nothing to go upon 
which will enable us to come nearer to a knowledge of it” (Freud, 1938, p.163).  
 
The scientific justification of metapsychology never arrived as Freud expected. 
Instead, in post-Freudian psychoanalysis, metapsychology, the economic 
viewpoint in particular, has been heavily reproached for its unfounded biologism. 
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Empirical data collected by contemporary biology has not supported the existence 
of psychic energy of the character described by Freud in the nervous system. As 
Breger claims: “the concepts of psychic energy, of libido, of conservation or 
economy, of the life and death instincts – has long been its weakest aspect” (Breger, 
1968, p.44). Objections to Freud’s metapsychological construction lead to two 
different solutions. One, as André Green has observed, is to discard these weak 
points and circuit the biological issues by other explanatory systems (object-
relations theory). Emphasis is then placed on object relations, intersubjectivity and 
the primacy of the other (Green, 2005, p.171). The other solution goes further in the 
direction of modern science and intends to implant the neurosciences as the 
authentically scientific guideline for psychoanalysis. However, in so doing, both 
solutions seem to overlook the potentially metaphysical implication of Freud’s 
metapsychology. If metapsychology fails to achieve the status of science, it does 
not mean that it cannot remain a valid metaphysical theory that still resonates with 
contemporary philosophical inquiries.  
 
At the core of metapsychology, Freud’s economic viewpoint has three basic 
functions. As Richard Boothby has summarised, the first function is of clinical 
value, which “conveys something essential about the subjective experience of the 
patient……affording a conceptualization of the lived experience of depression or 
mania, exhaustion or anxiety”; the second function is of theoretical value in the 
realm of psychoanalysis, which “provides a way of explaining the origin and 
function of excessively intense ideas”; in addition to these, it also has a function of 
philosophical value beyond psychoanalysis, which is an “even more fundamental 
dimension along which the energetic concept was indispensable for Freud's 
thinking: that in which psychoanalysis tries to theorize the relation of the psychical 
to the somatic, the relation of the mind to the body” (Boothby, 1996, p.345). By 
identifying two terminal points in our psyche, namely its bodily organ and our acts 
of consciousness, Freud intends to explore “everything that lies between (which) 
is unknown to us” (Freud, 1938, p.144). The idea of psychic energy is his tool to 
enter the discussion which, until then, had been only reserved to philosophical 
thought. Before Freud, the mind-body problem had been most famously addressed 
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by Descartes. Descartes argued that the mind and the body are separate substances 
with independent existence, but he also defined the mind or the soul as the 
primary substance of the human, while the human body, characterised as a 
biophysical mechanism, is only secondary to the mental substance. This substance 
dualism became the dominant approach to the mind-body problem for the next 
three centuries. However, by the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
advancement of natural science, including Darwin’s evolution theory, undermined 
this Cartesian model and changed the expression of human being in a body to “a 
primordial rather than an incidental and secondary feature of human existence and 
the expression of meaning” (Protevi, 2006, p.166).   
 
Against this background, it is hardly surprising to find that Freud is not a dualist 
as many would believe. From as early as the Project (1895), Freud refused to 
recognise the psyche as an independent substance. Influenced by Fechner’s 
panpsychism, which was popular during the late nineteenth century, Freud regards 
mind and body as two aspects of one and the same existent. However, neither 
Freud nor Lacan follows Fechner to “go a long way down the path of universal 
subjectivisation” (Lacan, 1988b, p.60). Unlike Fechner who believes that the same 
existent can be equally viewed from the psychical as from the physical perspective, 
Freud moves towards a physicalist viewpoint, arguing psychoanalysis should find 
“the true essence of what is psychical” in these somatic processes (Freud, 1938, 
p.157), not the other way around. The dramatic change from panpsychism to 
materialism is understandable in the context of the nineteenth century, as 
Macdougall explains: “(Early materialists) were concerned to show matter consists 
not merely of inert solid particles…But that it is rather endowed with intrinsic 
powers of activity, of which thought and feeling are special developments” 
(MacDougall, 1911, p.98). The obscurity of psychic energy is largely due to the 
impossible task it is expected to undertake. We can never locate psychic energy in 
specific organic cells and nerve-fibres, an attempt Freud recognised as doomed: 
“Every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in nerve-cells and of excitations as 
travelling along nerve-fibres, has miscarried completely” (Freud, 1915c, p.174), but 
at the same time it in some manner reproduces these psychical paths in “organic 
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elements of the nervous system” (Freud, 1905a, p.148) (emphasis is added). While 
its qualitative aspect cannot be clarified, the measurement of its quantitative 
aspect constitutes the psychic economy. After Freud, alternative psychoanalytic 
theories based on an interpersonal model may well explain relevant functions of 
the psyche without referring to the energetic framework, which they regard as 
pseudo-physiological residues, but they can hardly substitute for the missing link 
between the somatic and the mind, nor are they capable of having their own 
metapsychology to explain how the passive activity of the body gives rise to 
consciousness, and how the “raw” sensational matter recorded by the bodily organ 
is transformed into mental representation. In his famous essay “Facing up to the 
Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers nicely summarises the myth that has 
troubled philosophy, psychoanalysis and natural science up to today, under the 
name of “the hard problem of consciousness”: 
 
It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the 
question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is 
perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and 
auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: 
the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain 
why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to 
experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a 
physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. 
Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems 
objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does (Chalmers, 1995) 
(emphasis is added).  
 
Freud nowhere explains the why question, but it seems that after one hundred 
years, the energetic account Freud formulated in his Project for a Scientific 
Psychology (1895) and continued to insist on for the remainder of his life is still the 
most comprehensive answer psychoanalysis can give to the how question, since “it 
is not clear how referring to the object relation which, from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, consists essentially in demonstrating its unconscious modalities, 




In contrast to his Anglo-American colleagues, Lacan warmly embraces Freud’s 
theory of energetics. He remarks in his early work on paranoid psychosis that the 
idea of psychic energy is “the innovation of Freud……which provides a common 
measure to very diverse phenomena” (Boothby, 1991, p.49). Following his 
announcement of “returning to Freud” in 1953, he discusses the Freudian notions 
of consciousness, ego and death drive from an energetic perspective throughout 
Seminar II, including a detailed reading of the Project. His appreciation of the idea 
of psychic energy is clearly reflected in his comment that “Freud’s psycho-physical 
conception of the investments of the intra-organic systems is extremely ingenious 
at explaining what takes place in the individual” (Lacan, 1988b, p.45). Later in 
Seminar XI, Lacan puts the energetically based notion of drive among the “four 
fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis” and reconceptualises the body as a part 
of the Real, alongside the material insistence of the signifier. Although Lacan’s 
heavy use of linguistics and the way he constructs the unconscious as like language 
may leave the impression that Lacanian psychoanalysis overlooks the role of body 
and affect, the truth is that Freud’s theory of energetics is well preserved in Lacan’s 
work and enables Lacan to continue Freud’s exploration of the mind-body 
relationship.  
 
Lacan is fully aware of the post-Freudian critiques of Freud’s metapsychology. The 
first step he makes to save Freud from his fatal encounter with modern biology is 
to change the scientific ground on which we can think of psychic energy. Before 
turning to psychoanalysis, Lacan, during his medical apprentice years at the 
Hôpital Sainte-Anne, had already abandoned old-fashioned organicism, vitalism 
and constitutionalism in favour of a dynamic approach to madness. Therefore, he 
does not believe that the theory of energetics needs to seek approval from modern 
biology: “Freudian biology has nothing to do with biology” (Lacan, 1988b, p.75). By 
reducing the body to an object within the territory of scientific rationality, modern 
biology has diverged from psychoanalysis since the beginning:  
 
Biologists think that they devote themselves to the study of life. It’s not 
clear why. Until further notice, their fundamental concepts’ point of origin 
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has nothing to do with the phenomenon of life, which in its essence 
remains completely impenetrable (ibid., p.75). 
 
According to Lacan, the real aim of “Freudian biology” is not to reveal the secret of 
the phenomenon of life, which remains unthinkable in the domain of the Real, but 
to understand the body in terms of the machine. Although Freud’s work spurred 
on and implied this idea, he never went so far as to say that “compared to the animal, 
we are machines” (ibid., p.31). Lacan certainly does not believe that the body is a 
machine. He makes it very clear that “the question as to whether it [the machine] 
is human or not is obviously entirely settled – it isn’t”. However, he adds that 
“there’s also the question of knowing whether the human, in the sense in which you 
understand it, is as human as all that” (ibid., p.319). What Lacan insists is an 
“epistemological parallelism” that might help us find in the machine the answer to 
the problem of the body, so that we can explain the living organism in terms of 
mechanism and reinterpret Freud’s energetic principles as basic principles of 
physics that sustain the function of a machine. If “what Descartes is looking for in 
man is the clock” (ibid., p.74), then what Freud is looking for in man is the steam 
engine, a machine that balances energy input and output: “Let us call this 
regulation the restitutive function of the psychic organisation. At a very elementary 
level…Not only is there discharge, but withdrawal - which testifies to the still very 
primitive functioning of a principle of restitution, of equilibration of the machine” 
(ibid., p.60). To any objection that the idea of psychic energy cannot be given a 
biological meaning, Lacan’s answer would be that psychic energy is couched in an 
explicit mechanical framework:  
 
It is the machine that is at cause in the accumulation of any energy 
whatever, in this instance electric power, which can later be distributed 
and put at the service of consumers. What is accumulated in the machine 
has above all the strictest ratio with the machine. To say that the energy 
was already there in a virtual state in the current of the river does not 
advance us at all. It means, strictly speaking, nothing, because the energy, 
in this instance, only begins to interest us from the moment that it is 
accumulated, and it is only accumulated at the moment when machines 




Energy and machine are inextricably linked. On the one hand, a machine needs 
energy: “what could the desire of a machine be, except to restock on energy sources?” 
(Lacan, 1988b, p.54); on the other hand, circulations of energy require a machine as 
well: “Energy…is a notion which can only emerge once there are machines” (ibid., 
p.75). The concept of psychic energy now becomes a legitimate theoretical 
construction validated by the law of conservation of energy in physics. Applying 
this analogy to a broader context, Lacan later claims that Freud’s metapsychology 
in general is a mechanical theory: “Their economic/dynamic import can be 
illustrated by a comparison that is equivalent to its own reason: what a turbine, a 
machine that operates according to a chain of equations, brings to a natural 
waterfall in order to produce energy” (Lacan, 2006g, p.544). We shall notice that 
Lacan’s body-machine is not controlled by the mind or destined to be surpassed by 
the mind. Instead, it follows its own rules and functions from the very beginning, 
prior to the formation of self-consciousness. The body-machine leads us to the 
material bodily principles that transcend various individualised bodies. It is an 
organising centre of subjectivity which undermines the autonomy of selfhood 
through a passive, organismic manner. By introducing the machine as the essence 
of the body, which “goes much further in the direction of what we are in reality, 
further even than the people who build them suspect” (Lacan, 1988b, p.74), Lacan’s 
ontological transformation not only provides an epistemological approach to 
directly confront the body without eliminating the Real, it also consolidates the 
status of Freud’s theory of energetics as a genuine metaphysics to investigate the 
mind-body problem.  
 
After considering the controversy around Freud’s metapsychology, we can begin to 
understand it from a temporal perspective. If Freud’s metapsychology, in general, 
is an attempt to answer David Chalmers’ “hard problem” concerning the idea of 
consciousness, then in terms of the nature and meaning of time, we once again 
confront a variant of this problem, which I will call “the hard problem of temporal 
consciousness”: It is clear that the organism is in constant flux, experiencing 
changes in both the external and internal environments. Time is perceived by the 
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body and reflected in the bodily rhythm. However, how does this fundamental, 
organismic sense of time give rise to temporal consciousness including the 
temporal order (Before, During, After), the time-series (Past, Present, Future) and 
various temporal experiences such as succession, simultaneity and duration? How 
does the human subject move from a passive perception of time to a subjective 
understanding of time? How might we correlate psychological time with the cycle 
of bodily movement? Explaining this “hard question” is the first step to make any 
coherent theory of time possible. Modern science has tried and failed to find a 
neurobiological locus that serves as the core “clock” in the human brain (Merchant, 
Harrington, & Meck, 2013), and most attempts to build psychological time on an 
organismic basis remain metaphysical speculations.  
 
Although scholars have observed that through Freud’s work, there is “a continual 
growth in richness and complexity” in the way he treats time (Green, 2005, p.169), 
and have further identified multiple themes of time in Freud’s writings (Abraham, 
1976; Green, 2007, 2008), most discussions are limited to mechanisms of psychic 
time without paying attention to the possibility of bodily time embedded in Freud’s 
metapsychology. As Lacan points out, Freud’s body-machine is “constructed so as 
to embody something which is called time and is the mystery of mysteries” (Lacan, 
1988b, p.74). Deleuze is one of a few who realise that a psychoanalytic response to 
“the hard problem of temporal consciousness” can be extracted from Freud’s work, 
although he never gives this body of work an independent status but only 
selectively chooses some Freudian materials in the service of his own theoretical 
construction. In fact, as we will see in the following chapter, the Project, which 
stands for Freud’s most elaborated energetic account of the psychic apparatus, 
contains a metaphysical insight into the human body’s relationship with time. 
Using the hypothesis of psychic energy to explain how time is primarily synthesised 
in the organism, this metaphysical account of time not only supplements existing 
theories of time in Freud’s work but defines the genesis of the latter. Lacan’s return 
to Freud allows a more specific understanding of this point. He closely follows 
Freud’s theoretical construction and points out its inherent impasses, 
contradictions and limitations, from where he takes over Freud’s energetic 
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principles and the overall conceptual framework to build his own metaphysics of 
bodily time. 
  
2.2 The Freudian Metaphysics of Time 
If, as Lacan suggests, Freud’s whole discussion of metapsychology revolves around 
the question “what, in terms of energy, is the psyche? ” (Lacan, 1988b, p.75), then 
the main question I am going to pursue in this section is “what, in terms of energy, 
is time?” Before I turn to Freud’s answer, I will first use Kant’s metaphysics of time 
as a necessary background against which the distinctive contribution of both 
Freud’s and Lacan’s work can be understood. At the beginning of Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant lays down his fundamental point of view regarding the nature of time 
and space: they are relations “that only attach to the form of intuition alone, and 
thus to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates 
could not be ascribed to anything at all” (Kant, 1998, p. A23). According to Kant, 
intuitions are representations given in sensation which are related immediately to 
objects, but time and space do not belong to intuitions in this empirical sense. 
Instead, they are pure intuitions which do not contain sensation, but contain 
“merely the form under which something is intuited” (ibid., p. A51). Time is an a 
priori form of sensibility through which we acquire representations of objects, and 
any sensible representation is always-already spatio-temporally determined. 
Simply put, our temporal experience first and foremost includes the experience of 
ourselves as a temporal being. We are constituted by time to experience “outer” 
objects temporally. Kant further points out that time as a transcendental condition 
of sensation is still far away from time as our temporal consciousness. In order to 
move from sensation to understanding and combine intuitions with concepts, a 
transcendental process is needed, which he calls “synthesis”. In Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant provides three syntheses to synthesise the intuited diversity into three 
different dimensions of temporal consciousness, in which the main act of cognition 
and understanding can be performed: 
 
1. The synthesis of apprehension in the intuition, or the synthesis of the present. 
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Every intuition, as Kant argues, is an immediate and singular representation, and 
thus is only perceived in one moment. In order for the mind to perceive temporal 
succession, there must be a synthesis, “aimed directly at the intuition”, to “take 
together this manifoldness” (ibid., p.A100). Meanwhile, in order to sustain this 
synthesis at the empirical level, we also need a pure synthesis of apprehension 
that takes together the sensibility of time and space as pure intuitions. 
 
2. The synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, or the synthesis of the past. 
After the first synthesis, we have the unity of intuitions as the present. “But if I 
were always to lose the preceding representation from my thoughts and not 
reproduce them when I proceed to the following ones, then no whole 
representation and none of the previously mentioned thoughts, not even the 
purest and most fundamental representations of space and time, could ever arise” 
(ibid., p.A102). Therefore, a second synthesis must supplement the first one: the 
empirical synthesis of reproduction reproduces a synthetic unity; while the pure 
synthesis of reproduction constitutes the transcendental ground of 
reproducibility.  
 
3. The synthesis of recognition in the concept, or the synthesis of the future. After 
the second synthesis, we have two unities of intuitions at hand: the newly 
synthesised one, standing for the present; and the reproduction of the former 
one, standing for the past. The problem is that “without consciousness that 
which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all 
reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain” (ibid., p.A103). A 
reproduction may be mistaken as a new apprehension if one fails to recognise 
that it is the same as what was apprehended. Therefore, the empirical synthesis 
of recognition is needed, alongside the pure synthesis of recognition that unifies 
sensibility and reproducibility. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, this 
synthesis “also proves to be essentially time-forming”: “If the function of this pure 
synthesis is recognition, this does not mean that its prospecting is concerned 
with an essent which it can pro-pose to itself as identical but that it prospects the 
horizon of proposition in general. As pure, its prospecting is the pure formation 
of that which makes all projection [Vorhaften] possible, i.e., the future” 
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(Heidegger, 1965, p.191). 
  
Kant’s philosophy of time contains some theoretical ambiguities that would 
become the targets of later philosophers. On the one hand, by treating time as 
“properties of the mind, not of the things we experience” (Brook, 2013, p.123), Kant 
seems to rule out the possibility for the body to synthesise time. Although the 
empirical intuition occurs at a very fundamental level of sensation, time is not 
brought into being by any object of the senses but functions as a permanent 
subjective condition for experiencing external objects through internal mental 
activity. If we omit from empirical intuitions everything empirical or sensible, “time 
and space still remain, which are therefore pure intuitions that lie a priori at the 
basis of the empirical” (Kant, 1912, p.36); on the other hand, a part of the mind in 
Kant’s philosophy seems to share the noncognitive in-the-world character with the 
body. The first and second syntheses of time, despite occurring in the mind, are not 
conscious. Consciousness starts from the third synthesis, which recognises what 
the first and second syntheses have synthesised and thus constitutes knowledge. 
The first two syntheses are not conscious because they are not self-conscious, but 
rather blind, passive and unconscious syntheses. However, as a transcendental 
idealist, Kant finds it difficult to digest the idea of passive synthesis. As we have 
seen, three pure syntheses of time condition three empirical syntheses of time. 
Therefore, no matter how the “I” given in an empirical content is passively 
synthesised as a sensible, perceptible and concrete being, there must be a 
transcendental “I” which actively makes these passive syntheses possible. In the 
1787 edition of Critique of Pure Reason, at the risk of confusing the sequence of three 
syntheses, Kant eliminates the possibility of passive synthesis and puts the active 
synthesis, or “an action of the understanding”, at the beginning of the whole process: 
 
The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition that is merely 
sensible, i.e., nothing but receptivity, and the form of this intuition can lie 
a priori in our faculty of representation without being anything other than 
the way in which the subject is affected. Yet the combination of a manifold 
in general can never come to us through the senses, and therefore cannot 
already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for it is an act 
of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one must call 
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the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination, 
whether we are conscious of it or not…is an action of the understanding” 
(Kant, 1998, p. B130) (emphasis is added).    
 
By insisting that all syntheses of time are actively accomplished by a transcendental 
“I”, Kant’s theory of time reflects a limitation of his representational philosophy in 
general, which only contemplates how the mind constructs the world as 
representations but never asks how the mind itself is constructed. Kant may not 
think of it as a problem, as Faulkner suggests that Kant began his thinking with the 
assumption of a fully formed human, capable of rational thought (Faulkner, 2004). 
But after the theory of evolution, this tension lying in Kant’s theory, “in which the 
self arises within the world and yet somehow peers at nature from an external and 
detached perspective” (Tauber, 2010, p.153), is becoming more and more evident.  
 
In the twentieth century, Husserl first singled out the idea of passive synthesis in 
Kant’s philosophy as a genuine phenomenological concept, even though Kant 
himself failed to recognise its importance. According to Husserl, in Kant’s synthesis 
of productive imagination, there is “nothing other than what we call passive 
constitution, nothing other than the team-work of the constantly higher 
developing intentionalities of passive consciousness in which an extremely 
multiform process of immanent and transcendent sense-giving is carried out 
passively and is organized into encompassing formations of sense and formations 
of being” (Husserl, 2001, p.410). While Kant is not in a position to localise the 
passive synthesis except holding it in subjection to the transcendental principles, 
Husserl relates the passive synthesis to his understanding of the body as the 
experiential centre of sensational orientations. Adopting this crucial aspect of 
Husserl’s interpretation of Kant, Deleuze rewrites the entire structure of the 
syntheses of time. The transcendental “I” is discarded and replaced by the passive 
organism. The syntheses of time start from the passive syntheses through the body, 
which “are not carried out by the mind” but “prior to all memory and all reflection” 
(Deleuze, 1994, p.71). In this sense, “time is subjective, but in relation to the 




There are a number of themes in this brief examination of Kant’s metaphysics of 
time and its influence that will become important below. First of all, in parallel to 
Husserl and Deleuze, both Freud and Lacan have produced responses to the lack of 
passivity or the bodily dimension in Kant’s philosophy of time. This is why their 
theories of time manifest primary philosophical relevance. Secondly, Freud’s theory 
of energetics provides an experiential or empirical basis for the idea of passive 
synthesis, which is lacking in Husserl and Deleuze’s theory. Thirdly, I apply “three 
syntheses of time” as the overall structure of my interpretation of Freud’s original 
theory and Lacan’s further development, which can be put into comparison with 
Kant’s “three active syntheses of time” and Deleuze’s “three passive syntheses of 
time”. While these models have some points in common, they are also significantly 
different at some crucial points. 
 
Freud’s metaphysics of time is most systematically presented in the Project, which 
is the primary text for my analysis in this section. The aim of the Project is “to 
represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable 
material particles” (Freud, 1895a, p.295). It starts with “a basic principle of neuronal 
activity in relation to Q”4: the principle of neuronal inertia. According to this 
principle, the neurons completely and instantly discharge the energy they have 
received by “giving it off through a connecting path to the muscular mechanisms, 
and in that way keeps itself [the nervous system] free from stimulus” (Freud, 1895a, 
p.296). In doing so, the organism achieves an experience of pleasure since the 
diminution of excitation is defined by Freud as pleasure, in contrast to unpleasure 
as the accumulation of excitation. For instance, if the organism of an individual is 
impinged upon by an external stimulus such as fire, the neurons, following the 
principle of neuronal inertia, will immediately divest themselves of Q and lead the 
organism to react by a single motor response: removing itself from the presence of 
                                                          
4 According to Freud, Q means activity in the form of excitation/energy, and the 
neuron is the material particle which is capable of absorbing and discharging 
excitation/energy. Excitation or energy carried by the neuron is called Qή, which 
means neural excitation or neural energy. 
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fire. Freud names the system of these neurones “the system φ”. As Lacan nicely 
summarises: 
 
What is Freud calling the system φ? He starts from the schema of the 
reflex-arc in its simplest version, which offered such hope of grasping the 
relations of the living being with its environment. This schema displays 
the essential property of the system of relations of a living being – it 
receives something, an excitation, and it responds with something (Lacan, 
1988b, p.106). 
 
Similar to Kant’s concept of “empirical intuition”, Husserl’s concept of “sensory 
matter” (or “hyletic data”), and Deleuze’s concept of “discontinuous matter”, the 
system φ, which is characterised by pure passivity, receptivity and bodily 
sensibility, gives rise to the experience of the Now, the singular instant of time. The 
Now is not time, but an essential component of time. It is absolute immediacy 
without either the past or the future. It passes as soon as the organism tries to hold 
this Now. Since the reception and discharge of energy in the system φ happen at 
the same time without any delay, the experience of the Now simultaneously stands 
for the birth of a moment and its death. Lacan, later in his work, will refer to the 
experience of the Now as the “momentary fashion”: “not only is destruction 
possible, but at every instant there is creation” (1988b, p.293). 
 
The Now is not a self-subsistent reality. It is a pure evanescence in the form of 
energy intensity that cannot be singled out of the living present. From a 
phenomenological perspective, the living present emerges as a multiplied unity. It 
is an ongoing sense that contains a temporally extended (although narrowly) 
sensed content (Gallagher, 2013), exceeds and contextualises separate instants. 
This raises the question of how to collect these scattered instants of time together 
in a bodily horizon. In Kant’s philosophy, we have the synthesis of apprehension 
which “take together this manifoldness”; while in Deleuze’s philosophy, the 
imagination is defined as a contractile power, “which contracts the successive 
independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, 
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present” (Deleuze, 1994, p.70). Coming back to the Project, we find that the 
unification of isolated Nows is demanded “under the compulsion of exigencies of 
life” (Freud, 1895a, p.301). The principle of neuronal inertia proves to be inadequate 
after further contemplation, because the organism is not only interfered with by 
the external stimuli. It also “receives stimuli from the somatic element itself – 
endogenous stimuli – which have equally to be discharged. They have their origin 
in the cells of the body and give rise to the major needs: hunger, respiration, 
sexuality” (Freud, 1985, p.297). The organism is unable to get rid of these 
endogenous stimuli, and thus “is obliged to abandon its original trend to inertia”. 
A different system of neurones, the system ψ, is indicated to handle these internal 
stimuli. Unlike the system φ which only contains permeable neurones, the system 
ψ contains impermeable ones with “contact barriers” in between in order to 
perform two functions. On the one hand, it is “loaded with resistance and holding 
back Qn” (ibid., p.300); only when the Qs increase up above a certain threshold 
can they pass into ψ neurones. On the other hand, ψ neurones do not evacuate all 
energy that comes into them, but “put up with a store of Qή sufficient to meet the 
demand for a specific action” (ibid., p.297).  
 
The system ψ undertakes the energetic synthesis of the present in Freud’s 
metapsychology due to its unique characteristics. We have already seen that the 
experience of the Now is fleeting because the system φ discharges everything and 
retains nothing. By contrast, the system ψ has “a capacity for being permanently 
altered by a single occurrence” (ibid., p.299). Contact barriers retain a small 
amount of Qn to maintain ψ neurones in a permanently cathected state. Moreover, 
the system ψ is more than a pure reflex-system in response to the environment. It 
integrates externality and internality by “receiving Q, on the one hand from the φ 
neurones themselves, and on the other from the cellular elements in the interior 
of the body” (ibid., p.304), and contains both energy charge and discharge as part 
of the living process. Through the system φ, the present as a temporal extension is 
produced, a present that enables the organism to grasp “the magnitude of the 
impression and on the frequency with which the same impression is repeated” 




However, the temporal extension is not limitless. As Deleuze explains: “Time does 
not escape the present, but the present does not stop moving by leaps and bounds 
which encroach upon one another. This is the paradox of the present: to constitute 
time while passing in the time constituted. We cannot avoid the necessary 
conclusion – that there must be another time in which the first synthesis of time 
can occur” (Deleuze, 1994, p.79). This leads us to the second synthesis, the 
synthesis of the past. In Kant’s metaphysics, this synthesis is built on the 
transcendental ground of reproducibility. The former representation has to be 
reproduced. Otherwise, it simply passes into oblivion. Unlike Kant, Freud’s reason 
to have the second synthesis is empirically based. A series of contact barriers 
between neurones already make the system ψ able to remember and reproduce, as 
Freud says, “memory is represented by the differences in the facilitations between 
the ψ neurones”. The issue here is the material to remember or reproduce. So far, 
the neural system we have built only deals with different quantities of energy or 
excitations, which can be retained, resisted or discharged, but only perceptual 
images or “qualities-sensations” cathected by energy can be remembered or 
reproduced. To overcome this difficulty, Freud assumes that “there is a third 
system of neurones –ω perhaps [we might call it] – which is excited along with 
perception, but not along with reproduction, and whose states of excitation give 
rise to the various qualities – are, that is to say, conscious sensations” (Freud, 1895a, 
p.309). 
 
The system ω itself does not generate a different temporal dimension, but it stores 
mnemic images that can be activated by the system ψ to synthesise the past so that 
the organism can bring back the previous perception and perceives its content in 
the living present. In this sense, the second synthesis of the past in Freud’s theory 
is still a passive, organismic synthesis, facilitated by the energy exchange between 
the buffer-system (the system ψ) and the organ of perception (the system ω). The 
past and the present should not be regarded as two different parts in a single line 
of time. They are two overlapping dimensions. The past depends on the present to 
be representable while the present needs the past to be reproducible. In 
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accordance with Deleuzian terminology, we might call the present the “foundation 
of time”, and the past the “ground of time”.  
 
In the Project, one example of this energetic synthesis of the past is hallucination. 
After receiving a certain amount of Qή from the internal stimuli, there is an urgent 
need for the system ψ to discharge surplus energy or excitations. However, the 
infant, due to “the initial helplessness of human beings”, is unable to alter the 
external environment to meet his or her need without external intervention. The 
discharge can only be achieved when “an experienced person is drawn to the child’s 
state” (Freud, 1985, p.318). In order to reduce the risk of unpleasure caused by the 
uncontrollability of the other’s intervention, the system ψ turns to the mnemic 
images of the object of satisfaction stored in the system ω. Therefore, the next time 
the same pressure of internal needs increases, the system ψ, instead of suffering 
from unpleasure while waiting for external intervention, simply reproductively 
remembers the motor image associated with the first experience of satisfaction, 
and thus discharges the excitations through this short circuit. We can use the 
example Freud gives to understand this process: 
 
A hungry baby screams or kicks helplessly. But the situation remains 
unaltered, for the excitation arising from an internal need is not due to a 
force producing a momentary impact but to one which is in continuous 
operation. A change can only come about if in some way or other (in the 
case of the baby, through outside help) an ‘experience of satisfaction’ can 
be achieved which puts an end to the internal stimulus. An essential 
component of this experience of satisfaction is a particular perception 
(that of nourishment, in our example), the mnemic image of which 
remains associated thenceforward with the memory trace of the excitation 
produced by the need. As a result of the link that has thus been established, 
next time this need arises a psychical impulse will at once emerge which will 
seek to re-cathect the mnemic image of the perception and to re-evoke the 
perception itself, that is to say, to re-establish the situation of the original 
satisfaction. (Freud, 1900, pp.565–66) (emphasis is added) 
 
The hallucination is produced in the living present, yet its realisation always 
requires the association between a past moment and a present one. The 
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combination of the first and the second syntheses of time constitutes the primary 
process of the psyche, in which “wishful cathexis to the point of hallucination 
complete generation of unpleasure which involves a complete expenditure of 
defence” (Freud, 1895a, p.326). It is worth noting that the principle of inertia, 
suspended in the first synthesis of time, seems to return here in the form of the 
primary process. The short circuit to discharge energy through hallucination 
overcomes the material constraint imposed by the “temporal asymmetry” between 
the constant internal needs and the discontinuous external intervention. However, 
a hallucination of nourishment will not feed a starving infant. It is only a temporary 
solution to the internal needs at the expense of a large amount of psychic energy 
and at the risk of the exhaustion of the organism. Lacan’s reading points out the 
danger in the primary process: “How is it that the living organism nonetheless 
succeeds in not falling into terrible traps, biologically speaking? ” (Lacan, 1988b, 
p.144). To prevent the body from being “made helpless and suffer[ing] injury”, 
“satisfaction must fail to occur, because the object is not real but is present only as 
an imaginary idea” (Freud, 1895a, pp.324–25). As a result, another system, which 
Lacan calls “a mechanism of regulation”, needs to be introduced in order to 
distinguish between perception and memory, hallucination and reality.  
 
Here we move to the third synthesis of time in Freud’s work. This synthesis is 
achieved by the ego, “an organisation…formed in ψ whose presence interferes with 
passages [of quantity] which on the first occasion occurred in a particular way [i.e. 
accompanied by satisfaction or pain]” (ibid., p.323). The ego is formed as a response 
to the biological need of self-preservation, a defensive apparatus against the over-
discharge of energy that “is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from 
those springing from the surface of the body” (Freud, 1923a, p.26 footnote). This 
genesis justifies Freud’s well-known statement in The Ego and the Id (1923) that 
“the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego” (Freud, 1923a, p.26). The ego prevents 
the cathexis of the desired mnemic image from generating hallucination and only 
allows energy discharge towards the specific action. It is responsible for many 
complicated mental operations including the activation of certain memory traces, 
the reservation of a major part of energy for the sake of efficiency, and the selection 
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of a particular need to be cathected in order to reduce unpleasure. In so doing, it 
introduces the secondary process of the psyche to take over without contradicting 
the primary one. By inhibiting the immediate discharge of excitation based on a 
realistic and economic consideration and regulating the flow of energy along 
various conductive pathways, it chooses a different, longer route to achieve the 
same goal as the primary process.  
 
In Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning (1911), Freud 
reformulates the primary/secondary process in terms of the pleasure principle and 
the reality principle, and implies that the transition between them is essentially a 
requirement for the synthesis of the future as a new temporal dimension: “Actually 
the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure principle implies no 
deposing of the pleasure principle, but only a safeguarding of it. A momentary 
pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain along the new 
path an assured pleasure at a later time” (Freud, 1911, p.223) (emphasis is added). 
The future here is not another organised and unified series of instants. Freud 
doesn’t come up with a new system to synthesise the future, nor does he introduce 
new materials to be synthesised. The ego is formed in the system ψ, the living 
present. The future can only be contemplated as “future in the present”. It inhibits 
the self-realisation of the present and opens it up towards something that has not 
yet come. By assuring that satisfaction will be realised in the horizon of the future, 
the ego appeases the urgent needs in the living present and resists the temptation 
to find comfort in the past.   
 
Freud’s third synthesis of the future strongly resembles the synthesis of recognition 
in the concept in the Kantian structure. First of all, these two syntheses have 
similar causes. Kant also needs this synthesis to solve the problem of hallucination, 
or in his words, the problem of the lack of recognition of the difference between 
what is reproduced and what is actually manifest in perception. Secondly, the 
synthesis of the future is an active synthesis, as is the synthesis of recognition in 
Kant’s philosophy, which is called “an action of the understanding” that gives rise 
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to pure knowledge. In Freud’s metapsychology, the ego indeed originates from 
passive syntheses in the body. Nonetheless, “as a mental projection of the surface 
of the body” (Freud, 1923a, p.26, footnote), it is located at the boundary between 
the body and the psyche and mostly undertakes psychic functions in the name of 
the “I”. Under its influence, the secondary process involves thought activity and 
replaces “perceptual-identity” with “thought-identity”. Thirdly, to both Freud and 
Kant, the third synthesis does not synthesise something new. It instead synthesises 
the products of the first and second syntheses in each one’s work. It governs the 
other two and directs the present and the past towards the future. At the end of 
Freud’s metaphysics of time, the ego becomes the master of the organism: “The 
ego is the nucleus, that is how Freud expresses it, the kernel of this apparatus” 
(Lacan, 1988b, p.145). 
 
2.3 The Consciousness Without the Ego  
In Seminar II, Lacan presents a close reading of Freud’s Project and explains the 
different roles played by the system φ, ψ and ω. For the most part, Lacan endorses 
Freud’s theoretical construction of the psychic apparatus based on the energetic 
principles of the intra-organic system, which, “however hypothetical it may be”, 
helps us acquire in the way of experiencing “the diffusion and distribution of 
nervous input” (Lacan, 1988b, p.45). But at the same time, Lacan also identifies, 
repeatedly, a crucial contradiction in the text which Freud fails to solve, namely 
the problem of consciousness: 
 
In the metapsychology, when he tries to explain the different pathological 
forms…through investments of systems, he repeatedly finds himself 
confronted with a paradox when it is a matter of making the system of 
consciousness function (ibid.). 
 
Here for the first time we find ourselves faced with this difficulty, which 
reoccurs at every turn throughout Freud’s work – one doesn’t know what 




Freud doesn’t succeed in finding a coherent model of it, and this isn’t due 
to the existence of the unconscious. While he can give a coherent, 
balanced account of the majority of the other parts of the psychic 
apparatus, when it’s a question of consciousness, he always encounters 
mutually contradictory conditions (ibid. p.117).  
 
To understand this impasse, we have to return to the Project, where the word 
“consciousness” first appears when Freud faces the problem of quality. The 
essential function of consciousness, according to Freud, is that “it gives us what are 
called qualities-sensations” (Freud, 1895a, p.308). The psychic apparatus 
constituted by system φ and system ψ only involves the charge and discharge of 
psychic energy in a quantitative way. In this sense, it functions independently of 
consciousness and does not explain how we are aware of qualities-sensations 
through consciousness. So where do qualities originate? Freud points to the third 
system ω, the organismic system of consciousness: “Here consciousness is the 
subjective side of one part of the physical processes in the nervous system, namely 
of the ω process” (ibid., p.311). By defining consciousness as the physical, excitatory 
process in the ω neurones, Freud does not accept the idea of consciousness 
understood in psychology that usually contains an active process but gives it the 
characteristic of immediacy and passivity.  
 
However, this definition and localisation of consciousness is challenged when the 
temporal dimension of the past is introduced. On the one hand, if the ω neurones 
whose states of excitation give rise to the various qualities “behave like organs of 
perception” (ibid., p.309), then consciousness as perception, or at least the 
qualitative part of perception, ought to be localised in the upper storey of the 
nervous system and in direct contact with the external world. It needs to be linked 
with “masses in motion” and reflect them as images. This point is confirmed when 
Freud attributes to the ω neurones the function of “the indication of reality” (ibid., 
p.325). In this sense, consciousness partakes of the living present. On the other 
hand, as we have already discussed in the previous section, the system ψ needs 
mnemic images to remember and reproduce, and the only place to store mnemic 
images is the system ω. If this is the case, consciousness has to be localised in the 
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understorey of the nervous system, as a mere appendage to the system ψ. It has to 
be detached from the present and falls into the past. This is what Lacan calls “the 
paradox of the system of consciousness”: 
 
It both has to be there, and not be there. If it is included in the energy 
system as constituted at the ψ level, it won't be any more than a part of it, 
and won't be able to play its role as reference to reality. Still, some energy 
has to go through it. But it can't be directly linked to the external world's 
massive input, as is presumed in the first, so-called discharge, system, that 
is, of elementary stimulus-response reflex. On the contrary, it must be 
completely separated off from it……On the other hand, beginning with 
what happens in ω, the system ψ needs information, as Valabrega said the 
other day, which I found somewhat hasty, but not false in itself. It can only 
find this information at the level of the discharge of the perceptual system 
(Lacan, 1988b, p.117). 
 
Consciousness, as a result, is split between fresh perceptions, standing for the 
present, and mnemic images, standing for the past. In fact, this paradox is not as 
fatal as it appears. If it is handled delicately, in the way Lacan does, it will generate 
new insights into the synthesis of the past. But first, we may have a look at Freud’s 
own solution. Five years later, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud 
presented another version of the psychic apparatus, which, despite largely 
resembling the one formulated in the Project, includes several revisions specifically 
in relation to the system and function of consciousness.  
 
 
Figure 1. Graph of the Psychic Apparatus. Reprinted from Freud, S. (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. 




In this schema, Freud divides the system ω, the system of consciousness, into three 
parts. The left end of the diagram is a sensory end, which is responsible for 
receiving perceptions in addition to quantitative excitations. Its mechanism is a 
reflex process, which preserves the characteristic of immediacy and passivity in the 
living present: “The very front of the apparatus receives the perceptual stimuli but 
retains no trace of them and thus has no memory” (ibid., p.358). In the middle 
portion, Freud locates mnemic images and impressions in another system “which 
transforms the momentary excitations of the first system into permanent traces” 
(ibid.). These mnemic images are no longer consciousness and completely 
separated off from the organ which receives fresh perceptions. As Freud says: “Our 
memories – not excepting those which are most deeply stamped on our minds – 
are in themselves unconscious” (ibid., p.539). Alongside them are various 
facilitating pathways ready for remembering and reproducing. In this sense, this 
mnemic system can be regarded as an extended system ψ. It is able to synthesise 
the past without relying on a supplement from another system. Freud puts 
“consciousness” near the other end (the motor end) of the diagram. The system 
lying behind it is the Pcs. system, which takes over various functions Freud 
attributed to the ego in the Project. According to this new schema, not only 
“memory and the quality that characterises consciousness are mutually exclusive” 
(ibid., p.540), but consciousness is also separated from the Pcpt. System. It is no 
longer a passive, organismic process that synthesises, but is an after-effect, or a by-
product of the ego’s active synthesis in a “censored present”.  
 
Lacan has observed this revision: “The first schema gave us a representation of 
perception and consciousness at only one extremity of the apparatus, united 
together, just as they are in experience. The second schema compounds the 
difficulties of the first by dissociating the location of the perceptual system and 
that of the system of consciousness” (Lacan, 1988b, p.141). Why Freud makes such 
an arrangement is not a concern for this chapter.5 It is sufficient to say here that 
                                                          
5 According to Lacan, Freud “encounters this difficulty just when he introduces the 
temporal dimension” (Lacan, 1988b, p.145). To be more specific, Freud wants to 




Lacan disapproves of this revision. He regards the change of consciousness from a 
physical phenomenon to a psychic phenomenon as the wrong solution to “the 
paradox of the system of consciousness”, because what makes the second synthesis 
of the past possible is not mnemic images, but precisely consciousness as a passive 
process.  
 
Let us think about this question again: does the recollection of mnemic images, i.e., 
traces of present perceptions, synthesise the past? Images coming into 
consciousness, be they for the first time as new qualities-sensations, or for the 
second time through remembering or reproducing, are always perceived in the 
living present. Alterations of the neurones ω caused by mnemic images, according 
to Freud, are permanent alterations. They do not direct us to the past since they 
are always present and will continue to be present. What do mnemic images carry 
with them that can tell us about the past? Philosophers who have paid attention to 
this question help us shed some new light on the relationship between mnemic 
images and the past. According to Merleau-Ponty, “no preservation, no 
physiological or psychic ‘trace’ of the past can make consciousness of the past 
understandable…These traces in themselves do not refer to the past: they are 
present; and, in so far as I find in them signs of some ‘previous’ event, it is because 
I derive my sense of the past from elsewhere, because I carry this particular 
significance within myself” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, pp.479–80). Similarly, Bergson 
argues that “the image, pure and simple, will not be referred to the past unless, 
indeed, it was in the past that I sought it” (Bergson, 1991, p.135). What can be 
derived from these remarks and resonate usefully with Lacanian psychoanalysis is 
the idea that neither mnemic images, nor the psychic process that reproduces 
these images in the present synthesises the past. An image is a past image because 
the individual gives the meaning “past” to it in the present. It is not “past-in-itself” 
                                                          
infantile wishes, to provide another version of the synthesis of the past. However, 
Lacan believes that in the chronological sense, “regression doesn’t exist” (ibid., 
p.103). “(One) doesn’t have to go back to childhood memories, nor to think of 
regression” (ibid., p.126). What needs to be introduced here is not a temporal 
dimension, but an entirely different temporal register, that is Symbolic time. This 
topic will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
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but “past-for-itself”. The system ψ will not be able to cathect the image of a 
previous satisfaction to achieve hallucination if the organism has not already 
possessed the past as a temporal dimension, and thus associated this image with a 
sense of “something past”. It is not memory that constitutes the past; on the 
contrary, it is a sense of the past that constitutes memory. The past as a horizon of 
“having-been” must have already been synthesised before any image that can be 
stored in the past.   
 
Therefore, what is synthesised as the past must mean the Real past. This idea 
corresponds not to the “empirical reproduction” but to the Kantian 
“transcendental reproducibility”; not to the “memory image” but to the Bergsonian 
“pure memory”; not to a “past present” but to the Deleuzian “pure past”. All of these 
concepts define the past as something different from a “former present” that stands 
out as specific moments in a temporal chronology. Firstly, the past as such does 
not pass. If it passes, it no longer defines a temporal horizon but becomes 
something in the past; secondly, it is not represented. Otherwise, it becomes 
something in the present; thirdly, it causes the passing of the present. In Lacan’s 
work, we find that this synthesis is embodied by the “consciousness without the 
ego”. In Seminar II, Lacan gives an unequivocal definition of consciousness: 
“There’s a surface such that it can produce what is called an image. That is a 
materialist definition” (Lacan, 1988b, p.49). He urges his audience to think of a 
phenomenon of consciousness “which won’t have been perceived by any ego, 
which won’t have been reflected upon in any ego-like experience – any ego kind of 
ego and of consciousness of ego being absent at the time” (ibid., p.47). But isn’t 
this impossible? Isn’t the transparency of consciousness “an indisputable given”, 
indicating that “nothing can be experienced without the subject being able to be 
aware of himself within this experience in a kind of immediate reflection” (ibid., 
p.46)? The problem of this philosophical tradition is that it fails to detach itself 
from a transcendental “I”. If consciousness is only understood in the form of “I am 
conscious of”, then it is almost impossible to ask for the genesis of consciousness 
without presupposing the consciousness of the “I”. Lacan rejects this circular logic 
by pointing out that “the issue is how to free our notion of consciousness of any 
74 
 
mortgages as regards the subject’s apprehension of itself” (ibid., p.57). He argues 
that consciousness is not an active operation, but a passive function primarily 
carried out by the organism, in the form of “it is conscious of”. The apprehension 
of self-existence, essentially required for the constitution of “I”, is only “a particular 
experience, tied to objectifiable conditions”, and “has no privileged character” in 
consciousness:  
 
We are conscious of seeing, and nothing seems to us more homologous to 
the transparency of consciousness than the fact that we see what we see - 
seeing imposes its own transparency on itself. But on the other hand, we 
are not in the least bit aware, except in a very marginal, limitrophe, way, 
of what we are doing, efficaciously, actively, in a motoric sense, in this 
synchronisation, in the palpation at a distance which the eyes undertake 
when they try to see (ibid., p.118). 
 
According to Lacan, there is an illusion of autonomous agency underlying the 
statement “I see”, which must be distinguished from “the eyes see”. The difference 
is between the active consciousness, which, as the ego’s function, finds itself in the 
unified image through what Deleuze calls “attentive recognition”, and the passive 
consciousness as “a neutral and abstract, and even abstracted form of the totality 
of the possible mirages” (ibid., p.224). 6  The consciousness without the ego 
perceives the totality of images of partial objects without unifying these images as 
a totality. These objects are partial not because they are part of a total body – since, 
without the ego’s imaginary intervention, the Real body itself is disorganised, 
fragmented and partial, a body in pieces – but because they participate in the non-
totalisable energetic economy among various sensible/perceptual organs 
disseminated on the surface of the body. In this sense, the consciousness without 
                                                          
6 It may not be a coincidence that Lacan’s detachment of consciousness from the 
ego resonates with the distinction made by Sartre between the pure consciousness 
and the ego in The Transcendence of the Ego, first published in 1936: “The ego is not 
the owner of consciousness; it is the object of consciousness” (Sartre, 1960, p.97). To 
Sartre, the pure consciousness is a mere openness to the world. It is characterised 
by the non-positional, non-substantial spontaneity. Consciousness does not 




the ego matches our definition of the Real past. Firstly, it does not pass because 
the present is the only place of consciousness; secondly, it is not represented 
because it is not perceived by the ego; thirdly, it causes the passing of the present 
because it frustrates the ego. As Lacan writes: “The ego, which you allegedly 
perceive within the field of clear consciousness as being the unity of the latter, is 
precisely what the immediacy of sensation is in tension with” (ibid., p.50). The 
tension here is essentially a virtual tension. What the organism perceives as a 
presence, namely the partial object, is what the ego perceives as a lack in the 
imaginarily unified image. As a result, every present becomes the recognition of 
the impossibility of unification, driven by the need to replace itself with a new 
present.  
 
The second synthesis of the past is a passive foundation of the active consciousness 
governed by the ego. The consciousness without the ego, as the “past in the 
present”, makes mnemic images as the “past of the present” possible. The 
individual’s subjective experience of the past not only refers to the combination of 
a passive faculty and an active faculty but more precisely refers to the contrast 
between the two. By taking consciousness as a physical phenomenon located in 
the system ω, before the emergence of the ego, Freud in the Project could have 
arrived at the same conclusion as Lacan. However, he confused the Real past and 
memory material. In The Interpretation of Dreams, this confusion leads to the 
subordination of consciousness to the preconscious and the prioritisation of 
infantile wishes as the determination of the past.7  In so doing, psychoanalysis 
becomes dominated by one specific structuration of human experience, which 
Lacan calls “ancient, based on reminiscence”. This structuration presupposes 
                                                          
7 Freud argues that, in terms of daytime thought, “it is obliged to find a connection 
in some way or other with an infantile wish which was now conscious and 
suppressed” (Freud, 1900, p.556); in terms of dream formation, “our theory of 
dreams regards wishes originating in infancy as the indispensable motive force for 
the formation of dreams” (ibid., p.589); in terms of symptom formation, “the theory 
of the psychoneuroses asserts as an indisputable and invariable fact that only sexual 
wishful impulses from infancy, which have undergone repression (i.e. a 
transformation of their affect) during the developmental period of childhood, are 
capable of being revived during later developmental periods” (ibid., pp.605-06). 
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“agreement, harmony between man and the world of his objects, which means that 
he recognises them, because in some way, he has always known them” (Lacan, 
1988b, p.100).  
 
Lacan maintains that this human experience is fundamentally a misrecognition. 
Reminiscence is “the passage into the imaginary” rather than the reality because 
the subject fails to realise that there is no “ideal object” that was once possessed 
and then lost, no memory trace that carried with it the definite meaning of the past. 
Reminiscence is conducted not by the organism but by the ego, as an imagination 
in which a unified but also isolated representation has long been forgotten, yet 
exercising a power of attraction that reshapes the present in the same manner. It 
constitutes an enclosed system in which one’s present is predetermined by one’s 
past. However, Freud in the Project would endorse another structuration of human 
experience, as Lacan argues, “what distinguishes Freud here from all the authors 
who have written on the same subject, and even from the great Fechner to whom 
he constantly refers, is the idea that the object of the human quest is never an 
object of rediscovery in the sense of reminiscence” (ibid., p.136). Instead, it is a 
rediscovery in the sense of repetition, a repetitive encounter with objects in the 
present which correspond “only partially with what has already gained him 
satisfaction”. In this sense, “the human object always constitutes itself through the 
intermediary of a first loss” (ibid.). This “first loss” must not be understood as a loss 
occurring at the earliest point in the chronological sequence of an individual’s life. 
It occurs in every instant of the present when the organism receives far more than 
what the ego is able to perceive. In other words, the object here is nothing other 
than the partial object perceived by the consciousness without the ego. It does not 
reside in the memory trace but belongs to the Real past, in the form of lack 
lingering beyond the periphery or margin of the ego’s sensory field.  
 
The idea of the Real past introduces a new understanding of the relationship 
between the past and the present, which conforms neither to “past-based” 
determinism nor to “present-based” constructionism. The former, a variation of 
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the reminiscence model, fails to see that the past is not a series of instants we have 
left behind to which a part of our being is attached, but a horizon perpetually re-
emerging and repeating; the latter, on the other hand, restricts itself to the ego’s 
function of imagination and creation, rejecting the fact that the past is never fully 
in the grasp of the ego. Against these two options, the Real past does not identify 
itself with a past moment or a present moment, but connects them into a process 
of displacement and substitution, in which the original and the derived constantly 
change their moments. In this sense, the Real past does not include the object of 
desire but stands for the object-cause of desire, through which desired objects 
circulate across time. It is a past open to the present in which one will not cease 
perceiving something new, as well as something impossible.  
 
2.4 Death Drive as the Real Future 
If Lacan’s idea of the “consciousness without the ego” intends to reappraise the 
passive synthesis of the past discarded by Freud himself, his interpretation of the 
death drive can be regarded as an attempt to reveal an unformulated passive 
synthesis of the future in Freud’s work. Consistent with his theoretical 
development in the Project, Freud concludes The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) 
with the triumph of the ego (or the Pcs. /Cs. system) and the dominance of the 
active synthesis of the future. The secondary process takes over the primary 
process, suspends hallucination as an immediate satisfaction and binds the free-
flowing psychical forces in the dream. It is only through the ego that the active 
syntheses of the present, the past and the future, represented by attention, memory 
and thinking respectively, are produced.8 The ego, in the form of an “I”, promises 
                                                          
8 Freud’s discussion in relation to the three active syntheses of time, conducted by 
the ego, can be found in Formulations on two principles of mental function (Freud, 
1911). The ego’s function of attention as a form of active consciousness replaces 
bodily sensations. It is no longer a passive faculty of receptivity, but “meets the 
sense-impressions half way, instead of awaiting their appearance” (ibid., p.220). The 
ego’s function of memory lays down the result of the periodic searches for 
satisfaction, thus constituting the subjective experience of the past. Last but not 
least, the function of thinking directs both attention and memory towards the 
future: “Thinking was endowed with characteristics which made it possible for the 




in the present the future satisfaction of an unfulfilled wish from the past. In this 
sense, both the present and the past are no longer independent temporal registers 
but re-synthesised by the ego in accordance with the future, which determines 
what can be perceived in the present and what can be recollected from the past. 
This vision of the future conforms to a widespread belief held by many 
philosophers before and since, which takes the synthesis of the future as the 
“synthesis of synthesis”, an ultimate force of coordination which either “unifies the 
manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one 
representation” (Kant, 1998, p. A104), or “governs the other two described 
above…anticipates them, as it were” (Heidegger, 1965, p.191), or “subordinates the 
two to itself and strips them of their autonomy…ensures the order, the totality of 
the series and the final end of time” (Deleuze, 1994, p.94).  
 
However, according to Lacan’s interpretation, the evolution from the organism to 
egoism, from a physiological perspective of time to a psychological perspective of 
time, should not be considered as Freud’s final answer. The ego is a very unstable 
and fragile psychical organisation. The existence of the “consciousness without the 
ego” has exposed the myth that the unity of the ego is guaranteed by “the fact of 
consciousness” (Lacan, 1988b, p.45), thus depriving the ego of any ontological 
privilege it is supposed to enjoy. The ego’s formation is closely associated with the 
process of energy binding, but only in an imaginary way. As Lacan points out, “any 
conception of the unity of the psyche, of the supposed totalising, synthesising 
psyche, ascending towards consciousness, perishes there” (Lacan, 1998, p.51). 
Lacan suggests that his critique of the ego is supported by Freud’s later theoretical 
development. In 1920, the celebrated but also controversial work Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle marked a radical revision of Freud’s early theory. With the 
introduction of the death instinct, Freud’s attention was no longer restricted to the 
psychical conflict within the “primary process – secondary process” system. He 
returned to the organism to find another, not yet identifiable body process that is 
                                                          





able to account for the multiple dimensions of human experience. However, 
Freud’s theorisation of the death instinct turns out to be unsatisfactory. To begin 
with, we shall remember that the term “Instinct”9 made its first appearance in 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (Freud, 1905b). At that time, it did not 
suggest a leap in Freud’s theoretical development, as we have already seen the 
prototype of this notion in the Project, where endogenous stimuli originating in 
the cells of the body generate a constant impact on the neural system. As 
Laplanche and Pontalis explain, “the idea originates as an energetic notion in a 
                                                          
9 Regarding the long-lasting controversy around the English translation of Freud’s 
Trieb, both Lacan and many Anglo-American psychoanalysts have made a clear 
distinction between “instinct” and “drive”, and preferred the latter as the more 
correct translation. However, it is important to note different reasons behind their 
common choice. Anglo-American psychoanalysts generally regard the opposition 
between instinct and drive as “biological forces vs. psychological forces”. Otto F. 
Kernberg suggests, “the Strachey translation has had the unfortunate effect of 
linking Freud’s drive concept too closely with biology, inhibiting psychoanalytic 
research into the nature of the mediating process that bridges biological instincts 
with drives, defined as pure psychic motivation" (Kernberg, 1995, p.4). However, it 
is impossible to deny that the term Trieb indeed has a strong biological connotation. 
According to Freud’s definition, Trieb “appears to us…as the psychical representative 
of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind” (Freud, 
1915a, p.122). It stands for “the forces which we assume to exist behind the tension 
caused by the needs of the id” (Freud, 1938, p. 148). One has to admit that Freud 
understands Trieb, at least before his introduction of Todestrieb, largely as a 
biological given. The fact that Freud contrasts Instinkt and Trieb only suggests a 
possible difference between animal instinct and human instinct without endorsing 
any over-psychologising interpretation. Therefore, throughout this thesis, I will 
follow Strachey to translate both Instinkt and Trieb in Freud’s work into “instinct”, 
not only for the sake of consistency with the translations being quoted, but also to 
remain faithful to Freud’s original thinking. On the other hand, I will use “drive” to 
translate the same term in Lacan’s work. Although Lacan equally rejects “instinct” 
as the English translation of Trieb, and has even made a strong claim that “the drive 
– the Freudian drive – has nothing to do with instinct (none of Freud’s expressions 
allows for confusion here)” (Lacan, 2006d, p.722), the meaning of his “drive” is not 
an overall psychologisation of Freud’s various instincts, but, if we look closely, 
derived exclusively from a rereading and reconstruction of Freud’s Todestrieb. While 
the Todestrieb, in Freud’s opinion, is one Trieb that exists alongside the other, Lacan,  
by arguing that “every drive is virtually a death drive” (Lacan, 2006f, p. 719), takes 
it as the genus under which all drives must fall. In so doing, Lacan does not 
translate but reclassifies Freud’s conceptual vocabulary. My following discussion 
concentrates precisely on this conceptual nuance, as I will demonstrate how Lacan’s 





distinction that Freud made in very early days between two types of 
excitation…there exist internal sources of a constant inflow of excitation which the 
organism cannot evade and which is the basis of the functioning of the psychical 
apparatus” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p.215). In Freud’s first instinctual model, 
the origin of both the sexual instinct and the ego instinct (the self-preservative 
instinct) can be easily located at some fundamental types of internal energy 
sources, such as hunger, thirst and sexuality. However, the same task becomes 
much more difficult when it comes to the death instinct (Thanatos), whose 
existence is only descriptively demonstrated rather than ontologically explained in 
energetical terms.  
 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, three sets of behaviours, from the repetitive 
emergence of unpleasant experience in dreams of patients suffering from 
traumatic neurosis, to a child’s play that involves repeatedly throwing a reel by the 
string away while saying “o-o-o-o” and pulling it back while saying “da”, to the 
repetition of unwanted situations and painful emotions in the transference 
phenomena of neurotics, lead Freud to wonder if the individual is “pursued by a 
malignant fate or possessed by some daemonic power” (Freud, 1920a, p.21). Based 
on these observations, Freud “finds courage to assume that there really does exist 
in the mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle” (ibid., 
p.22). However, energetically speaking, all instincts Freud identified before lead to 
certain repetitive activities corresponding to the recurrent needs which generate a 
state of tension in the organism, no matter if the activity is eating, drinking or 
sexual discharge. A repetitive phenomenon without a clear instinctual ground can 
be interpreted in infinite ways, many of which conform to rather than contradict 
the pleasure principle. For example, the child’s play can be understood as a 
representation of the self-preservative instinct, which drives the child, through 
active repetition, to master a passive situation that has overwhelmed him; 
transference repetition can be understood as the representation of the sexual 
instinct, a demand to re-experience the absolute satisfaction against the delay of 
the reality principle. As a matter of fact, Freud soon realises his overconfidence 
about his discovery, as he admits that “none of this contradicts the pleasure 
81 
 
principle; repetition, the re-experiencing of something identical, is clearly in itself 
a source of pleasure” (ibid., p.36). The repetitive compulsion only overrides the 
pleasure principle when it attaches to an instinctual force that refuses to follow the 
pleasure principle. In response to this demand, Freud postulates an instinct that is 
“inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity 
has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces” 
(ibid.), an instinct that is “brought into being by the coming to life of inorganic 
substance” (ibid., p.60, footnote), an instinct that literally has death as its aim. 
 
Freud’s biological explanation of these observed psychic phenomena in terms of a 
new instinct is unexpected if not entirely unreasonable. First of all, it is unclear 
how the death instinct will explain the repetition compulsion better than other 
existing instincts, as Richard Boothby points out: “The idea of repetition does not 
by itself imply any tendency toward a restoration of an earlier state of things” 
(Boothby, 1991, p.79). Secondly, the idea that an instinct seeks its own death sounds 
even less compelling. Although Freud has recourse to Weismann’s morphological 
theory, whose distinction between soma and germ-plasm seems to share “striking 
similarity” with his distinction between the death instinct and the life instinct 
(Eros, the fusion of the sexual instinct and the ego instinct), the result is 
disappointing. Weismann’s assertion that death is a late acquisition “is of very little 
help to us. For…there can be no question of there having been death instincts from 
the very beginning of life on this earth” (Freud, 1920a, p.47). Apart from that, 
scientific evidence of a biologically determined trend towards death lacks in 
Freud’s text, although it does not discourage Freud from believing that “we are at 
liberty to continue concerning ourselves with their possibility” (ibid., p.49) 10 . 
                                                          
10 Some commentators suggest that human suffering during the First World War 
may be a main factor causing Freud to invent the death instinct responsible for 
destruction, aggression and death. However, Freud completed Thoughts for the 
Times on War and Death (1915) five years earlier, and at the same time, he attributed 
hate, destruction and aggression to the ego instinct: “The object is brought to the 
ego from the external world in the first instance by the instincts of self-preservation; 
and it cannot be denied that hating, too, originally characterized the relation of the 
ego to the alien external world with the stimuli it introduces…this hate can 




Thirdly, the death instinct is incompatible with the definition of instinct in Freud’s 
Instincts and their vicissitudes (1915). As many have noted, “the death instinct and 
the outwardly directed aggressive drive, that some take to be independent of it, 
lack one or more of the defining attributes of source, aim, object, and impetus or 
pressure” (Johnston, 2005; Loewenstein, 1940; Lowental, 1983; Macmillan, 1997). 
Last but not least, Freud’s distinction between the death instinct and the life 
instinct collapses at the end of his paper when it comes to the problem of psychical 
tension. The life instinct, following the pleasure principle, aims at the diminution 
of psychic tension, whereas the death instinct is also defined by Freud as an 
impulse reducing tensions to a minimum. As a result: 
 
The dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life in 
general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal 
tension due to stimuli (the ‘Nirvana principle’, to borrow a term from 
Barbara Low) – a tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle; 
and our recognition of the fact is one of our strongest reasons for believing 
in the existence of death instincts (Freud, 1920a, pp.55-56).  
 
An instinct that accounts for psychic phenomena that override the pleasure 
principle ends up following the pleasure principle. This paradox, along with a 
number of logical inconsistencies summarised above, leads many post-Freudian 
psychoanalysts to question the validity of the death instinct. However, from a 
different perspective, it is difficult for the reader not to be puzzled and also 
impressed by Freud’s insistence on this new discovery against all objections, as if 
something matters so much that he has no choice but to reconstruct the instinctual 
theory and the psychic apparatus completely. As Lacan observes, “the death instinct 
is itself a leap in relation to the phenomena accounted for, an enormous leap”, but 
“if this articulation has seemed to him to be worth communicating, it is because he 
was of necessity brought down the path of this problematic” (Lacan, 1988b, p.67). 
Following the direction Freud has pointed out, Lacan’s interpretation of the 
                                                          
object—an intention to destroy it” (Freud, 1915a, pp.136–37). Therefore, it hardly 




Todestrieb reveals the necessity buried under Freud’s confusing if not contradictory 
descriptions. In so doing, he reclaims the last piece of the puzzle that completes 
our theorisation of Real time.  
 
As we have already discussed, the guideline of Lacan’s rereading of Freud’s 
metapsychology is to replace the original biological framework with a mechanical 
framework. With regard to the death instinct, Lacan does not hesitate to point out 
in the same way that the appeal to biology is the root of most confusions and 
contradictions in Freud’s discussion. The psychical repetitive tendency must not be 
explained in terms of a biological restitutive tendency, as Lacan makes it clear that 
“I can cite you several authors for whom reducing the stimuli to the minimum 
means nothing more nor less than the death of the living being…when Freud speaks 
of the death instinct, he is, thank God, designating something less absurd, less anti-
biological, anti-scientific” (ibid., p.80). Against the biological inclination, Lacan 
reformulates the Todestrieb in terms of the death drive rather than the death 
instinct. “Death” here has no relationship with biological death, but designates 
symbolic death: “it is in the signifier and insofar as the subject articulates a 
signifying chain that he comes up against the fact that he may disappear from the 
chain of what he is” (Lacan, 1992, p.295). Lacan would even go so far as to conceive 
of death as a signifier and nothing but a signifier (Lacan, 1998, p.257). This 
conceptual reinvention seems far-fetched at first sight, but it actually can be 
situated within Freud’s text and turns Beyond the Pleasure Principle into a more 
coherent piece of work.  
 
To begin with, the repetitive phenomena of the death drive are now clearly 
differentiated from those of the life instinct. Instinctual tensions are generated and 
discharged recurrently because their sources are biological needs, whereas the drive 
which presses towards discharge of tensions “is of a quite different nature, and is 
on a quite different plane”. Its machinelike constancy “forbids any assimilation of 
the drive to a biological function, which always has a rhythm” (Lacan, 1998, p.165). 
Moreover, the opposition between Thanatos and Eros can now be unequivocally 
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confirmed. It is not an opposition between two types of instincts but between drive 
and instinct. The life instinct is the psychical representative of the stimuli 
originating from within the organism. The death drive, on the other hand, is the 
psychical representative of the symbolic order, or in Lacan’s words, “only the mask 
of the symbolic order” (Lacan, 1988b, p.326). Identifying the death drive with the 
symbolic order does not mean that the death drive functions symbolically. It simply 
means that the death drive is a somatic process initiated by symbolic causes outside 
of the body. It is the result of the embodiment of the nets of language in the 
organism, “an effect of the signifier into something fragmented and panic-stricken” 
(Lacan, 1992, p.301). Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes can be applied here. The 
physical substratum is the material cause of the death drive while the symbolic 
order is the formal cause of the death drive. In other words, if the instinct is the 
demand of the body on the mind, then the drive posits the demand of the symbolic 
order on the body as its presupposition. To understand this point, we shall turn to 
Lacan’s graph of drive in Seminar XI: 
 
 
Figure 2 Graph of the Movement of the Drive. Reprinted from Lacan, J. (1998). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. (p.178). (J.-A. Miller, Ed.). Translated by 
Alan Sheridan. London & New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
This graph represents the journey of the drive through a certain path. Unlike 
Freud’s instinct which seeks discharge along established one-way paths, presses the 
internal tensions outwards to the muscular mechanisms and achieves satisfaction, 
in Lacan’s formulation of the drive, “what is fundamental at the level of each drive 
85 
 
is the movement outwards and back in which it is structured” (ibid., p.177), and the 
aim of the drive “is simply this return into circuit” (ibid., p.179). Yet how can we 
explain this strange circular movement of the drive? A common misunderstanding 
of this graph, which presumes the part below the rim as the body, and the part 
above the rim as the outside world, makes this problem incomprehensible. The 
drive which moves outside the body will discharge all energy and is impossible to 
move back. In fact, Lacan never clarifies which is the body, and which is the outside 
world in this picture, but if we rotate it 90 degrees counter clockwise and juxtapose 
it with another graph we find in Seminar XI, the circular movement of the drive will 
be much easier to understand: 
 
 




Figure 4. Graph of the Subject, the Erogenous Zone and the Unconscious. Reprinted from Lacan, J. (1998). 
The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. (p.187) (J.-A. 
Miller, Ed.). Translated by Alan Sheridan. London & New York: W. W. Norton & Company.  
 
Our previous spatial assumption must be reversed. The drive does not come from 
the body towards the outside world and then miraculously return; on the contrary, 
originating in the field of the Other, the drive is brought into existence by forces 
impinging from the outside. Having dramatically increased tensions in the 
organism, it then turns around, moves with the life instinct towards the motor exit 
and strives for satisfaction. The trajectory of the drive movement Lacan depicts in 
Seminar XI resonates with what Freud understands as the traumatic process in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle: Excitations “from outside which are powerful enough 
to break through the protective shield” break the barrier against stimuli, “set in 
motion every possible defensive measure” so that the intruder can then be disposed 
of (Freud, 1920a, p.29). During this process, the death drive achieves what can never 
be done by the instinct, that is the undoing and the unbinding of the ego. The death 
drive maintains an “unbound” state in the organism, not in the sense of having-not-
yet-been-bound, as in the case of some rudimentary instinctual forces, whose freely 
mobile processes are destined to be replaced by bound processes controlled by the 
ego; but in the sense of having-already-destroyed-the-binding, since a massive 
influx of forces from outside overwhelms the ego’s capacity to bind energy and 
threatens its imaginary coherence.  
 
Freud, despite his obsession with biologism, comes so close to this insight at one 
point in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, when he puts the contrast between the 
organic and the inorganic aside for a moment and picks up the difference between 
binding and unbinding: “The aim of the first of these basic instincts [Eros] is to 
establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus – in short, to bind together; 
the aim of the destructive instinct is on the contrary, to undo connections and so 
to destroy things” (Freud, 1938, p.148). If the life instinct tends to decrease tension 
in the control of the ego, since “the binding is a preparatory act which introduces 
and assures the dominance of the pleasure principle” (Freud, 1920a, p.62), we may 
say that the death drive intends to do the same only after the negation of the ego. 
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In this sense, what the death drive really goes beyond is the reality principle as “a 
prolongation or an application of the pleasure principle” (Lacan, 1992, p.21). 
 
The death drive is Lacan’s most powerful weapon in his tireless attack on the 
sovereignty of the ego. Although Lacan’s death drive is commonly understood as a 
representation of the return of the Real in the Symbolic, based on our reading of 
Lacan’s graph of the movement of the drive, I argue that it should be more 
accurately defined as a traumatic intrusion of the Symbolic into the organism at the 
expense of the Imaginary, which evokes a strong reaction of the Real. It is clear that 
the death drive in Lacan’s work stands for the passive synthesis of the Real future. 
It subverts the temporal narrative elaborated by Freud in his first topology, in which 
a dominant, “ego-based” future incorporates both the past and the present, and 
constrains the passive, primary process of the body so that it can only take an 
imaginarily bound state as its final destination. What distinguishes the Real future 
in Lacan’s work from this narrative, and from other philosophical thinking about 
the future following the Kantian model, is that it rejects any form of active 
involvement from the human subject. While the ego posits a distant horizon which 
one must struggle to reach, produces a fantasy screen of fulfilment which absorbs 
all dissatisfaction in the past and the present, and introduces a sense of inertia in 
the present situation where every impulse must “wait” until the future unfolds; the 
death drive eliminates the imaginary future in the disguise of unreachability or 
unattainability, and is experienced by the subject as what comes back from the 
future.  
 
In Seminar I, Lacan explains what this backward temporal movement means: “If 
one of them sends a message to the other, for example, a square, the being going in 
the opposite direction will first of all see the square vanishing, before seeing the 
square” (Lacan, 1988a, p.157). This is precisely what the movement of the death 
drive suggests, as we first witness the after-effect of the death drive, namely the 
undoing of the ego, before it can possibly come into the body and presents itself as 
a somatic process with the aim of complete discharge. The genesis of the death 
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drive demonstrates how the organism perceives a temporal dimension 
incomprehensible to the ego. It subverts the chronological sequence of the maturity 
of the sexual instinct, “disrupts the smooth fitting together of reality and the 
imaginary which should in principle exist” (ibid., p.149). The Real future 
synthesised by the death drive is not a “future after the present” but a “future in the 
present”. Without being constricted to a few fixed biological stimuli, the death 
drive draws unlimited possibilities from the symbolic order. Therefore, it frees the 
present from the form imposed upon it by the ego – whether as the constraint of 
memory or as the moulding of fantasy - and enlarges the present to include the Real 
past, so that it can cover the whole of our relationship to the world. It is a future in 
the Deleuzian sense of the “eternal return”, which “affirms everything of the 
multiple, everything of the different, everything of change except what 
subordinates them to the One, to the Same, to necessity, everything except the One, 
the Same and the Necessary” (Deleuze, 1994, p.115).  
 
The synthesis of the Real future is of crucial importance in Lacan’s Real time 
because it stands for the temporal dimension of freedom. Freedom is realised when 
the subject lives the future in the present when the present becomes a “present of 
difference” overwhelmed by actualised possibilities. Freedom does not mean that 
the subject is freed from the Real body as the material substratum; on the contrary, 
it means that the subject is freed from the ego by returning to the body and 
recognises that its passivity is another kind of activity that determines how itself 
should be determined. This is precisely what the prisoner feels at the moment of 
subjectivisation in Lacan’s “Logical Time” essay. For as long as he discards his 
imaginary identification with the pre-existing rule in order to make his own rule, 
he has already won and will always win.  
 
In summary, Real time concerns the bodily dimension of time. Built on Freud’s 
theory of energetics, Lacan’s idea of the “consciousness without the ego” and his 
reformulation of the death drive contribute to a robust theory about how different 
temporal dimensions are first and foremost synthesised by the body. It responds to 
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the mind-body problem which perplexes philosophical investigations of time. The 
body or the organism here is not a biologically determined entity, nor is it a blank 
surface completely shaped and reconfigured culturally, politically or linguistically. 
Instead, it is an autonomous “body-machine” outside of what is being symbolised 
that perpetually receives, circulates and disseminates tensions while resisting, 
disrupting and defying the ego’s manipulation. It distances “what is the marvellous 
harmony of the living organism in its milieu in order to operate and dislocate, 
dismember and disarticulate” (Miller, 2001, p.14). It is in this sense that we can 
understand the body as the Real, and speak of time synthesised by the body as Real 
time. Far from restricting its attention to experiences of time in the forms of 
perception, memory or expectation, Lacanian psychoanalysis, through critically 
inheriting and developing Freud’s metapsychology, shows how these experiences 
are only organised by the imaginary ego, and further questions how they are made 
possible and impossible by passive, organismic processes. Real time leads the 
subject to perceive reality in the Real present, a present which is not characterised 
by instantaneity and immediacy but contains what “have already been structured” 
(i.e., the Real past as the past in the present) and what “presents itself in his 
experience as something that always returns to the same place” (i.e., the Real future 
as the future in the present) (Lacan, 1992, pp.74-75). The body may be a passive 
substance, but the temporal life produced out of this body is deeply positive. It 
offers the possibility of freedom that transcends the isolated, egotistic individual 
and conditions an act of liberation from the established temporal order.   
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3. Symbolic Time 
 
In Seminar II, Lacan points out that “I in fact believe that there are two sorts of 
relations to time. From the moment that a part of the symbolic world comes into 
existence, it does indeed create its own past. But not in the same way as the form 
at the intuitive level” (Lacan, 1988b, p.19). While the last chapter on Real time can 
be considered as a study of time at the level of intuition, sensation and drive, where 
time is passively synthesised and remains unrepresentable, but nevertheless 
constitutes the world of representations and conditions the active experience of 
time which is regulated by the ego, this chapter will be devoted to an explanation 
of this “second relation” to time as a result of the intervention of the symbolic 
world. What Lacan points out in this statement and will continue to explore in his 
later work is another register of time at the level of representation, where objects 
are represented to the individual by signifiers from the symbolic order. It’s a 
temporal register that defines man’s existential condition in the symbolic reality 
by connecting the subject and the Other through temporal interactions. 
 
Let us begin to approach this temporal register by first asking what the temporal 
nature of the symbolic order is. Lacan’s work on the symbolic order has often been 
referenced to support the argument that he was part of the structuralist 
phenomenon in France since the 1950s, sharing viewpoints with a group of 
intellectuals including Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roman Jakobson and Roland Barthes. 
We should certainly admit that using Saussure’s structural linguistics to 
reformulate Freudian psychoanalysis is an essential component of Lacan’s work. 
What Lacan finds interesting is the mechanism of word-plays in numerous psychic 
phenomena studied by Freud, from jokes and parapraxes to dreams. Not only can 
the signification of these phenomena be read through the linguistic structure, but 
they themselves are structured like language. By replacing Freud’s ideas of 
condensation and replacement with rhetorical devices such as metaphor and 
metonymy, Lacan moves away from individual psychology, which, according to 
him, is a misdirected development of Freudian psychoanalysis represented by the 
American ego psychology, to a study of symbolic functions as the determination of 
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the human order: “Everything is ordered in accordance with the symbols which 
have emerged, in accordance with the symbols once they have appeared” and 
“everything which is human has to be ordained within a universe constituted by 
the symbolic function” (Lacan, 1993, p.29). The idea of the “symbolic universe” 
seems to imply some universal and autonomous rules of human society and the 
human mind, an assumption fundamental to structuralist thoughts. 
 
This being the case, many have argued that the overall theoretical edifice of Lacan 
cannot be confined to a structuralist framework. Bruce Fink suggests that “while 
structure plays a very important role in Lacan’s work, it is not the whole story, nor 
was it ever at any point in Lacan’s development” (Fink, 1995, p.64). Not only 
because chronologically, the later Lacan in the 1970s became more interested in 
the Real which lies outside language and resists assimilation by the symbolic 
structure, but also because Lacan’s theory, in general, does not share the strong 
sense of determinism and conformity with structuralism. As Eve Tavor Bannet 
suggests, if we cease to regard the label ‘structuralist’ as a description of method, 
and begin to think of it ideologically, as an intellectual endeavour that defines 
society as a system that exclusively restricts human action, “leaving no place for 
innovation, creativity and non-conformity”, then we must read Lacan as an anti-
structuralist or counter-structuralist (Bannet, 1989, pp.3–4). The Lacanian subject, 
despite being alienated by the symbolic order and determined by the name-of-the-
father, retains what Jacques Alain Miller calls “the ineliminable feature of 
subjectivity” that has often been excluded in typical structuralist thinking (Miller, 
2012). Lacan is able to maintain this seemingly paradoxical position by reversing 
Saussure’s algorithm and putting the signifier over the signified, which not only 
indicates the primacy of the signifier but also produces an incessant sliding of 
meaning in the symbolic structure that can never be pinned down to a fixed point. 
The subject in the symbolic structure is not an entity but a void that lacks 
substantial existence, a speaking being that does not manifest itself in speech. 
Introducing the subject as pure negativity also radicalises the notion of structure 
itself, which no longer designates an all-encompassing system but a dynamic one 
in the process of constitution. There is a dialectic relation between the structure 
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and the subject: “the absence is produced in the real order of the structure”, while 
“the action of the structure comes to be supported by a lack” (ibid.). 
 
As we have seen, these attempts to distance Lacan from structuralism often takes 
the form of a different imagination of space, in the sense that the Lacanian 
structure is understood as an incomplete structure and the Lacanian subject 
appears as lack or absence, something that the symbolic order leaves ungrasped. 
On the other hand, time has also been a central problem of structuralism. 
Following Saussure’s privileging of synchronic analysis over diachronic analysis of 
language, structuralist theories often focus on principles, rules and relational 
models that are supposed to be universal and permanent, at the same time failing 
to address the question of how the structure itself comes into being. However, it is 
striking to find that this ignorance of time is repeated by the critics of structuralism. 
In post-structuralist thinking, rather than being a problem that needs to be solved, 
the historicisation of the structure becomes a metaphysical illusion that should be 
discarded to serve the logic of spatialisation. Derrida’s classic critique of 
structuralism in his paper “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences” is an example of this strategy. To Derrida, the quest for the origin is a 
reiteration of a basic metaphysical assumption of Western philosophy, which 
insists on the existence of a fixed centre and a static presence. The fact that 
structuralism is haunted by the “structurality of structure” itself is a testimony to 
its inability to imagine an unorganised, centreless space where a play of 
signification replaces the historical substitution of the centre. He points out that 
“the thematic of historicity, although it seems to be a somewhat late arrival in 
philosophy, has always been required by the determination of Being as presence” 
(Derrida, 2005b, p.368). Therefore, to deconstruct the structure necessarily 
requires “a rupture with its past, its origin and its cause”. An ideal structure for 
Derrida “compels a neutralisation of time and history” (ibid.), leading to an infinite 




In contrast to both the structuralist and the post-structuralist reading, what I 
intend to demonstrate in this chapter is that Lacan’s understanding of the symbolic 
structure takes time into account and refuses to follow the logic of spatialisation. 
It is Lacan’s claim in Seminar XII that “the field of the Other is inscribed in what I 
will call Cartesian coordinates, a sort of space that for its part is three dimensional, 
except that it is not space, it is time” (Lacan, 1964, p.58). Time is neither overlooked 
nor intentionally rejected, but inherent in the symbolic structure, which is not only 
an incomplete meaning-system but also a dynamic one, characterised by 
mutability and fluidity of signifiers. As Lacan continues: “For in the experience 
which is the creative experience of the subject at the locus of the Other, we well 
and truly, whatever has been said in previous formulations, have to take into 
account a time that cannot in any way be reduced to the linear property – past, 
present, future” (ibid.). To contain time within the structure does not mean that 
Lacan returns to what Derrida calls “a teleological and eschatological metaphysics”. 
On the contrary, this specific temporal register Lacan develops accounts for a non-
linear process of encounters between the subject and the Other.  
 
Throughout this chapter, I intend to bring together scattered pieces of writings in 
Lacan’s work which imply the existence of Symbolic time and explore how this 
temporal register introduces a new approach to understanding the Lacanian 
subject. In the first section, I examine how Freud’s famous argument that “the 
unconscious is timeless” has been given a fresh meaning in the Lacanian 
framework. Like his development of Real time from Freud’s metapsychology, the 
notion of Symbolic time is also derived from Lacan’s radical reinterpretation of 
Freud’s argument on the time of the unconscious. In the second section, I explore 
how Lacan theorises Symbolic time on the basis of cybernetics. The symbolic 
machine produces an impenetrable temporal dimension in which the unconscious 
is constituted. In the third section, I move from abstract symbolic articulation back 
to the practice of psychoanalysis by examining Freud’s case study of the Wolf Man 
and Lacan’s reading of Hamlet. I suggest that there is continuity between these two 





3.1 The Unconscious: Timelessness or Otherness? 
Throughout Freud’s theoretical development, there was a rich account of time in 
relation to a range of psychic phenomena, from trauma and dream to infantile 
development. As part of this “tree of time” in Freud’s thought, the idea of the 
timelessness of the unconscious plays a central role (Green, 2005, p.173). It 
describes a distinctive characteristic of the unconscious and determines the way 
we understand psychic causality. It is also a problem highly relevant to our 
theorisation of Symbolic time because if the unconscious, as Lacan claims over and 
over again, is structured like a language, any attempt to introduce time into the 
symbolic structure must first deal with the Freudian unconscious which seemingly 
resists being subordinated to time. 
 
To understand the definition of Freudian timelessness requires us to first examine 
the genesis of this concept in Freud’s work. As Adrian Johnston suggests, Freud’s 
argument that the unconscious is timeless is a result of a long line of observations 
and thinking. It is abstracted from a congregation of various psychoanalytic ideas 
including “the indestructibility of infantile wishes, the persistence of 
polymorphously perverse libidinal activities through sublimation, the mechanisms 
of transferential object-choice in neurosis” (Johnston, 2005, p.7). Strachey, in his 
examination of appearances of the term “timelessness” throughout Freud’s writing, 
points out that while the idea had already been indirectly alluded to in The 
Interpretation of Dreams,11 the first explicit reference to it was in a footnote added 
in 1907 to The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), where Freud made a 
comment that “in the case of repressed memory-traces it can be demonstrated that 
they undergo no alteration even in the course of the longest period of time” (Freud, 
1901, p.274). The timelessness of the unconscious takes the form of psychical 
fixation which preserves all previous impressions, “not only in the same form in 
                                                          
11 Freud claims in this book that “it is a prominent feature of unconscious processes 
that they are indestructible. In the unconscious, nothing can be brought to an end, 
nothing is past or forgotten” (Freud, 1900, p.577).  
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which they were first received, but also in all the forms which they have adopted 
in their further developments”. In Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through 
(1914), Freud continued to elaborate this idea by highlighting how early childhood 
impressions are the most valuable memories for psychoanalysis: “Not only some 
but all of what is essential from childhood has been retained in these memories. It 
is simply a question of knowing how to extract it out of them by analysis” (Freud, 
1914b, p.148). Based on these speculations, Freud formally introduced timelessness 
as an essential characteristic of the system Ucs. in his 1915 metapsychological paper 
The Unconscious (1915): 
 
The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered 
temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference 
to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of 
the system Cs (Freud, 1915c, p.187). 
 
According to these statements, it is clear that what Freud had in mind when he 
talked about “timelessness” is certain representational content (memories, wishes 
and fantasies) in the unconscious that is unforgettable. In this sense, timelessness 
equals permanence and immutability. If the discovery of the Freudian unconscious, 
as generally believed, amounts to the “Copernican revolution”, the idea of the 
timeless unconscious can be regarded as his most original contribution to the 
philosophy of time, which puts the validity of Kant’s famous argument that time is 
a priori form of intuition into question. In the previous chapter, I discussed and 
compared Kant’s and Freud’s different understandings of the syntheses of time, an 
idea which remains latent in Freud’s work. Here, in relation to the timeless 
unconscious, Freud made some direct comments on Kant’s philosophy. In Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920a), Freud indicates that after certain psychoanalytic 
discoveries, we are now in a position to discuss “the Kantian theorem that time and 
space are ‘necessary forms of thought’” (Freud, 1920a, p.28). He then goes on saying 
that “we have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in themselves ‘timeless’” 
without making clear the relationship between this “timelessness” and Kant’s point 
of view of time. Such a clarification only arrived years later in New Introductory 
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Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933), where Freud offers a direct refutation of the 
Kantian notion of time: 
 
There is nothing in the id that could be compared with negation; and we 
perceive with surprise an exception to the philosophical theorem that 
space and time are necessary forms of our mental acts. There is nothing in 
the id that corresponds to the idea of time; there is no recognition of the 
passage of time, and—a thing that is most remarkable and awaits 
consideration in philosophical thought—no alteration in its mental 
processes is produced by the passage of time (Freud, 1933, p.74). 
 
It appears that in Freud’s opinion, the psychoanalytic finding that a portion of the 
mind is timeless is in contrast to Kant’s understanding of consciousness where time 
is given as an a priori form, which shapes experience and makes all actuality of 
appearances possible (Kant, 1998). However, subversive as it sounds to many 
commentators of Freud (Green, 2005, p.165; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1968), Freud’s is 
not sustainable upon closer inspection. To begin with, Freud’s timelessness and 
Kantian time are not even constituted at the same level to be contestable. By 
arguing that time is a transcendental principle of subjective cognition that “lies a 
priori at the basis of the empirical” (Kant, 1912, p.36), Kantian time belongs on a 
nonrepresentational level that determines our perceptions of the world of 
representations. On the other hand, the Freudian unconscious, consisting not of 
abstract forms but of very concrete contents, often in relation to infantile sexuality 
and primary object relations, is firmly rooted at the level of the representation. Yet 
the ability to represent is incompatible with the idea of atemporality since the 
difference between the original perception and its re-presentation can only be 
perceived through time. In other words, Freud’s unconscious contents must have 
an origin, a specific moment when they are acquired and individualised through 
the subject’s sensibility. It shall also have a history, in which the individual’s life is 
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influenced by the unconscious at various moments. Defining the unconscious as 
timeless seems to deny the essential temporal dimension of representation.12  
 
More importantly, if the unconscious must have a beginning, it also has an ending. 
In the paper “Time and the Unconscious”, based on her conversation with Freud, 
Marie Bonaparte argues that “even Freud is prepared to admit that repressed 
psychic content undergoes some modification, however unalterable it may appear 
to our conscious minds” (Bonaparte, 1940, p.439). For example, in New 
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933), Freud revisits the topic of the 
timeless unconscious and goes on to suggest that the unconscious contents “can 
only be recognised as belonging to the past, can only lose their importance and be 
deprived of their cathexis of energy, when they have been made conscious by the 
work of analysis, and it is on this that the therapeutic effect of analytic treatment 
                                                          
12 As a response to this problem, one may argue that Freud’s unconscious needs to 
be understood in terms of Kant’s idea of noumenon as thing-in-itself, which indeed 
does not recognise the passage of time since it cannot be represented. In fact, Freud 
adds credence to this speculation in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920): 
 
Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are 
subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what 
is perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to 
equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious 
mental processes which are their object (Freud, 1920a, p.171). 
 
However, there are considerable philosophical differences between the ways these 
two concepts are construed and employed by two authors that should make us reject 
this parallel. In Kant’s philosophy, the noumenal is the entity lying beyond the 
subjective representation. For a human agent capable of rational cognition, it is 
forever unknown and inaccessible. On the other hand, the unconscious, according 
to Freud, is located within the limit of subjective cognition. Being part of the psychic 
system that constantly influences the Pcs. and is subject to the influences from the 
latter at the same time, the unconscious is phenomenologically unknown because 
of repression but epistemologically knowable. In this sense, Bettina Bergo makes 
the point that “the unconscious was arguably more than Kant’s noumenon, because 
it did not set a speculative limit to the possibilities of experience but instead opened 





rests to no small extent” (Freud, 1933, p.92). If the task of psychoanalysis is to 
render the unconscious contents conscious by putting it in the temporal sequence 
of an individual’s life, to recognise and reconstruct the forgotten in the present, we 
must admit the possibility that the unconscious can be altered by the passage of 
time. For this reason, Charles Hanly points out that “Freud’s attributions of 
timelessness to unconscious constellations of memory, phantasy and wishful 
motives are inconsistent with his valid claim that these constellations can be 
modified by psychoanalysis” (Hanly, 2009, para.24). The assumption of the 
timeless unconscious is ontologically unjustifiable as it not only fails to be an 
exception to Kant’s philosophy of time, but also undermines the foundation of 
psychoanalysis as a therapeutic technique to bring change.13 
 
Having realised the problem in Freud’s treatment of time in relation to the 
unconscious, some contemporary readers of Freud come to suggest another 
possibility that the unconscious is not timeless but instead follows a different 
temporal order which Freud failed to describe. To Derrida, understanding Freud’s 
                                                          
13  In her book, Kelly Ann Noel-Smith defends the validity of the timeless 
unconscious by arguing that “Freud never claims that the cathartic effect of 
psychotherapy is to change the unconscious” (Noel-Smith, 2016, p.144). She 
describes a transition in Freud’s thinking on this topic, from an ego-centred view in 
the beginning, which regards the task of psychotherapy as permanent 
strengthening of the ego, “either enabling it to firm up its repressive function or to 
permit what is repressed access to consciousness: that is, either to keep material 
timeless or to impose temporal order on it” (pp.144-45), to a more pessimistic 
perspective in the end, which admits the temporariness of the therapeutic effect, 
due to the strength of the death drive “that undermines the help afforded by 
psychoanalysis” (p.146). However, I find this argument unconvincing. Firstly, 
imposing a temporal order on the unconscious is not merely a temporal relocation. 
The unconscious contents have also been changed since they are now related to 
other conscious memories and subject to meaningful associations. It is impossible 
to relocate the unconscious without a minimum working-through. To argue that the 
unconscious remains intact after being revealed is to deny the subjective 
reconstruction and resignification of memories which occurred at the conscious 
level. Secondly, the impossibility of permanent change does not mean that any 
change is impossible. On the contrary, it further indicates that the unconscious is 
no less temporal than the conscious, both of which defy the idea of permanence and 
belong to a process of constant transformation.   
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opposition between timelessness and time requires a more careful examination of 
the context in which the term “time” is defined: 
 
The timelessness of the unconscious is no doubt determined only in 
opposition to a common concept of time, a traditional concept, the 
metaphysical concept, the time of mechanics or the time of 
consciousness…The unconscious is no doubt timeless only from the 
standpoint of a certain vulgar conception of time (Derrida, 2005a, p.270). 
 
This argument is echoed by Julia Kristeva, who, in her reading of Freud, suggests 
that Freud’s idea of timelessness does not imply non-time, but refers to a “lost 
time”, a “time outside time” (Kristeva, 2002). Both Derrida and Kristeva reject the 
absolute absence of time in the Freudian unconscious while maintaining that the 
time of the unconscious cannot be confused with our everyday concept of time, 
namely the individual’s conscious temporal experience. In this sense, the term 
“timelessness” is indeed misleading, since it does not adequately convey the 
metapsychological meaning Freud attributes to the unconscious. If the target of 
Freud’s critique is only a form of time that is conscious, linear and chronological, 
there is no good reason to consider the negation of time as the only alternative. 
 
Similar to Derrida and Kristeva, we find in Lacan’s work a radical reworking of the 
relationship between time and the unconscious that does not fall into the naive 
opposition between chronological time and timelessness, but actively explores new 
possibilities of time. As we will see in Lacan’s interpretation, time of the 
unconscious is not eliminated, but articulated as a different temporal register 
separated from conscious time, one that manifests itself to the subject in the form 
of otherness.  
 
Throughout his reading of Freud, not only does Lacan rarely make use of the idea 
of the timeless unconscious, but he actually offers an explicit critique of the 
indestructibility of infantile wishes as the cornerstone of Freud’s argument. Freud 
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derives the idea that wishes in early childhood are most persistent and highly 
immutable from his study of dreams. In The Interpretation of Dreams, although 
Freud covers “dreams of hunger, dreams stimulated by thirst or by excretory needs, 
and dreams of mere convenience” (Freud, 1900, p.160), dreams caused by infantile 
wishes are considered to be of most psychoanalytic significance, as he claims that 
“our theory of dreams regards wishes originating in infancy as the indispensable 
motive force for the formation of dreams” (ibid., p.589). Hunger, thirst or excretory 
needs, standing for internal organic sensations, have only retained a “humbler” 
place in Freud’s dream theory by providing materials “accessible at any time” for 
the dream work to express repressed thoughts. Even the daytime thought is 
“obliged to find a connection in some way or other with an infantile wish which 
was now unconscious and suppressed, and which would enable it—suitably 
decocted, it is true—to ‘originate’ in consciousness.” (ibid., p.556).  
 
Although the theory of the determination of infantile wishes in one’s psychic life 
remains influential among various post-Freudian schools, there is a sense of 
vagueness in Freud’s explanation of this point that remains troubling. Firstly, if 
these infantile wishes are permanently unsatisfiable and developmentally 
inaccessible, it still needs to be explained how they become unconscious in the first 
place. According to Freud’s description of the primary process as characteristic of 
the unconscious, psychic excitations are subject to free and instant discharge 
without obstruction or delay. “An inhibition of the tendency of cathected ideas 
towards discharge”, as Freud would later indicate, belongs to the process of the 
system Pcs. (Freud, 1915c, p.188). Provided that we agree with this distinction, then 
how is it possible for the unconscious, at the time of childhood when the Pcs. has 
not yet fully developed, to be able to reserve wishes, often highly structured and 
well-organised wishes which require different objects, relationships and emotional 
feelings combining into an indissoluble representational unity? Clearly, forming 
such wishes necessarily requires the use of mimic materials kept in the system 
Mnem. system and the allocation of psychic energy performed by the secondary 
process, thus giving the system Pcs. a power to alter the unconscious which is in 
contradiction to Freud’s statement that the mechanism of the preconscious “is 
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restricted once and for all to directing along the most expedient paths the wishful 
impulses that arise from the unconscious” (Freud, 1900, p.603). Reflecting on this 
contradiction, Malcolm Macmillan concluded that “Freud’s explanations of the 
formation of symptoms and of some types of dreams requires the existence of a 
class of fantasies the theory of the mind says cannot exist. Repressed fantasies 
cannot exist in the Ucs. and cannot therefore be incorporated into dreams” 
(Macmillan, 1997, p.271).  
 
Secondly, there is a noteworthy inconsistency in Freud’s explanation of the 
mechanism of regression essential to the formation of dreams in adult life. 
According to Freud, everyday experience in adult life is not strong enough to 
produce a dream, unless it is connected with the forbidden expression of infantile 
wishes, and thus “attracted by the memory into regression as being the form of 
representation in which the memory itself is couched” (Freud, 1900, pp.544-45). 
Therefore, an adult dream is “a substitute for an infantile scene modified by being 
transferred on to a recent experience” (ibid., p.545). However, how do infantile 
wishes hold such a determinate power in the timeless unconscious? Adrian 
Johnston has drawn attention to this problem in Freud’s theory, as he points out 
that “if the unconscious is truly timeless, then it shouldn’t be capable of 
recognizing any chronological differences between the mnemic traces forming its 
content. This would therefore imply the possibility of nonhierarchized interactions 
between representations being the paradigm of unconscious processes” (Johnston, 
2005, p.136). In this sense, recent adult wishes should be as influential as earlier 
infantile wishes, both of which deserve equal distribution of wishful impetus from 
the unconscious. At least the activation of the former should not rely on the 
energetic displacement from the latter. In fact, Freud himself admits that: 
 
We have learnt, lastly, from numerous analyses that wherever a dream has 
undergone distortion the wish has arisen from the unconscious and was 
one which could not be perceived during the day. Thus it seems at a first 
glance as though all wishes are of equal importance and equal power in 
dreams. I cannot offer any proof here that the truth is nevertheless 




Unlike Freud, who nevertheless continues to insist on the regression to infantile 
wishes when evidence is lacking, Lacan in Seminar II explicitly rejects the idea of 
regression in any developmental sense. He remarks that “do we ever see any adult 
actually regress, return to the state of a small child, start wailing? Regression 
doesn’t exist” (Lacan, 1993, p.103), and “the idea of the regression of the individual 
to the initial stage of his development dominates…The entering into play of this 
notion, which now seems so familiar, is however not a matter of course” (ibid., 
p.147). To Lacan, infantile wishes do not enjoy any particular psychical significance 
whose distribution is based on chronological order. The unconscious is not defined 
by the residues of a phase of development when the primary process is the only 
kind of psychical process, nor must we have recourse to the childhood experience 
in order to understand the present. If the indestructibility and immutability of 
infantile wishes are put into question, so is the timelessness of the unconscious. 
However, how can we interpret the unconscious in the dream after getting rid of 
the dependence on the distant past? Does it mean that the unconscious is merely 
the sedimentation of the present experience during the day, or does it belong to 
another temporal register beyond the chronological order of conscious time? 
 
Lacan’s interpretation of the dream of Irma’s injection provides us with an answer. 
As the first dream presented by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams, a dream 
through which the secret of the unconscious is revealed to him, the dream of Irma’s 
injection occupies a crucial position in Freud’s theoretical development. However, 
as Lacan points out, Freud’s treatment of this dream does not lead to the 
conclusion he summarises later in the book, that the indestructible infantile wish 
is determinant in the dream formation. In his meticulous analysis of this now well-
known dream, Freud reveals two wishes - excusing his own responsibility in the 
unsuccessful treatment of Irma’s symptoms and putting the blame on his friend 
“Otto” - both of which are merely responses to the waking experience of recent 
events in Freud’s adult life. One may wonder where the unconscious infantile 
wishes are. If it is so important, how can they be absent in the dream which Freud 




The question in my view is rather more like this – how is it that Freud, 
who later on will develop the function of unconscious desire, is here 
content, for the first step in his demonstration, to present a dream which 
is entirely explained by the satisfaction of a desire which one cannot but 
call preconscious, and even entirely conscious? (ibid., p.151).  
 
Apart from Lacan, many commentators note the absence of evidence for infantile 
wishes in Freud’s dream interpretations and the lack of a method to test for their 
presence (Foulkes, 1978; R. M. Jones, 1978). While rejecting the need to regress to 
infantile wishes to explain this dream, Lacan does not accept the two preconscious 
wishes as the ultimate meaning of this dream either. In his two consecutive 
sessions devoted to the analysis of the dream of Irma’s injection, Lacan divides it 
into two parts. In the first part, Freud in the dream maintains an imaginary 
relationship with Irma by seeing his wife and another ideal patient behind her 
image. This part ends when he gets Irma to open her mouth, where a horrendous 
scene appears, “that of the flesh one never sees, the foundation of things, the other 
side of the head, of the face, the secretory glands par excellence” (Lacan, 1993, 
p.154). To Lacan, this horrendous picture designates the subject’s encounter with 
the Real, and “the experience of his being torn apart, of his isolation in relation to 
the world has been attained” (ibid., p.167).  
 
If this traumatic moment in the dream marks the disintegration of the ego as a 
loose aggregation of a series of imaginary identification, then the theme of the 
second part of the dream can be interpreted as symbolic reorganisation. After 
Freud’s ego being decomposed into three doctors, all of whom desperately try to 
explain the scene and thus to symbolise the Real, the dream ends with another 
peak, when a mysterious word presents to the subject: trimethylamine. This, in 
Lacan’s word, “explains everything.” In Freud’s original account, a series of 
associations are produced in relation to this word. However, to Lacan, the 
significance of this word does not come from what it may signify, be it the mystic 
trio (three women, three doctors) or a sexual meaning (trimethylamine as a 
decomposition product of sperm), but is derived precisely from a lack of meaning. 
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It is the pure gesture of pronunciation that introduces the discourse of the Other 
into play, “discourse as such, independently of its meaning, since it is a senseless 
discourse” (ibid., p.170). Trimethylamine appears in the dream as a signifier without 
signified to represent the subject, whose lack of being is revealed through its 
encounter with the Real. Substituting the “I of the subject” with the “N of the 
trimethylamine formula”, the subject in the dream regains a sense of self not by 
imaginary attachment but by symbolic fixation in the discourse of the Other so 
that it can recognise itself as a subject of the signifier. In this sense, the dream of 
Irma’s injection is indeed extraordinary, as it does not convey a personal secret but 
expresses the truth of psychoanalysis and tells an allegory of the constitution of the 
subject.  
 
Lacan's interpretation of Irma’s injection offers an insight into his understanding 
of the relation between time and the unconscious. The unconscious meaning of 
the dream is far more complicated than a narrowed range of infantile wishes, and 
far more dynamic than a limited number of messages with unchanging contents. 
To understand the unconscious necessarily means to locate the subject in the 
symbolic order and to find the signifier through which it speaks. The word 
trimethylamine in Freud’s dream can be seen as an “enigmatic signifier” in 
Laplanche’s terminology that comes from the Other. However, different from 
Laplanche’s theory, the encounter with the signifier does not take place in the 
subject’s conscious time. A linear narrative cannot be provided in which an 
enigmatic signifier was received in one’s early childhood and then revives in one’s 
adult life, calling for reinterpretation and retranslation.14 On the contrary, nothing 
                                                          
14 The problem of Laplanche’s theory of après-coup is that although it intends to go 
beyond the either-or choice between two temporal directions in the traditional 
understanding of time – a determinist one that proceeds from the past to the future 
and a retrospective or hermeneutic one that proceeds from the present to the past – 
by introducing the unconscious of the other, so that the dilemma of the primal scene 
between reality and fantasy can be solved by the idea of “enigmatic signifier”, it is 
still dominated by a unified and singular temporal register that is subjective and 
conscious. To place the enigmatic signifier in one’s childhood means that the 
individual only reaches the unconscious in a closed temporal circle consisting of his 
“own past” and “own present”. The problem of the temporal hierarchy which always 
prioritises the past remains to be solved.  
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in the subject’s life-history makes trimethylamine a certainty to come in the present, 
neither does the subject come across this signifier purely by accident. This signifier 
rather belongs to a temporal register independent of the subject’s existence and 
experience, produced through the autonomous mechanism of symbolic 
substitution and condensation, and spoken in a voice that is “nothing more than 
the voice of no one”, “which speaks in me, beyond me” (ibid., pp.170-171).  
 
The game Freud mentions at the end of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life 
further clarifies this point. In this game, the subject is invited to say numbers at 
random. In the following association, these numbers turn out to be not random at 
all but contain significance unique to the subject. In Lacan’s reading, the reason 
why “what he chose goes well beyond anything we might expect from pure chance” 
is not that these numbers were acquired in the past and repressed in memory, or 
that these numbers have already been articulated by the subject unconsciously, 
which means that one’s following association is simply a rediscovery of what one 
has already known. On the contrary, Lacan argues that these mathematical 
combinations are counted by the symbolic machine (Lacan, 1988b, p.56). The 
subject pronounces numbers as the production of a temporal process to which he 
himself does not belong: “Chance doesn’t exist. While the subject doesn’t think 
about it, the symbols continue to mount one another, to copulate, to proliferate, 
to fertilise each other, to jump on each other, to tear each other apart” (ibid., p.185). 
The individual’s following association is not a kind of reminiscence directed 
towards his own past, but a genuine exploration that introduces him into the 
discourse of the Other and generates meaning which he has never sensed before. 
In this sense, an encounter with the signifier from the Other is always an encounter 
with the time of the Other, or what I call “Symbolic time”. The history of the 
signifier is not “my past” in which the signifier is acquired, remembered and 
utilised, but an unknown process of becoming in the Other that will only unfold 




3.2 Mechanisation of the Symbolic Order 
By replacing the repressed messages left in the individual’s own past with the 
unknown signifier emerging from the operation of the symbolic order, Lacan’s 
reinterpretation of the unconscious opens up a different temporal register which 
externally determines the subject’s psychical life. However, how can we approach 
this temporal movement in which a thinking subject is absent? In the previous 
chapter, we examined Real time as the result of Lacan’s theorisation of the body-
machine. In this section, we will see that Lacan has done similar work in relation to 
the symbolic order by claiming that the world of the symbolic is indeed the world 
of the machine, and Symbolic time is the time of the signifying kinetics.  
 
Considering the theoretical continuity between Saussure and Lacan in terms of the 
privileged synchronic characteristic of the linguistic structure, it is understandable 
to see that the notion of time rarely appears in the contemporary discussion of 
Lacan’s idea of the Symbolic. For many thinkers, Lacan’s analysis of the signifier 
follows the fundamental principles of Saussure’s theory of language, in which the 
notion of time seems thoroughly repressed. To Saussure, language is defined by 
double perspectives: synchronic and diachronic, which lead to two branches of 
linguistic studies. These two perspectives, despite both being essential, cannot be 
analysed simultaneously. Transformations of a linguistic system over time can only 
be understood once a synchronic description of language is provided and functions 
as “the solid ground for discussion” (Saussure, 1965, p.73). More importantly, 
against the predominant historical linguistics of the nineteenth century, Saussure 
claims in his work that diachronic changes of language are in fact produced out of 
synchronic difference within language. With regard to the question of “the 
meaning that we attach to the word change”, Saussure refers to “a shift in the 
relationship between the signified and the signifier” (ibid., p.75). The relationship 
itself must remain stable, permanent and even transcendental during the constant 
historical evolution of various languages, and it is precisely because the nature of 
language is “a system of arbitrary signs and lacks the necessary basis”, that the 
historical changes of linguistic signs can become possible. In other words, 
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diachronic change is an effect of the synchronic structure, which unfolds spatial 
differences on the temporal axis. As Culler in this reading of Saussure explains: 
 
Historical or causal explanation is not what is required…Explanation in 
linguistics is structural: one explains forms and rules of combination by 
setting out the underlying system of relations, in a particular synchronic 
state, which create and define the elements of that synchronic system 
(Culler, 1986, p.45). 
 
This remark brings us back to Lacan, because similarly, the reduction of the 
signifier’s diachronic movement to its synchronicity can also be observed in 
Lacan’s texts. While Saussure argues that “language is a system whose parts can 
and must all be considered in their synchronic solidarity” (ibid., p.87), Lacan 
maintains that “the subject proceeds from his synchronic subjection in the field of 
the Other” (Lacan, 1998, p.188). The synchronic point of view occupies a significant 
proportion of Lacan’s discussion of the relationship between words and things. To 
Lacan, “The word doesn’t answer to the spatial distinctiveness of the object…but 
to its temporal dimension” (Lacan, 1988b, p.169). The world of things is always in 
motion and connected to the past and the future. Objects appear and disappear, 
leaving the subject a momentary experience. “If the human subject didn’t name,” 
Lacan says, “no world, not even a perception, could be sustained for more than one 
instant” (ibid., p.169). This remark resonates with Freud’s 1915 essay On Transience 
(1915), in which the ephemeral nature of all the beauty and mutability of human 
life become a source of profound emotional disturbance. The world of signifiers, 
on the other hand, stabilises and prolongs subjective experience through the 
operation of synchronic signification, since “it is through nomination that man 
makes objects subsist with a certain consistence” (ibid., p.169). If the transition 
between presence and absence necessarily implies the presence of time, then by 
substituting the absence of the object with its own presence, the signifier erases 
time and replaces it with an enduring presence that cannot fade away. This process 
is summarised in the obscure comments Lacan repeats in Seminar I and Seminar 
II: “The concept is the time of the thing” (Lacan, 1988a, p.242) and “The name is 
the time of the object” (Lacan, 1988b, p.169). If an object takes the place, a signifier 
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can be said to hold the place, and hence makes what Saussure calls “linguistic 
identity”, that is, the recognition and repetition of the same, possible within a 
semiological system.  
 
Built upon the de-temporalised relationship between signifiers and things, Lacan’s 
theory of synchrony can be understood in two ways: on the one hand, it means that 
the static, atemporal symbolic order is presented to the subject as a given, whose 
origin cannot be traced. As Lacan cautions his audience in Seminar XVII: 
“Language is present and already there, already efficacious…Our first rule is never 
to seek the origins of language. ” (Lacan, 2007, p.155) Language presents a complex 
network of oppositions that relates one signifier to another at one point in time. 
The infinite combinations and displacements of signifiers include and 
predetermine any potentiality, if not actuality, of meaning. On the other hand, it 
provides a structuration of various diachronic events encountered by the subject 
in one’s life history so that they don’t appear as contingent but necessary, in the 
sense that they repeat some fundamental themes of the discourse of the Other in 
a circular pattern. The whole symbolic structure, according to Lacan, can be seen 
as a symbolic circuit external to the subject, “tied to a certain group of supports, of 
human agents, in which the subject, the small circle which is called his destiny, is 
indeterminately included” (Lacan, 1988b, p.98). If this is the case, what is left to be 
considered from a temporal perspective? Having noticed the seeming superiority 
of synchronicity over diachronicity, Adrian Johnston questions whether the 
subject’s interaction with the Symbolic can lead to a genuine temporal experience 
or the Lacanian model of time is simply a redoubled synchronicity, reaffirming the 
hegemony of static, spatialised logic (Johnston, 2005, p.43). Slavoj Žižek, in his own 
manner, arrives at a similar conclusion, as he suggests that Lacan’s theoretical 
models take the ostensible historical account simply as “a temporal projection of 





Although there is some truth in these critiques, Johnston’s and Žižek’s elaborations 
of Lacan’s engagement with Saussurean theory are only valid in a restricted sense. 
Paradoxically, alongside various assertions of static, synchronic characteristics of 
the symbolic structure, Lacan, throughout his seminars, also insists on the 
existence of another side of the symbolic structure that is intrinsically temporal. 
For example, in Seminar VI, Lacan speaks of language not as the fixation of the 
momentary appearance of things, but as the very creation of time: 
 
At a time when the whole of philosophy is engaged in articulating what it 
is that links time to being…It is quite simple to see that time, in its very 
constitution, past-present-future, refers itself to the act of the word – and 
to nothing else. 
 
It is strictly impossible for us to conceive of a temporality in an animal 
dimension, namely in a dimension of appetite. The abc of temporality 
requires even the structure of language (Lacan, 1959, p.254). 
 
Further on, in Seminar XI, Lacan continues to introduce time into the unconscious 
which is supposed to be structured like a language by claiming that “we are 
beginning to circumscribe the unconscious in a structure, a temporal structure” 
(Lacan, 1998, p.32) and “I speak to you of the unconscious as of that which appears 
in the temporal pulsation” (ibid., p.143). However, how can the temporal pulsation 
become compatible with the synchronic structure of the unconscious? Is this 
merely another linguistic effect that produces the illusion of time? Or does the 
Lacanian symbolic order show a complexity that cannot be reduced to the 
Saussurean model? 
 
Based on my reading of Lacan, I suggest that these questions can be answered if 
we pay attention to another theoretical resource underlying Lacan’s construction 
of the symbolic order. In the 1950s, what Lacan appropriated as new 
epistemological approaches to reinterpreting the Freudian unconscious and thus 
reinventing psychoanalysis include not only Saussurean linguistics and Lévi-
110 
 
Strauss’s anthropology, but also cybernetic theory, to which Lacan devotes a large 
proportion of the discussion in his early seminars. While the former two are more 
concerned with the synchronic structure, cybernetic theory, as Lacan explains in 
Seminar II, “was born very straightforwardly from the work of engineers concerned 
with the economics of information passing through conductors” (Lacan, 1988b, 
p.296). It is dedicated to the study of data transmission and feedback that highlight 
the importance of time. More importantly, this temporal dimension offered by 
cybernetics is inaccessible through the lens of Saussurean linguistics. To Saussure, 
to think time or diachronic change of language necessarily means a transition from 
la langue to la parole, from a study of the language itself “which is social in its 
essence and independent of the individual” to a study of the individual part of 
language. As he writes in the Course:  
 
If we considered language in time, without the community of 
speakers…we probably would notice no change; time would not influence 
language. Conversely, if we considered the community of speakers 
without considering time, we would not see the effect of the social forces 
that influence language (Saussure, 1965, p.78). 
 
While “language is not a function of the speaking subject” (ibid., p.14), speech, for 
Saussure, certainly is. This opposition of language to speech clearly designates 
language users as the subject that sets the historical changes of language in motion. 
In other words, the time of language only appears in interpersonal communication 
where meaning is generated by humans. However, in making this distinction, 
Saussure’s theory seems to return to a notion of “consciousness” as the 
metaphysical presupposition of time, a consciousness capable of receiving and 
transmitting signs and meanings that logically precedes the time in which 
differences between signifiers are realised. If the human being is the only agent that 
can change the potentiality of time embedded in the synchronic differences within 
a linguistic system into actuality, it means, as Derrida points out, that “difference 
[which] has been derived, has happened, is to be mastered and governed on the 
basis of the point of a present being…this present being, for example, a being 
111 
 
present to itself, as consciousness, eventually would come to defer or to differ” 
(Derrida, 1982, p.15).  
 
The characterisation of consciousness as the determination of temporal experience 
clearly contradicts the fundamental viewpoint of Lacanian psychoanalysis, which 
persistently enhances the idea of a decentred subject that inscribes itself within the 
symbolic order. To Lacan, “what’s involved is knowing what time is involved” 
(Lacan, 1988b, p.286). The historicity of language is not defined by the time of 
language users. Instead, language has its own time and to use language is to 
“introduce ourselves into the temporal succession” (ibid.). What Lacan learns from 
cybernetics pushes him further in this direction. In The Human Use of Human 
Beings: Cybernetics and Society, a book written by Norbert Wiener, the originator 
of cybernetics to whom Lacan refers in his seminars, we find a different description 
of language which not only exists independently, as Saussure argues, but can also 
function independently without human involvement: “Language is not exclusively 
an attribute of living beings but one which they may share to a certain degree with 
the machines man has constructed…We ordinarily think of communication and 
language as being directed from person to person. However, it is quite possible for 
a person to talk to a machine, a machine to a person, and a machine to a machine” 
(Wiener, 1989, p.76). The human being does not exist as a stable entity prior to the 
symbolic order, nor is he in control of the symbolic machinery that automatically 
functions. Opposing the argument that the human subject is the only speaking 
being that manifests itself as an unconditional self-presence, this anti-humanist 
point of view makes cybernetics “one of the principal destabilizing instruments of 
the anthropocentric conception of man” (Dupuy, 2009, p.109).  
 
It is easy to imagine how Lacan was impressed by Wiener’s assertions that would 
have likely led him towards the conclusion that “cybernetics also stems from a 
reaction of astonishment at rediscovering that this human language works almost 
by itself, seemingly to outwit us” (Lacan, 1988b, p.19). If Saussure’s linguistics 
provides a theoretical framework for Lacan to investigate the systematicity of the 
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symbolic order, and Lévi-Strauss’s anthropology demonstrates how fundamental 
symbolic relations are set up, then cybernetics can be regarded as the only science 
utilised by Lacan that illustrates the autonomy of the symbolic process. By 
recognising the existence of the machine that transmits messages according to its 
own algebraic laws, Lacan is able to move away from a traditional binary distinction 
between atemporal, impersonal language and temporal, subjective speech, from 
where he can start to theorise the idea of Symbolic time that transcends human 
consciousness. 
 
In cybernetics, what interests Lacan most is the cybernetic idea of the machine. The 
machine has long been a fascinating topic in Western philosophy, particularly since 
the eighteenth century, when the Industrial Revolution initiated rapid 
development of labour-saving machinery that would eventually change the 
landscape of social life. The steam engine that ushered in the industrial age became 
a key object of contemplation for theorists who popularised the idea of mechanism 
that explains human behaviour in terms of an outside or internal motor force. 
However, in the 1950s when Lacan started his seminars, he had observed that “there 
is a mutation taking place in the function of the machine, which is leaving all those 
who are still bent on criticising the old mechanism miles behind” (Lacan, 1988b, 
p.32). The first electronic computers were constructed in the years just preceding 
Lacan’s seminar. These symbol-processing machines, which “automated the ‘laws 
of thought’ in a series of logical and combinatorial operations” (Johnston, 2008, 
p.71), radically redefined what the idea of the machine could offer for philosophical 
thinking. We can observe that Lacan’s theoretical development throughout 
Seminar II is, in fact, a transition from an old mechanical model based on the 
energy-driven machine to a new one based on the information machine. In the first 
half of the book where the body and the Real are concerned, Lacan develops but 
does not go beyond the Freudian machine, which uses the steam engine as a 
template to construct a theory of energetics; however, in the second half, 
preoccupied with Poe’s The Purloined Letter and in particular with the game of even 
and odd in the story, Lacan attributes the cybernetic machine a central role in the 




In the fifteenth chapter of Seminar II, Lacan dedicates the whole seminar to the 
discussion of the cybernetic machine. It is no coincidence that Lacan makes this 
move just after he finishes the reinterpretation of the dream of Irma’s injection, 
which, as we have examined in the first section, ends with a symbol that is devoid 
of meaning but nevertheless represents the subject. Such a conclusion opens rather 
than closes the question about what constitutes the being of the subject. Therefore, 
in the following seminar, in order to make fully comprehensible his claim that 
cybernetics is something “which concerns us in the highest degree” (Lacan, 1988b, 
p.175), Lacan turns to the game of even and odd which appears in Poe’s story as an 
anecdote. It is a simple game in which one puts two or three marbles in his hand 
and lets the other guess whether the number is odd or even. In the original account, 
the detective Dupin talks about a brilliant boy he knows that always wins the game 
by “mere observation and measurement of the astuteness of his opponents”: a 
simpleton keeps changing the number of marbles every time he loses, while a smart 
one chooses the same number for the next round. By “making himself other, and to 
end up thinking that the other, being himself an other, thinks like him, and that he 
has to place himself in the position of a third party, to get out of being this other 
who is his pure reflection” (ibid., p.180), the boy is able to beat his opponent. 
However, in his seminar, Lacan points out some problems in this strategy. Since 
the boy can only recognise the opponent as either naive or smart, it will be 
extremely difficult for him to play against “someone of superior intelligence [who] 
can in fact understand that trick”, whose play-style does not fall into the prefigured 
scripts. Similar to the prisoner’s process of reasoning in Logical Time, the boy’s 
strategy to play the game of even and odd remains on the level of the dual relation, 
“of the equivalence of one and the other, of the alter ego and the ego” (ibid., p.181). 
In order to escape this imaginary intersubjectivity, Lacan asks the audience to 
imagine a game of even and odd not between two persons, but between a person 
and a machine, which will allow the emergence of the symbolic function.  
 
What is it like to play with a machine? As Lacan suggests, because of the 
complexity of the mechanic articulation which makes it impossible for the subject 
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to identify with, the game of odd and even is no longer a psychological game but a 
symbolic game based on probability and chance. What the subject addresses is the 
symbol and his chances “bear only on the symbol” (ibid., p.182). The process in 
which the machine automatically generates seemingly random numbers for the 
subject bears a resemblance to the operation of the symbolic order, whose secrets 
remain inaccessible to human intelligence. The machine does not require the 
intervention of a thinking subject to produce an infinite sequence of numeric 
combinations. But on the other hand, Lacan also points out that “there are the 
temporal breaks which we make in it (the machine)” (Lacan, 1988b, p.284) that 
produce signification for us. The subject comes to find himself being determined 
in this symbolic process over which he has no control. What produces the effect of 
symbolic subjectivisation is precisely “the temporal element, the intervention of a 
scansion permitting the insertion of something which can take on meaning for a 
subject” (ibid. p.285). To illustrate this point, Lacan asks his audience to imagine a 
case in which a player surprisingly wins multiple times against the machine. If we 
examine each round separately, his chance of winning is always fifty percent; 
however, on the symbolic level, his chance of continuing to win the next round 
actually decreases. As Lacan summarises: 
 
Anything from the real can always come out. But once the symbolic chain 
is constituted, as soon as you introduce a certain significant unity, in the 
form of unities of succession, what comes out can no longer be anything 
(ibid., p.193).  
 
Chance exists in the Real but doesn’t exist in the Symbolic, where an isolated 
signifier is always oriented towards a certain direction in the temporal succession 
of signifying substitution and displacement. What appears random often turns out 
to be determined when the whole cybernetic circuit of signifiers are taken into 
consideration. As Lacan points out: “Since there is a temporal succession, things 
are oriented, and it is evidently not the same if there is first 2 then 1, or 1 then 2” 
(Lacan, 1993, p.269). John Johnston gives a succinct explanation of this point: “The 
very recording of random events gives rise to a rudimentary form of order, since it 
allows the formation of units and hence the emergence of a syntax governing their 
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possible sequences of succession” (Johnston, 2008, p.76). Lacan gets this idea from 
the practice of psychoanalysis. Although the patient on the couch is encouraged to 
free associate, the more he “gets as close as possible to chance” (Lacan, 1988b, 
p.296), the more evident it becomes that this speech is not free at all but reveals 
some sort of determinism. In this sense, Lacan’s symbolic order is not a spectrum 
of signifiers that is open to the play of differences and thus becomes subject to 
multiple interpretations. On the contrary, as Lacan mentions in Seminar IV: “It is 
evidently not the same if there is first 2 then I, or 1 then 2” (Lacan, 1957, p.269), the 
symbolic order is always a temporal order that sets itself in motion and restricts 
the ways in which differences can be distributed, and meaning can be derived.  
 
Lacan’s analysis of the game of even and odd sets the tone of his reading of Poe’s 
The Purloined Letter. Although Lacan’s delineation of a triadic structure within 
Poe’s text has now become classic, the primary focus of his analysis is not the 
structure as such but the temporal movement from one symbolic position to 
another, the very concrete way in which Symbolic time intervenes in human reality. 
As Lacan declares at the beginning of his Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”: 
 
This is why I have decided to illustrate for you today a truth which may be 
drawn from the moment in Freud’s thought we have been studying – 
namely, that it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject 
– by demonstrating in a story the major determination the subject receives 
from the itinerary of a signifier (Lacan, 2006h, p.7) (emphasis added).  
 
As is well-known, Lacan abstracts from Poe’s story “three moments, ordering three 
glances, sustained by three subjects, incarnated in each case by different people” 
(ibid., p.10). These three subject positions are organised around a letter received 
by the Queen, whose content remains mysterious throughout the whole story. In 
the first scene, the King sees nothing; the Queen sees that he doesn’t see and thus 
believes the letter to be covered; the Minister sees what the Queen is hiding and 
takes advantage of it. However, in the second scene, the possession of the letter 
puts the Minister in the Queen’s position. The way he conceals the letter by leaving 
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it uncovered fools the police but not Dupin, who uses the same strategy the 
Minister had used against the Queen to retrieve the letter. The letter, therefore, 
functions as a signifying mark in the story that sustains the repetitive moment of 
displacement of three subjects. Lacan summarises the relation between the letter 
and the subject as such: “When the characters get a hold of this letter, something 
gets a hold of them and carries them along and this something clearly has 
dominion over their individual idiosyncracies” (Lacan, 1988b, p.196). Each subject 
shows a certain degree of blindness regarding the symbolic chain that binds and 
orients them. Even Dupin himself, who uses the anecdote of the game of even and 
odd as a metaphor to demonstrate his capability of thinking what the Minister is 
thinking, cannot help but leave a vicious message to the latter in the last moment 
and thus becomes “a participant in the intersubjective triad, as such, finds himself 
in the median position previously occupied by the Queen and the Minister” (Lacan, 
2006h, p.27).  
 
So how does this letter have such power that determines the subject’s displacement 
in a symbolic temporal sequence? This leads us back to the idea of the unconscious, 
which presents itself to the subject in a radical sense of otherness. As Lacan 
specifies in Seminar II: “The letter itself, this phrase written on a piece of paper, in 
so far as it wanders about, is the unconscious” (Lacan, 1988b, p.209). When Lacan 
concludes his seminar on “The Purloined Letter” by claiming that a letter always 
arrives at its destination (Lacan, 2006h, p.30), It means the unconscious is not 
static or timeless but dynamic as well. It’s a sequence of signifiers digitally encoded 
by the symbolic machine that is radically foreign to the human experience but 
somehow touches the very essence of subjective existence. The subject’s own 
unconscious is “out there”, inscribed within the field of language and generated by 
the symbolic machine. In this sense, while Lacan famously suggests that the 
unconscious is the discourse of the Other, it may be possible for us to substitute 
“Other” for “machine” in order to fully appreciate the work of the decentralisation 
of the ego Lacan continues after Freud based on a new theoretical foundation. This 
process through which the unconscious is produced by the Other can only be 
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understood in Symbolic time, a time of the constructed symbol which modern 
machines represent for us. 
  
3.3 Time of the Other: From the Wolf Man to Hamlet 
The idea of Symbolic time in Lacan’s work is not merely the result of purely 
theoretical contemplation by means of cybernetics and mathematics. While these 
two disciplines certainly contribute to a rationalised formation of a somewhat 
obscure temporal register, Symbolic time can also be sufficiently derived from the 
practice of psychoanalysis and is indeed a hidden theme that can be traced back to 
Freud’s clinical work. The seemingly counterintuitive idea that time, a taken-for-
granted experience through which we experience the world around us, might not 
be under our own control opens up a series of questions in relation to our 
understanding of memory, history and symptom formation. Can we still locate the 
basis of memory in personal experience if time itself is organised by an agent other 
than the subject? What does it mean for psychoanalysis if one is a stranger to one’s 
own life-history?  
 
Since its beginning, the individual’s relationship with their memory has remained 
a troubling matter for psychoanalysis, towards which Freud’s ambivalent attitude 
is evident. In his early writings, Freud’s understanding of memory is firmly centred 
on the function of the individual mind. For instance, in the Project, Freud takes 
memory as “a main characteristic of nervous tissue” and defines it as “a capacity 
for being permanently altered by single occurrences – which offers such a striking 
contrast to the behaviour of a material that permits the passage of a wave 
movement and thereafter returns to its former condition” (Freud, 1895a, p.299). In 
The Interpretation of Dreams, memory continues to function as the individual trace 
of original perception or sensation, a cathexis of which is hoped to attain once 
more the same experience of satisfaction through an intermediate stage of motor 
experiences (Freud, 1900, p.602). The idea that the formation of memory is based 
on one’s personal experience leads to an ontogenetic subject-formation which 
guarantees the continuity between the individual’s past and present. It becomes 
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the very point at which psychoanalysis must intervene in order to treat the 
symptoms.  
 
In Studies on Hysteria, Freud and Breuer highlight the problem of repressed 
memory in their investigation of the causes of hysteria. Their preliminary 
explanation regards the “abreaction” of surplus excitation produced by the 
memory of a traumatic event as the solution to any symptom. Testified to by the 
case of Anna O., it appears that as long as the repressed memory has been given 
verbal utterance, the symptom will be easily removed. In this sense, psychoanalytic 
treatment is identified with a technique to invoke memories and revive psychic 
excitations that were initially perceived. These case studies encourage Freud to put 
forward the seduction theory, which regards actual instances such as sexual 
assaults experienced in childhood, later registered as forgotten memories, as the 
cause of neurotic symptoms in adult life. 
 
However, Freud soon realises the difficulty or rather improbability of designating 
any specific “real” factor that can emerge from memory as the definite cause of 
neurotic symptoms. In his letters to Fliess, Freud complains that the theory of 
childhood seduction is not able to explain “the complete resolution of a neurosis 
and the certain knowledge of its aetiology in childhood”. In many cases, “a single 
analysis” cannot reach a successful conclusion even when all the memories have 
been recovered (Freud, 1897b). Meanwhile, the idea that there is no indication of 
reality in the unconscious also makes Freud wonder whether he has mistaken 
memory as the recollection of actual events. Therefore, by formally declaring the 
collapse of the seduction theory, Freud’s understanding of memory also undergoes 
a dramatic change. The discovery of normal infantile sexuality (most clearly 
displayed in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality) and the Oedipus complex (the 
term first appeared in 1910, but the primitive idea was already put forward in 
Freud’s letter to Fliess on October 15, 1897, and later publicly discussed in The 
Interpretation of Dreams) paved the way for the search for the hard facts of sexual 
trauma in the individual’s past to be replaced by the new idea of primal fantasy. 
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Employing the term “fantasy” does not mean that Freud places the trauma as a 
psychical construction within the child, since Jung’s idea of “retroactive fantasy”, 
which understands the past as the retroactive effect of construction performed by 
the adult and fuelled by the regressive movement of libido regardless of any real 
basis, is directly rejected by Freud. On the contrary, throughout his later 
theoretical development, Freud is increasingly convinced that the primal fantasy 
is rather “a phylogenetic endowment”: 
 
In them (primal fantasies), the individual reaches beyond his own 
experience into primaeval experience at points where his own experience 
has been too rudimentary. It seems to me quite possible that all the things 
that are told to us to-day in analysis as phantasy—the seduction of 
children, the inflaming of sexual excitement by observing parental 
intercourse, the threat of castration (or rather castration itself)—were 
once real occurrences in the primaeval times of the human family, and 
that children in their phantasies are simply filling in the gaps in individual 
truth with prehistoric truth. I have repeatedly been led to suspect that the 
psychology of the neuroses has stored up in it more of the antiquities of 
human development than any other source (Freud, 1917, p.371).  
 
The phylogenetic explanation had come to occupy an important position in Freud’s 
theoretical construction since the 1910s. Before his definition of the primal fantasy 
in terms of the mechanism of archaic heritage, Freud’s strong belief in phylogeny 
already surfaced in his ideas about metapsychology, culture and psychopathology. 
In The Unconscious, Freud suggests that “if inherited mental formations exist in the 
human being – something analogous to instinct in animals – these constitute the 
nucleus of the Ucs.” (Freud, 1915c, p.195). Similarly, in Totem and Taboo, by 
explaining the power of the totem as “an inherited psychic endowment” (Freud, 
1913, p.31), Freud argues for a form of psychical continuity in the sequence of 
generations which transmits mental states of one generation to the next. The 
clinical implication of this hypothesis is further investigated in the unpublished 
metapsychological paper A phylogenetic fantasy: overview of the transference 
neuroses, in which Freud boldly correlates present-day neurotic symptoms with the 
phyletic development of prehistoric humanity. More specifically, it is the harsh 
environment of the Ice Age that produces a “phylogenetic disposition” towards 
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certain neuroses(Freud, 1987). As Freud succinctly summarises in his letter to 
Ferenczi: “What are now neuroses were once phases of the human condition” 
(Freud, 1996, p.66). 
 
However, the theory of phylogeny is also a site of controversy in Freud’s theory. On 
the one hand, it is treated as absurd by critics who point out that Freud’s arguments 
rely on the Lamarckian model which postulates that one’s acquired characteristics 
can be genetically inherited, a theory that has been discredited in modern biology 
(Rice, 1990; Sulloway, 1992; Yerushalmi, 1991). From this point of view, because of a 
yearning for scientific justification of psychoanalytic findings, Freud is, once again, 
trapped by unfounded biologism and thus adopts a teleological view of psychic life 
as if it is predetermined genetically. On the other hand, some intimate associates 
of Freud, including Heinz Hartmann and Ernst Kris, have tried their best to 
distinguish Freud’s phylogeny from dubious Lamarckian assumptions, as they 
argue that the former is postulated mainly “for psychological reasons” (Hartmann, 
Kris, & Loewenstein, 1964, p.96). This argument makes sense if we notice that Freud 
himself is actually fully aware of the scientific evidence against Lamarckism, yet, as 
Ernest Jones complains, he never “gave up a lot of his belief in the inheritance of 
acquired characters” (Jones, 1957, p.313). The statement Freud makes in Moses and 
Monotheism (1939), which is written near the end of his life, bears witness to this 
longstanding belief: “What may be operative in an individual's psychical life may 
include not only what he has experienced himself but also things that were innately 
present in him at his birth, elements with a phylogenetic origin—an archaic 
heritage” (Freud, 1939, p.98). The relation between Freud’s phylogeny and the 
claims of Lamarck is further challenged by Derrida: 
 
[Freud] repeats here that this topic has nothing to do with the anatomy of 
the brain, and this is enough to complicate the phylogenetic dimension, 
which he judges to be in effect irreducible but which he is far from 
simplifying in its Lamarckian schemas (he is often accused of this, by 
Yerushalmi also), or even its Darwinian ones. The adherence to a 
biological doctrine of acquired characters – of the biological archive, in 
sum – cannot be made to agree in a simple and immediate way with all 
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Freud acknowledges otherwise: the memory of the experience of previous 
generations, the time of the formation of languages and of a symbolicity 
that transcends given languages and discursivity as such (Derrida, 1998a, 
pp.34–35). 
 
In my opinion, the accusation of Freud’s biologism and the defence of Freud which 
demands a psychological or cultural reading both hold some truth, yet they are too 
limited to appreciate the complexity of Freud’s various phylogenetic explanations. 
It is impossible to deny the existence of the intergenerational transmission of 
instinctual impulse which is clearly biologically grounded in Freud’s writings, 
particularly in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and The Ego and The Id, 
where Freud’s understanding of “need” and the revision of the drive theory largely 
rely on a problematic organic basis. In this sense, one must resist the temptation to 
entirely erase psycho-Lamarckism from Freudian psychoanalysis. However, the 
inheritance of collective memory which is more culturally and socially oriented 
should be regarded as Freud’s original contribution to psychoanalytic thinking. 
What can be learnt from this idea is not genetic programming but a subversive 
understanding of memory, rationality and subjectivity. As Adrian Johnston points 
out: “The supposition of the actual, factual historical reality of early 
infantile/childhood episodes as the concrete ontogenetic basis of fundamental 
fantasies is manifestly what is explicitly at stake” (Johnston, 2013, p.61). The 
possibility that the memory of others’ experiences determines one’s own thinking 
disrupts the sense of self-containment and self-continuity promised by the 
ontogenetic representation of the individual’s life history. It also provides an 
alternative solution to difficult clinical puzzles.  
 
Freud’s case study of the Wolf Man is paradigmatic of this shift between two 
opposite understandings of memory. What we find in the first part of the essay 
From the History of an Infantile Neurosis is a discussion of symptom formation 
based on a traditional understanding of memory. The patient, through free 
association, provides two crucial moments in his life history when his neurotic 
symptoms can possibly be determined. The first moment was a dream of six white 
wolves sitting motionlessly outside his bedroom window when the patient was 
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“three, four or at most five years old”; the second moment identified by the patient 
was much earlier. At the age of eighteen months old, the patient woke up in the 
afternoon and witnessed coitus between his parents, three times repeated. The 
memory of such a traumatic encounter can be fitted into Freud’s seduction theory 
without difficulty and is promptly labelled as the primal scene. But is this memory 
a real occurrence with a historical basis in the patient’s infantile life? Freud initially 
gives a positive answer by arranging the temporal sequence of these events in a 
progressive way: 
 
At the age of one and a half the child receives an impression to which he 
is unable to react adequately; he is only able to understand it and to be 
moved by it when the impression is revived in him at the age of four; and 
only twenty years later, during the analysis, is he able to grasp with his 
conscious mental processes what was then going on in him (Freud, 1918, 
p.45 footnotes). 
 
However, Freud’s reservation regarding this interpretation soon becomes evident, 
since thirteen pages later, he gives another view by putting emphasis on the 
moment of the dream. It turns out that the wolves in the dream may actually be 
sheep-dogs as the patient repeatedly visited flocks of sheep shortly before the 
dream, and he may also have witnessed some copulating activities between dogs. If 
this is the case, then the primal scene would become a fantasy: “The scene was 
innocent. The rest had been added by the inquisitive child’s subsequent wish, based 
on his experiences with the dogs, to witness his parents too in their love-making” 
(ibid., p.58). The temporal sequence became retrogressively constructed in the 
sense that the meaning of the earlier experience was given by the later one.  
 
Confronting these two possible readings, Freud comes to realise that it is impossible 
to decide which solution is valid from the perspective of psychic causality. The 
discussion of the determinant moment in one’s life history is in vain since the two 
crucial psychical representations, located by the patient at the age of four years and 
the age of eighteen months, can both be constructions of the patient during the 
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analysis, or substitutions of another unconscious representation that has never 
been revealed. These subjective representations can easily change their psychic 
value through condensation or displacement, in a way that disrupts temporal 
sequences and spatial relations.  
 
What rescues Freud from his failed attempt to account for an ontogenetic cause of 
the symptom is the introduction of phylogeny. In the second part of the paper, 
Freud abstracts the fear of castration as the common factor from the patient’s 
various fragments of memory and attributes it to a phylogenetic pattern, which 
predominates over individual experience: “The first relates to the phylogenetically 
inherited schemata, which, like the categories of philosophy, are concerned with 
the business of ‘placing’ the impressions derived from actual experience. I am 
inclined to take the view that they are precipitates from the history of human 
civilization” (ibid., p.119). By introducing the notion of phylogenesis that stands for 
the cumulative experience of history rather than what is innate in the individual, 
Freud moves the unconscious representation out of one’s inner-sense and re-
localises it in a trans-subjective field.  
 
When discussing Freud’s analysis of the Wolf Man, Nicholas Abraham and Maria 
Torok notice that “polemical in its explicit purpose, it also reflects another debate, 
that of the author with himself. Throughout this stirring account and within the 
meanderings of the theoretical discussion, attentive readers will sense a doubt – it 
is Freud’s doubt regarding his own statement” (Abraham & Torok, 1986, p.2). This 
observation accurately points out the dramatic change occurring between the 
beginning and the end of Freud’s paper. Through his self-challenge, Freud ends the 
paper in a complete break with the ontogenetic account which takes for granted 
the narrative of identity-based, developmental psychology: “I should myself be glad 
to know whether the primal scene in my present patient’s case was a phantasy or a 
real experience; but, taking other similar cases into account, I must admit that the 
answer to this question is not in fact a matter of very great importance” (Freud, 1918, 
p.97). While the case of the Wolf Man starts with the problem of memory deficit in 
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terms of “what has been forgotten by him?”, it ends with a more radical sense of 
memory surplus, as if the individual knows something he is not supposed to know, 
something absent in his experienced-based mind process yet indispensable for the 
production of his unconscious desire. It is the discourse pertaining to the 
phylogenetic dimension, a memory which belongs to the collective and is inherited 
by the individual that determines the Wolf Man’s symptom formation. The theory 
of inherited memory breaks with fundamental ideas of rationality and self-
sameness rooted in the ontogenetic narrative. It becomes a theory that Freud 
cannot do without when articulating the formation of unconscious knowledge.  
 
However, although the theory of inherited memory is theoretically subversive and 
clinically useful, the way Freud frames it makes it difficult for the reader to 
appreciate his real intention. The idea of “the inheritance of prehistorical 
knowledge” shows a certain commonality with the notion of hereditary disposition, 
which remains in the shadow of psycho-Lamarckism and reflects Freud’s 
longstanding struggle with biological reductionism. Therefore, when Lacan picks 
up and further develops this theory, he does not hesitate to eliminate any 
biogenetic residue in Freud’s thinking to reinterpret it on the basis of completely 
different disciplines. In Seminar V, Lacan gives a rather harsh comment on the idea 
of “genetic reconstitution”, which he believes is “much more imbecilic than 
anything that you can find in these little books that you are taught under the guise 
of religious instruction” (Lacan, 1958, p.231). As Adrian Johnston points out, Lacan 
“has no sympathy whatsoever for the idea of the ontogenetic recapitulating the 
phylogenetic” (Johnston, 2013, p.61). However, while Lacan distances himself from 
any Lamarckian speculation, he also captures and preserves the essence of Freud’s 
phylogeny: 
 
Freud no doubt claims to rediscover the origin of this primordial law, 
using a Goethean method, by following traces of critical events that have 
remained perceptible. But don’t be fooled: the ontogenesis that 
reproduces phylogenesis is merely a keyword used here in order to 
convince everyone. It is the onto [in ontogenesis] that serves here as a 
smokescreen [trompe l'oeil], for it is not the individual as an entity [l’ étant] 
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but rather the subject's relation to being, assuming this relation is based 
on discourse. The past of the concrete discourse of the human line can be 
refound therein, inasmuch as in the course of the man’s history, things 
have happened to him that have changed the subject’s relation to being 
(Lacan, 2013, pp.21–22).  
 
In Seminar III, Lacan claims that he has little interest in prehistory, precisely 
because “there is no point in searching so far back, for we can observe this lack in 
subjects within our reach” (Lacan, 1993, p.306). As we can see, Freud’s idea of 
prehistorical knowledge is replaced by the Other’s discourse, which is freed from 
the accusation of positivism and naturalism. It is no longer inherited but 
transmitted to the individual in symbolic form. Lacan’s symbolic universe, an 
always-already given that pre-exists the subject, integrates and consolidates Freud’s 
idea that “others’ memories are there already. The memory of others’ experiences 
exists at the outset” (White, 2008, p.40). More importantly, by introducing the 
whole symbolic dimension, Lacan enriches Freud’s original theory. Whereas the 
Freudian subject is mostly determined by the other’s past, such as the prehistorical 
murder of the primal patriarch in Totem and Taboo, the Lacanian subject is 
subordinate to the Other’s time, an ongoing signifying process in which the 
individual must locate his own past, present and future. 
 
In Seminar II, Lacan makes a crucial distinction between memory and remembering 
that helps us understand the function of the Other’s time. Memory, Lacan says, is 
“a means of characterising the living organism as such” (Lacan, 1988b, p.185). It is 
the same memory that I have discussed in the previous chapter, a cognitive function 
with an organic basis that records ontogenetic information under the control of the 
ego. Remembering, on the other hand, “pertains to the order of history”. It is “the 
grouping and the succession of symbolically defined events, the pure symbol 
engendering in its turn a succession” (ibid.). It is not difficult for us to see that the 
idea of remembering has its origin in Freud’s inherited memory, especially 
considering that Lacan later gives remembering another name: symbolic memory. 
But what is really worth our attention is the way Lacan separates symbolic memory 
from (individual) memory. While (individual) memory is the reactivation of the 
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same, fixed message in one’s own past, remembering or symbolic memory is 
regarded as the realisation of difference. As Lacan says, it is possible that symbolic 
memory has “changed content, changed sign, changed structure…it’s not what 
happens afterwards which is modified, but everything which went before” (ibid.). 
What is produced by symbolic memory is “a world of truth entirely deprived of 
subjectivity”, while on the other hand, “there has been a historical development of 
subjectivity manifestly directed towards the rediscovery of truth, which lies in the 
order of symbols” (1988b, p.285). In other words, because the Other functions 
according to its own time, continually producing a succession of symbolically 
defined events through which the subject lives, one can participate in this temporal 
movement at any moment and will always confront a reorganised sequence of life 
history.  
 
Psychoanalysis, Lacan writes in Seminar XI, “posits itself as modulating in a more 
radical way this relation of man to the world that has always been regarded as 
knowledge” (Lacan, 1998, p.63). If this is the case, then the idea of the time of the 
Other undoubtedly makes an important contribution to this revolution. Before 
Freud, there were two most influential theories of knowledge in Western 
philosophy. One is the Platonic model which presumes the existence of pure and 
complete knowledge belonging to the immortal soul. The individual does not get 
access to new knowledge through sensory experience but only attains what is 
always there through reminiscence (see the previous chapter). Pure knowledge 
reflects an eternal and unchanging reality to which our living world is only an 
imperfect replication. The other is the Kantian model which is transcendentally 
conditioned and experience based. To Kant, transcendental deduction of the 
categories conditions our action of understanding, but these pure concepts must 
be applied to the sensory manifold and combined with intuitions in order to make 
empirical knowledge intelligible. In this sense, the individual needs to adopt a 
cognitive attitude towards the external world and produces knowledge of their own. 
With the idea of the Other’s time, Lacan sees a third possibility of knowledge 
formation promised by psychoanalysis, one in which we can speak of an externally 
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located knowledge that is produced by the discourse of the Other, and at the same 
time, always changes and responds to the individual’s own desire and subjectivity.  
 
If the Wolf Man is the embodiment of Freud’s notion of the inherited memory, then 
Hamlet can be seen as the typical Lacanian subject who lives in the time of the 
Other. Lacan’s interpretation of this Shakespearean drama in Seminar VI points 
directly to the conundrum of Hamlet’s inability to act, even when the truth of 
Claudius’s identity, as a killer and usurper, is revealed to him from the very 
beginning. Ernest Jones provides an explanation of Hamlet’s mystery which, at first 
sight, is very Freudian. After rejecting both the temperamental explanation, which 
attributes Hamlet’s delay to “some general defect in his constitution”, and the 
situational explanation, which suggests the difficult political situation in which 
Hamlet is caught is the main reason, Jones draws Hamlet back to the Oedipus 
matrix, where he confronts Claudius as the person who realises his own hidden 
desire: “The long ‘repressed desire to take his father’s place in his mother’s affection 
is stimulated to unconscious activity by the sight of someone usurping this place 
exactly as he himself had once longed to do” (Jones, 1910, p.99). It is this 
unconscious identification with the murderer that transforms the idea of punishing 
Claudius into the torture of Hamlet’s own alter-ego. Meanwhile, by occupying the 
position of the father, Claudius reclaims the paternal power in the Oedipal triangle, 
which makes the action of killing him patricide that Hamlet is prohibited from 
committing. Therefore, Jones concludes: 
 
The call of duty to slay his uncle cannot be obeyed because it links itself 
with the call of his nature to slay his mother’s husband, whether this is the 
first or the second; the latter call is strongly 'repressed,' and therefore 
necessarily the former also (ibid., p.101). 
 
Lacan’s reading of Hamlet, however, does not accept the convenient analogy 
between Hamlet and Oedipus. Instead, he uses Hamlet as an example to analyse 
the Other’s determination of the subject in a temporal sense. The core of his 
argument is that “Hamlet is always suspended on the other’s time, and this up to 
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the end” (Lacan, 1959, p.273). While Jones’ understanding of the Oedipus complex 
is a fixed set of desires hidden within the individual, Lacan sees it as a dynamic 
structure within the field of language. Hamlet is not trapped in the internal psychic 
struggle between his ego and the superego represented by Claudius, a dual-relation 
in which the mother Gertrude as the object of desire is merely mentioned in the 
background. Instead, Lacan argues that he confronts his mother as a big Other, an 
omnipotent yet enigmatic presence on which his own desire depends. Hamlet is 
confused and immobilised by Gertrude’s desire for the “disparaged, contemptible 
object which is Claudius” that replaces the “idealised, exalted object which is his 
father”. He is overwhelmed by the sexual enjoyment Gertrude experiences as a 
woman rather than as a mother who is supposed to meet her son’s demands. 
Finding himself in the movement of the signifying chain that constantly produces 
new desires, Hamlet is dislocated from the subject position from where he acquires 
self-assurance and coherent meaning. Therefore, Hamlet cannot act because “it is 
not the other’s time. It is not the time that the other should have to give an account 
of himself before the eternal” (ibid.). Throughout the play, Hamlet never finds a 
moment when he can speak on his own behalf: 
 
It is in his parents' good time that he remains there (Wittenberg). It is on 
the time of other people that he suspends his crime; it is in his step-father's 
time that he embarks for England; it is in Rosencrantz and Guildenstem's 
time that he is led, evidently with an ease which astonished Freud, to send 
them to their death thanks to a piece of trickery which is carried out very 
cleverly (ibid., p.274). 
 
Even at the end of the play, when Hamlet finally makes up his mind to act, he does 
not do it in his own time. What is crucial in Hamlet’s action is that he feels 
compelled to act since the Other has left him no time. In Lacan’s words, it is “an act 
that he carries out, in some sense, in spite of himself” (Lacan, 1977, p.12). It is 
Hamlet’s realisation that he is going to die that prevents any further delay. Hamlet 
does not choose the right moment as an idiosyncratic ego. Instead, the Other’s time 
has chosen him to carry out a symbolic act which confirms rather than breaks the 
law. It is the only time, as Lacan says, “the time of his destruction. And the whole 
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tragedy of Hamlet is to show us the implacable journey of Hamlet toward this time” 
(ibid., p.281). 
 
In Lacan’s reading, Hamlet is not the incarnation but the opposite of Oedipus. 
Whereas Oedipus tries to escape his fate by challenging the Other’s desire; Hamlet 
tries to remain at a distance from his desire and also to smother the desire of the 
Other. He is afraid to know the answer that reveals his own position in the Other’s 
desire, the mystery of which leads him to postpone his act. In so doing, Hamlet 
loses his own subjectivity and becomes the marionette of the symbolic order. 
“There is a level in the subject on which it can be said that his fate is expressed in 
terms of a pure signifier, a level at which he is merely the reverse side of a message 
that is not even his own,” says Lacan, “Well, Hamlet is the very image of this level 
of subjectivity” (Lacan, 1977, p.12). To Lacan, Hamlet’s tragedy “follows its course 
and attains completion at the hour of [the] Other” (ibid., p.19). It is an extreme case 
showing what happens when the influence of the time of the Other becomes 
overwhelming and, therefore, deepens our understanding of Symbolic time as a 
necessary condition of the subject’s symbolic existence.  
 
To conclude, in this chapter, I move back and forth between different topics in 
Freud’s and Lacan’s work in order to demonstrate the existence of Symbolic time 
in psychoanalysis. The idea of Symbolic time is elusive because it counters our 
straightforward understanding that time is an intrinsic experience through which 
the individual perceives the external world, yet psychoanalysis, which pays 
attention to the unconscious process beyond rationality and sensibility of the 
individual, does not take time only as a conscious experience. Through my close 
reading, I argue that the timelessness Freud attributes to the unconscious suggests 
a temporal dimension different to conscious time. This temporal dimension is 
justified when Lacan introduces cybernetics to mechanise the symbolic order. I also 
have a look at the role of Symbolic time in the practice of psychoanalysis, which 
can be traced back to Freud’s employment of phylogeny in his case study of the 
Wolf Man but is most fully presented in Lacan’s reading of Hamlet. Symbolic time 
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is the time of the Other in the sense that it is embodied in the language machine 
that exists independently of us. The subject encounters the absolute otherness in 
Symbolic time and acts for reasons incomprehensible by its self-conscious existence. 
Therefore, by extending the inescapable symbolic determination to the temporal 
domain, Symbolic time in Lacan’s theory can be said to be a profound conception 




4. Symptomatic Time 
 
As we worked through Lacan’s dual temporality in the last two chapters, body and 
language, two important themes in twentieth-century philosophy, simultaneously 
emerged as two topics with which Lacan is primarily concerned and through which 
he rethinks and reinvents Freudian psychoanalysis. Although Lacan does not 
directly name Real time or Symbolic time within his theoretical structure, his 
analysis of the passive synthesis of the body process and the independent 
movement of the symbolic order clearly incorporates a temporal dimension, which, 
as I would argue, cannot be merely regarded as an insignificant addition to his 
overall theory. In this chapter, by extending the idea of dual temporality to other 
topics in Lacan’s theory and connecting it with a wide range of psychoanalytic 
phenomena, I intend to show that this idea provides a solid ground for our 
understanding of Lacan’s theory of subject-formation. 
 
Symptomatic time, as in the title of this chapter, designates a particular temporal 
process rather than another independent temporal register. Insofar as the Lacanian 
subject is essentially a symptomatic being-in-the-world, I use this term to name 
the time of subject-formation in Lacan’s theory. To do so, I will first make an 
important distinction between the pathological temporal experience and what I 
call “symptomatic time”. In psychoanalytic and psychological literature, symptom-
formation has long been studied from a temporal angle. In Freud’s early work on 
hysteria, we find time as a central factor of symptom-formation, not only because 
disturbances those patients experience in the present, as Freud and Breuer 
believed at that time, are determined by events in the past, but also because 
psychic struggles in relation to the future are also predominant in these cases. As 
Frank Summers observes:  
 
Anna O, fell ill fearing the prospect of life without her father. Both Lucy 
and Elizabeth von R. became symptomatic due to repression of a hoped-
for future with men they felt guilty for loving…the point for our purpose 
is that whatever conflicts these patients possessed from childhood, they 
also suffered from highly conflictual future visions of their lives, and they 
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became ill when reality forced awareness of the illusionary nature of their 
hoped-for-future (Summers, 2013, p.121). 
 
It does not matter whether the development of these symptoms in Studies of 
Hysteria is mainly orientated to the past or the future. The point is that patients, 
instead of living in the present moment, find themselves trapped at other moments 
that are only imaginarily created to satisfy their unconscious desires. This temporal 
discrepancy generates strong psychosomatic tensions, accompanied by feelings 
that are mainly painful. Following Freud, the idea that the displacement of 
temporal consciousness undermines the individual’s self-coherence is inherited by 
many contemporary studies on the pathology of temporality. For instance, when 
discussing the phenomenon of mental disorder, Kouba Petr writes that “suffering 
(is) conditioned by the temporal disintegration of the self and accompanied by the 
collapse of the order of experience” (Kouba, 2014, p.169). Similarly, Thomas Fuchs 
argues that “mental illnesses not only interrupt the continuity of normal life. They 
can also be accompanied by a radical change in subjective temporality, even to the 
point of a fragmentation of the experience of the self in time” (Fuchs, 2013, p.76). 
For both authors, what proves to be symptomatic is the subject’s disorientation to 
time that affects the individual’s cognitive synthesis of time-consciousness. 
Meanwhile, based on a phenomenological reading, a coherent self that synthesises 
the three dimensions of past, present and future into a continuous process against 
which personal biography is constituted is taken for granted as the normal state.  
 
However, Lacan’s understanding of the symptom is exactly the opposite. Rather 
than something that is experienced as a psychopathological disturbance and 
expected to dissolve through psychotherapy, the symptom for Lacan has a 
structural position in the individual’s psychic life. In his early writings including 
The Freudian Thing, Lacan emphasises the symbolic value of the symptom, “by 
which it differs from the natural index commonly designated by the term ‘symptom’ 
in medicine” (Lacan, 2006i, p.348). A symptom is a metaphor written on the body 
that signifies the return of repressed desire, articulated by the signifiers that then 
“captured in the signified of the current conflict and used by it as language” (Lacan, 
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1993, p.120). Lacan makes it clear that a symptom does not have a fixed meaning 
like smoke that always indicates a fire “with the possible call to put it out”. Instead, 
the truth of the symptom resides in the articulation of the relationship between 
one signifier and another on the basis of a signifying chain, which sets itself in 
motion (Lacan, 2006e, p.195). The symptom is an example of Lacan’s idea that “in 
language our message comes to us from the Other in an inverted form” since it 
contains a message from the Other but at the same time, is only interpretable 
through the Other. In this sense, we can say that the manifestation of the subject’s 
symptom is determined by Symbolic time, a temporal register that is not directly 
perceived by human consciousness but nevertheless organises the subject’s 
trajectory through different symbolic positions with which one identifies.  
 
In the 1970s, Lacan’s understanding of the symptom went through a radical 
transformation, which responded to a fundamental problem that can be traced 
back to Freud’s case studies. While the psychoanalytic interpretation is supposed 
to reveal the truth embodied in the symptom, in many cases the symptom persists 
despite the interpretation, as if it is sustained by another source. Lacan’s initial 
answer is that there is a jouissance of the signifier in the symptom. Just like jokes 
and slips of the tongue, the linguistic strategies including substitution and 
displacement employed in the symptom-formation indicate a particular way in 
which the subject enjoys the signifier. Although the symptom causes us discomfort 
and suffering, “the deciphering of the symptom is correlative to a jouissance linked 
to the appearance, to the emergence of the signification of this symptom” (Brousse, 
2007, p.84). However, in Seminar XXII, Lacan provides another answer that is 
almost the opposite of the first one: What the subject enjoys in the symptom is not 
the signifier or the sense-making but precisely the non-sense. He begins by 
redefining the symptom as a letter x:  
 
What is it to say the symptom? It is the function of the symptom, a 
function to be understood as the mathematical formulation. f(x) would do. 
What is this x? This is what can be expressed of the unconscious by a letter, 
insofar that only in the letter is the identity of self to self isolated from 




A letter stands for the materiality of a signifier, the elementary phenomenon of 
lalangue. Lacan distinguishes lalangue from language to emphasise the very 
expression of language through the body as an effect of cutting and jouissance. 
Therefore, a letter is attached more to the Real rather than the Symbolic since it 
does not acquire its meaning from another letter (from S1 to S2) but designates a 
unique self-identification of the speaking being, “isolated from every quality”. It is 
not a condensation of meaning but a condensation of enjoyment through which 
the Real invades the Symbolic.  
 
This point is further developed in the next year’s Seminar Le Sinthome, which is 
dedicated to the discussion of Joyce and his writings. As a novelist who is famous 
for the experimental use of language, James Joyce completes Finnegans Wake with 
a writing technique that is based on the dissolution of language. By borrowing 
words from Danish, Swedish, Old Icelandic, Norwegian and many other languages, 
breaking them down and reassembling different phonetic and semantic elements 
into new words, Joyce creates a masterpiece full of puns, neologisms and syllogisms, 
which is detached from any stable signification and free from symbolic restraint. 
To Lacan, the nature of Joyce’s use of the letter is revealed by his slip of the letter 
into litter. It shows that the letter as trash bears no relationship to the Symbolic or 
the Imaginary. It belongs to the dimension of the Real that points towards the 
singular in each individual. In so doing, the symptom is no longer regarded merely 
as the product of the symbolic articulation. It becomes “the sign of something 
which is what is not working out in the Real” (Lacan, 1974, p.20). Rather than a sign 
of the Other’s desire that calls for interpretation, the symptom is a sign of 
jouissance “by the way in which each one enjoys the unconscious” (ibid., p.98). To 
Lacan, if jouissance is the only thing that we can get a hold of in Joyce’s writings, 
then it becomes a symptom. Yet Lacan talks about not the “symptom of Joyce” but 
“Joyce-the-symptom”, in the sense that Joyce “is the one who has gone to the 
extreme of incarnating the symptom in himself” (Lacan, 1987, p.29), living as the 
symptom against the possible psychotic breakdown that may be triggered by the 
fact that “his father had never been for him a father” (Lacan, 1975, p.14). This leads 
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Lacan to put forward the notion of sinthome in Seminar XXIII, as a unique trait of 
both signifier and jouissance that completes the knot of the Imaginary, the 
Symbolic and the Real. The transition from symptom to sinthome, in Žižek’s 
reading, suggests Lacan’s attempt to capture the radical ontological status of 
symptom: “Symptom, conceived as sinthome, is literally our only substance, the 
only positive support of our being, the only point that gives consistency to the 
subject” (Žižek, 1989, p.81).  
 
If we take the symptom not as an illness that can be detached from the body it 
affects but as the core of the subject’s being-in-the-world, the relationship between 
psychopathology and time must also be rethought. Insofar as the subject is always 
a symptomatic subject, fragmentation and desynchrony should be regarded as the 
“normal” state of time that conditions the human experience. On the other hand, 
the ego’s insistence on the importance of linear temporal sequencing by denying 
other lived experience of time, from a Lacanian perspective, is indeed pathological. 
This explains why Lacan in Seminar I defines the ego as a “symptom” in the 
common sense of mental illness: “The ego is structured exactly like a symptom. At 
the heart of the subject, it is only a privileged symptom, the human symptom par 
excellence, the mental illness of man” (Lacan, 1988a, p.16). Therefore, instead of 
restricting the role of time within psychopathology, I put forward the idea of 
“symptomatic time” to cover the process of subject-formation that is symptomatic 
in its essence.  
 
One cannot grasp how a subject comes into being without a fundamental 
understanding of time experienced by the subject. For Lacan’s theory, this means 
that an analysis of the subject as a symptomatic being must always take into 
account how time functions in a symptomatic way. To do so, I begin with an 
examination of Lacan’s theory of the origin. I focus on one famous episode in the 
history of Freudian psychoanalysis – the debate over the issues of birth trauma 
between Freud and Rank – to demonstrate how the absence of a definitive account 
of the origin gives rise to confusions and uncertainties in psychoanalysis. I sketch 
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out the ways in which Lacan confronts this problem by challenging the assumption 
of linear time on which the location of any substantial origin relies, and reconsider 
the role of prematuration in the formation of the subject. In the second section, I 
approach the problem of the origin from another perspective. Freud’s notion of 
primal repression is crucial for a psychoanalytic understanding of the mechanism 
of repression and other workings of the psyche, yet its meaning remains obscure. 
Examining Lacan’s interpretation of primal repression, especially the way he 
translates Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, I argue that primal repression cannot be 
understood within a linear framework of time in terms of the “first and earliest” 
repression. Instead, it designates a body-to-signifier process that binds two 
temporal registers together in order to maintain a subjective domain. The third 
section aims to prove that the idea of dual temporality fits into the Lacanian 
account of subject-formation. I explore how taking multiple temporal registers into 
account offers a more comprehensive and conceptually rich understanding of the 
mirror stage, and provide an account of the process of subject-formation in which 
alienation and separation are interpreted as the interplay between Real time and 
Symbolic time.  
 
4.1 Freud-Rank Debate and Lacan’s Idea of Prematuration 
The articulation of subject-formation requires an understanding of the origin as a 
necessary foundation without which its temporal dimension cannot be conceived. 
Before we discuss Lacan’s writings on this topic, I want to first present the Freud-
Rank debate as a theoretical and historical background against which Lacan’s 
theorisation of the origin can be taken as a response. The idea of the origin is a 
crucial element of Freudian psychoanalysis. It directs the methodology that Freud 
uses to develop psychoanalysis and later links up with major psychoanalytic 
concepts. From the beginning of his career as a psychiatrist, Freud had already 
shown a greater interest in the psychoneuroses that have their origins in the 
individual’s past life rather than the actual neuroses which, in his opinion, are 
caused by the present sexual dysfunction (Freud, 1894). In his archaeological 
metaphor, Freud famously refers to psychoanalysis as a “psychology of the depths”, 
which metaphorically spatialises the temporal nature of psychoanalytic inquiry, in 
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the sense that to excavate what lies below the surface is to reach the bygone origin 
that is covered over by the present. The exploration of the neurotic origin is not 
only clinically useful but also a key to grasping the formative influence on 
childhood development. This is why when the idea of primitive seduction was put 
forward as the origin of psychoneuroses, Freud could not but excitedly claim that 
he now held “a capital revelation, something akin to the discovery of the sources 
of the Nile of psychopathology” (Assoun, 2000, p.184). To the extent that the cause 
of the symptoms is given serious consideration in psychoanalysis, the discovery of 
which is often equivalent to a full understanding and cure of the mental disease, it 
is no surprise that Freud never completely gave up the quest for the origin. After 
abandoning the seduction theory, Freud didn’t accept the Jungian idea of 
retrospective fantasies that reduces the traumatic childhood memory to the 
reconstruction in the present, instead, he continually returned to the starting-
point of the individual’s psychosexual development and attempted to provide a 
“single, tangible ‘ultimate cause’ of neurotic illness” (Freud, 1926, p.152). 
 
In the early 1900s, Freud started to consolidate the theoretical connection between 
neuroses and sexuality. In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, he traced the 
cause of neurotic symptoms in adult life to libidinal flow in early childhood and 
pinpointed various erotogenic zones which determine and organise patterns of the 
individual’s psychosomatic experience. If the occurrence of seduction can no 
longer be regarded as a formative factor in human development, then the course 
of libidinal satisfaction and its suppression must be explained in another way.  To 
the question of what is there at the origin, Freud replies with a myth, the Oedipus 
story, whose narrative is interpreted as the prototype of infantile phantasies that 
express the wish for the satisfaction of sexual impulses. To Freud, Oedipus, a tragic 
hero in Greek mythology who murdered his father Laius and married his mother 
Jocasta, “merely shows us the fulfilment of our own childhood wishes” (Freud, 1900, 
p.262). He regards the Oedipus story as a projection of the unconscious complex 
structured within the psyche, which reveals the familiar relations that are in 
tension. Later in Totem and Taboo (1913), Freud provided a historical account of 
the murder of the primal father that phylogenetically justifies the tragedy of 
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Sophocles. The origin of neuroses in the individual’s psychic life, therefore, 
becomes the continuation and repetition of the origin of human society and 
civilisation.  
 
Through replacing the seduction theory with the Oedipus story, Freud redirects 
the way quests for the origin should follow in psychoanalysis. Based on a myth 
rather than a real event, a universal theory of psychic life that rejects external 
determinism is made possible. However, defining the origin in such a way is only 
partially successful. The Oedipus story, as a myth or a phantasy that transcends 
individual experience and imagination, does not settle the question of the origin 
but rather covers up the void at the beginning. Speaking of the origin of the fantasy, 
Laplanche and Pontalis suggest that “the intrusion of the fantasy (or myth) into 
the subject cannot but occur to the organism, the little human being, at a point in 
time” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1968, p.5). In other words, the pursuit of the origin 
leads Freud to postulate an origin more primitive or original than the answer he 
provides. One has to assign a chronological position in the individual’s life history 
to the Oedipal myth, whose realisation always requires some internal 
preconditions. If psychic conflicts within the Oedipal narrative respond to and 
further channel the infantile sexual impulses, then what is there to explain the 
origin of sexuality that is supposed to be traumatic in itself? Instead of eliminating 
the need for a simple, substantial origin, Philippe Refabert points out that defining 
the origin in terms of the Oedipus story “makes the sexual a given, something 
natural, in short, a substance” (Refabert, 2014, p.12).  It is inborn sexuality rather 
than the Oedipus complex that takes the place of the seduction and becomes the 
starting-point of the individual’s psychosexual development. Yet the origin of the 
traumatic nature of sexuality remains unexplained.  
 
A psychoanalytic account of the subject that recognises time as its essential 
dimension must give a pivotal role to the symptom in the formation and 
maintenance of personal identity, yet the myth Freud constructed around the 
problem of the origin only gave rise to more confusions and uncertainties within 
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the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. During the mid-1920s, it finally became a 
painful conflict involving different positions and interests between Freud and his 
faithful disciples. Otto Rank, who was once regarded as Freud’s “favourite son” and 
designated heir, put forward the theory of birth trauma that directly challenged 
the original status of the Oedipal narrative. The opening pages of his book The 
Trauma of Birth shows a similar fascination about the origin, as the following 
arguments “indicate a first attempt to apply the psychoanalytic way of thinking, as 
such, to the comprehension of the whole development of mankind, even of the 
actual fact of becoming human” (Rank, 1924a, p.xi). To Rank, the incapability of 
Freudian psychoanalysis to provide a definitive account of the origin suggested the 
natural limitation of its methodology as well as its foundation. Meanwhile, his own 
clinical work led him to reach a conclusion that: 
 
In attempting to reconstruct for the first time from analytic experiences 
the to all appearances purely physical birth trauma with its prodigious 
psychical consequences for the whole development of mankind, we are led 
to recognize in the birth trauma the ultimate biological basis of the 
psychical. (ibid., p.xii) 
 
Replacing the male-oriented, oedipal origin with a physiological emphasis on birth 
constitutes the core of Rank’s theoretical innovation. Downplaying the role of the 
Oedipal complex and its accompanying castration anxiety, Rank argued that the 
infant’s separation from the maternal body is the original event that introduces the 
pleasure-unpleasure mechanism: “The child’s every anxiety consists of the anxiety 
at birth (and the child’s every pleasure aims at the re-establishing of the 
intrauterine primal pleasure” (ibid., p.20). The biological sense of separation will 
later be repeated in the infant-mother relationship when a loss of object takes place, 
while the anxiety felt at birth is the primary affective state which self-reproduces 
when similar situations are experienced by the individual in adult life. The child’s 
mental development, therefore, becomes a process to master the unpleasant 




By claiming in the preface that his theory “has proceeded from the consistent 
application of the method created by Freud, and from the doctrine based on the 
method” (Rank, 1924a, p.xii), Rank presented the manuscript of his book to Freud 
not only as a birthday gift, but also as a development based on Freud’s own 
concepts. However, this alternative answer to the problem of the origin did not 
get a warm reception. Although his attitude towards Rank’s theses remained 
ambivalent for a long time 15,  Freud’s criticism of the birth trauma theory in 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) was unequivocal: “I do not believe, 
therefore, that Rank’s attempt has solved the problems of the causation of 
neurosis; nor do I believe that we can say as yet how much it may nevertheless 
have contributed to such a solution”  (Freud, 1926, p.152).  
 
Many possible factors contributed to Freud’s break with Rank. Leaving the political 
and institutional ones aside, whose detail has already been well documented,16 
Freud was mostly unsatisfied with Rank’s treatment of the Oedipus complex. He 
did not appreciate Rank’s attempt to “supplement the Oedipus theory from a 
biologic point of view” (Rank, 1924b, p.245), but questioned his motivation with a 
psychoanalytic interpretation: 
 
The exclusion of the father in your theory seems to reveal too much the 
result of personal influences in your life which I think I recognize and my 
                                                          
15 Shortly after receiving Rank’s book, Freud in his correspondence with Abraham 
remarked that “I have no doubt in saying that I hold this work to be very important, 
that it has given me a lot to think about and that I haven’t yet reached an opinion” 
(Freud & Abraham, 1969, p.352). The theory of birth trauma clearly forced Freud to 
suspect the validity of the Oedipal origin. As in the conclusion part of The 
Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex (1924), Freud admitted that “since the 
publication of Otto Rank’s interesting study, The Trauma of Birth, even the 
conclusion arrived at by this modest investigation, to the effect that the boy’s 
Oedipus complex is destroyed by the fear of castration, cannot be accepted without 
further discussion” (Freud, 1924, p.179). 
 
16 Rank’s theoretical innovation heralded his own intellectual independence while 
the “active therapy” he elaborated and advocated in his book deviated from classical 
psychoanalytic practice, both of which threatened Freud’s leading role in the 
psychoanalytic movement. See Bókay, A. 1998, Obaid, F. P. 2012.  
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suspicion grows that you would not have written this book had you gone 
through an analysis yourself (Taft, 1958, p. 99). 
 
However, it is difficult to justify Freud’s insistence on the primacy of the role of the 
father and his refusal to accept the existence of a more primitive stage that takes 
precedence over the Oedipal, especially if we consider that Freud himself had 
thought about the connection between birth and trauma in his first theory of 
anxiety neurosis, long before Rank’s subversive publication. In a footnote added in 
1909 to The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud acknowledged his appreciation of “the 
importance of phantasies and unconscious thoughts about life in the womb”: 
 
They contain an explanation of the remarkable dread that many people 
have of being buried alive; and they also afford the deepest unconscious 
basis for the belief in survival after death, which merely represents a 
projection into the future of this uncanny life before birth. Moreover, the 
act of birth is the first experience of anxiety, and thus the source and 
prototype of the affect of anxiety (Freud, 1900, p.400). 
 
Comparing with Rank’s view, Freud’s original explanation of anxiety formation 
also contained a biological dimension. It was not part of Freud’s thinking on the 
psychoneuroses, which was his focus in the early 1890s, but instead came from the 
toxic theory he formulated in his writings on the actual neuroses. According to 
Freud, the actual neuroses were caused by the insufficient libidinal discharge that 
brought sexual toxins into the autonomic nervous system, which explained the 
clinical similarity between the neuroses derived only from disturbance of sexual 
life and “the phenomena of intoxication and abstinence that arise from the 
habitual use of toxic, pleasure-producing substances” (Freud, 1905b, p.216). The 
build-up of toxic substances thus produced anxiety as the physiological response. 
In Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916-1917), Freud specified that the 
act of birth was the first time when the infant was put into the state of auto-
intoxication: “the immense increase of stimulation owing to the interruption of 
the renovation of the blood (internal respiration) was at the time the cause of the 




Therefore, by rejecting Rank’s arguments, Freud was also distanced from his past 
self whose thinking had prepared, if not reached, Rank’s theory of the birth 
trauma. As Freud admitted in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, “Rank’s 
contention – which was originally my own -, that the affect of anxiety is a 
consequence of the event of birth and a repetition of the situation then 
experienced, obliged me to review the problem of anxiety once more” (Freud, 1926, 
p.161). With the advent of his structural theory, Freud’s second theory of anxiety 
is framed within the psychical system. Anxiety becomes a signal of the danger 
originating from intrapsychic conflicts among different agencies (instinctual 
drives, superego prohibition, external reality demands). Although Freud 
acknowledged that the act of birth is experienced in a state of helplessness, he 
questioned whether the impressions made on the infants have deterministic 
relationships with their later phobias. Without reaching the stage of psychic 
maturity, “it is not credible that a child should retain any but tactile and general 
sensations relating to the process of birth” (Freud, 1926, p.135). Instead, the danger 
of birth, which “has yet no psychical content”, can only be spoken of after the idea 
of a loss of the object has formed during the Oedipal stage.  
 
In my investigation of the Freud-Rank debate, I am not concerned so much with 
its detailed content as with its underlying logic. Despite their differences, Freud’s 
and Rank’s arguments about the origin of the neuroses are all set along a linear 
axis of time. Rank returns to the chronological beginning of human existence, 
proposing an origin as a prototypic physiological experience of trauma, while 
Freud adopts a regressive approach, insisting that the oedipal myth is the 
beginning of meaning-making that provides us with an epistemological structure 
for interpreting the unknown biological sensations. In both cases, the origin is 
regarded as an occurrence taking place within time, succeeded by other moments 
that constitute a change in the temporal flow. Our ability to experience time is 
thus reduced to an ability to count different events in a succession of standardised 
moments. The temptation to think of the origin as being “located in” time follows 
the logic of spatialisation that exchanges the temporal concepts with conceptual 
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content from the spatial domain. Such an approach to the origin is ultimately a 
failure since it asks about the sense of being in time on the basis of a taken-for-
granted existence of the being of time that is objective, linear and unary.   
 
Understanding the problematic assumption which underlies the Freud-Rank 
debate helps us assess further the theoretical significance of Lacan’s 
reconceptualisation of the origin. At first glance, Lacan’s theory of the origin 
belongs to a linear temporal scheme. In his early piece of work Les complexes 
familiaux dans la formation de l'individu (1938), published in volume 8 of the 
Encyclopédie Française, Lacan summarised different complexes in a linear 
sequence that “play the role of ‘organisers’ in psychic development” (Lacan, 1938, 
p.14): The first stage is the weaning complex, in which the infant experiences both 
the biological and psychic crises when losing the maternal breast. The second 
stage is the complex of intrusion, representing the infant’s experience when 
interacting with fellow human beings such as siblings. The third stage is the 
Oedipus complex that defines the psychic relationships within the human family. 
By presenting the developmental trajectory of the psyche in this way, Lacan’s 
understanding of the origin stands closer to Otto Rank’s theory of birth trauma. 
As Lacan argues: 
 
(The infant’s separation from the maternal breast) gives the first and also 
the most adequate psychic expression to the more obscure imago of an 
earlier, more painful weaning that is of greater vital importance, that 
which, at birth, separates the infant from the womb, a premature 
separation from which comes a malaise that no maternal care can 
compensate for (ibid., p.20). 
 
By prioritising the weaning complex, Lacan locates the primary affective 
relationship between the infant and the mother, since “nothing but the imago 
which is imprinted at the deepest level of the mind by the congenital weaning of 
man can explain the power, richness and duration of maternal sentiments” (ibid.). 
The Oedipus complex, on the other hand, is situated not at the beginning but as 
the ending, “the high point of infantile sexuality” (ibid., p.44), through which the 
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paternal figure marks both the ego-ideal and the super-ego. Yet while Freud insists 
that the castration complex must be confined to excitations that are bound up with 
the loss of the penis, Lacan emphasises that even the super-ego has a maternal 
origin. He understands the concept of castration not as the paternal punishment of 
the “eruption of genital desire in the subject”, but as “the anxiety this object 
awakens by reproducing the masochistic rejection through which he overcame his 
primordial loss” (ibid., p.45). We can find a similar if not identical statement in 
Rank’s the Trauma of Birth: “The importance of the castration fear is based…on the 
primal castration at birth, that is, on the separation of the child from the mother” 
(Rank, 1924a, p.20). 
 
However, as Shuli Barzilai notices, the theoretical connection between Lacan and 
Rank in Les complexes familiaux is not openly acknowledged by Lacan (Barzilai, 
1999, p.30). On several occasions, Lacan instead appears reluctant to accept the 
birth trauma theory. Only several pages after his statement that “the biological 
crisis (of weaning) is duplicated by a psychic crisis”, Lacan admits that “with our 
knowledge of the data of physiology…It is however impossible to see birth, as 
certain psychoanalysts do, as a psychic trauma” (Lacan, 1938, p.19). In his later work, 
Lacan seems to adopt a Freudian regressive approach to the origin and more clearly 
parts company with Rank. In Seminar XI, when again discussing different stages of 
childhood development, Lacan returns to the standard Freudian explanation.  As 
Freud in The Infantile Genital Organization (1923) argues that “one ought not to 
speak of a castration complex until this idea of a loss has become connected with 
male genitals” (Freud, 1923c, p.144), Lacan now suggests that “the fear of castration 
is like a thread that perforates all the stages of development. It orientates the 
relations that are anterior to its actual appearance – weaning, toilet training, etc.” 
(Lacan, 1998, p.64).  
 
So how can we make sense of Lacan’s changing positions in relation to the problem 
of the origin? Different from Shuli Barzilai who believes that Lacan revises his 
remapping of the psychical trajectory of the subject so that the paternal figure and 
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the phallic signifier are granted more significant status while the maternal role is 
gradually marginalised if not entirely excluded from the process of subject-
formation (Barzilai, 1999), I argue that Lacan’s understanding of the origin in his 
late work cannot be regarded merely as a demonstration of his affiliation with 
Freud. In fact, a closer investigation suggests that it remains consistent with his 
early thinking in Les complexes familiaux, both of which follow a temporal logic 
different from the linear, objective one. To begin with, despite all the similarities, 
Lacan’s early formulation of the weaning complex is ontologically different from 
Rank’s birth trauma. To Rank, birth trauma is “the ultimate biological basis of the 
physical” (Rank, 1924a, p.xii). It is a strict biological mechanism that lays the ground 
for psychic development. As Obaid points out, when Rank argues that every anxiety 
consists of the anxiety of birth, he means literally that anxiety experienced in the 
course of life is “an exact and complete physiological reproduction of that event” 
(Obaid, 2012, p.698), not in an allegorical or metaphorical way.  Lacan’s weaning 
complex, on the other hand, goes directly against this biological interpretation. 
Although it “appears with such broadly similar traits throughout the human species 
that it can be seen as generic” (ibid., p.15), Lacan stresses that “it is a cultural 
regulation that conditions weaning” (ibid.). The weaning complex continues to 
influence the human while the animal ceases to be driven by the maternal instinct 
with the completion of suckling, according to Lacan, due to the fact that weaning 
is a crisis of the psyche in response to an essential human characteristic, 
‘prematuration’. 
 
The concept of prematuration is the key to understanding Lacan’s account of the 
origin to which he frequently refers in his writings, mostly in the form of the 
“specific prematurity of birth”. Drawing on anatomical evidence in modern biology, 
Lacan postulates a primordial discord between the human species and the 
environment at birth, in contrast to other new-born animals such as apes which 
have a greater control of motor coordination and are better adapted to the 
surroundings. “The apparatus which in the organism plays the role of nervous 
system, still a matter for debate, is not complete at birth” (Lacan, 1988a, p.149).  In 
the case of the weaning complex, the prematurity of birth as a biological deficiency 
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that characterises humans “explains both the general nature of the complex and its 
independence of the accidents of ablactation” (Lacan, 1938, p.19). However, more 
than a biological phenomenon that explains the vital powerlessness and the psychic 
helplessness at birth, prematuration continues to be an important mechanism that 
organises the whole process of subject-formation in Lacan’s work. In the complex 
of intrusion, prematuration leads to a prolonged non-coordination between the 
body and the psychic function. The anticipated psychological mastery to solve this 
tension is manifested as an adaptive behaviour followed by a jubilant expression 
when one confronts one’s mirror image. In the Oedipus complex, the frustration 
one experiences when one’s attachment to the desired object cannot be realised is 
“inherent to the essential prematurity of the drives” (ibid., p.36). Lacan explains 
this point in detail: 
 
The psychic correction of sexual prematurity is ensured by the super-ego 
when it represses the biologically inadequate object that the first sexual 
maturation proposes to desire and by the ego-ideal when it brings about 
an imaginary identification that will orient the [subject's] choice towards 
the biologically adequate object when pubertal maturity comes (ibid., 
p.71). 
 
In these statements, we can see that what has been granted formative priority is 
not the weaning complex but prematuration as an everlasting and ongoing process. 
Lacan’s formulation of the three complexes of early childhood is not developmental 
since each of them is experienced as the present at that moment, with 
prematuration as the determinant principle which transforms and modifies 
relations within these complexes in which it appears. In this process, the original 
“specific prematurity of birth” as a biological phenomenon is doubled by another 
form of prematurity. While the human organism is premature in relation to the 
environment, the psychological mastery of the body through ego formation is also 
premature: “The sight alone of the whole form of the human body gives the subject 
an imaginary mastery over his body, one which is premature in relation to a real 
mastery” (Lacan, 1988a, p.79). As Lacan further points out, the imaginary mastery 
can be anticipated and achieved prematurely because of the totality of the symbolic 
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universe, which predetermines one’s subject position before one is ready to step in. 
The subject, therefore, sees its own image in the eyes of the Other: “The thing that 
we have tried to designate in the prematurity of birth…is that through the image of 
the other man finds the unification of his most elementary movements, whether it 
is there or elsewhere that this begins, what is certain, is that these images in their 
anarchic state characteristic of the human order, of the human species, are 
influenced, are caught up, are utilized by signifying management” (Lacan, 1958, 
p.82).  
 
In Seminar II, Lacan provides a definition of the human being: “Psychoanalysis 
stresses that man isn’t an object, but a being in the process of becoming” (Lacan, 
1988b, p.105). I argue that the notion of prematuration perfectly explains this 
definition by bringing together two different but essential temporal registers of the 
human being in Lacan’s theory. One is Real time, in which the human body is 
always in the process of becoming because of biological inadequacy; the other is 
Symbolic time, in which the subject is always-already presupposed before the 
physiological maturation is completed in order to enable its own formation. In 
response to the central temporal paradox in the Freud-Rank debate – the 
fundamental desynchrony between the biological origin and the symbolic origin of 
the subject – Lacan refuses to choose either along a linear timeline. Instead, he 
points out that this temporal desynchrony or the splitting of the timeline is the 
actual original mechanism that shapes the subjective structure in which the origin 
as a single moment is projected into the past, as something that comes too early, is 
too premature.  
 
At the root of Lacan’s thinking, we find that the temporal condition of subjectivity 
is redefined in the horizon of the present. While the Freudian account of the origin 
based on a linear notion of time is trapped largely, if not exclusively, in the past, 
Lacan argues that the origin of the present can only be revealed in the present itself. 
In Seminar II, Lacan has a discussion of this “common mistake” in one’s quest for 
the origin: “When something comes to light, something which we are forced to 
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consider as new; when another structural order emerges, well then, it creates its 
own perspective within the past, and we say – This can never not have been there, 
this has existed from the beginning. Besides, isn’t that a property which our own 
experience demonstrates? ” (Lacan, 1988b, p.5). The subjective temporal experience 
is fundamentally an experience of difference when the subject engages with 
something present in various instances of the Now, however, because of the 
symbolic universe as a field of meaning which precedes the subject: “what appears 
to be new thus always seems to extend itself indefinitely into perpetuity, prior to 
itself” (ibid.). Insofar as the origin is understood as a past event that acts at a 
distance upon the present one, assigned a fixed place in the sequence of instances 
that can be arranged linearly, difference is reduced to repetition. What appears to 
be new is disguised in the form of a consequence in regard to the representation of 
the past. The dilemma is that while the ontological bearing of the present requires 
the origin, the Freudian origin itself eliminates the present. By taking 
prematuration as the origin that is contemporaneous with the present yet 
conditions the very experience of lack which causes the present to pass, Lacan’s 
origin becomes an a priori horizon for the possibilities of being to manifest 
themselves in the present and thereby embraces changes that are contained in the 
moment of the Now.17  
 
4.2 Primal Repression and Temporal Binding  
In order to further comprehend the decisive significance of the idea of dual 
temporality in Lacan’s theorisation of subject-formation, we ought to have another 
look at his analysis of primal repression, which, in Lacan’s reading, is the 
fundamental mechanism that “essentially determines the unconscious” (Lacan, 
1998, p.60). In Freudian metapsychology, primal repression is a difficult concept 
that has not been given sufficient elaboration in his subsequent writings. However, 
                                                          
17 The lack introduced by prematuration should be understood on two planes: the 
biological plane and the symbolic plane. As Lacan points out: “The gap opened up 
in the human being by the original biological presence in him of death, due to what 
I have called the prematurity of birth. This is the point of impact where the symbolic 




its significant status is undeniable, considering that in his later work Analysis 
Terminable and Interminable, Freud takes the subsequent correction of primal 
repression as “the real achievement of analytic therapy” (Freud, 1937, p.227). It is 
common among Freudian commentators to take the idea of primal repression and 
the way Freud distinguishes it from repression proper or after-pressure as an 
explicit reference to the chronological priority of this type of repression in a linear 
axis of time. For example, Nunberg (1955) claims that all later repression are 
repetitions of the primal repression; Frank (1969) understands primal repression as 
“the unrememberable and the unforgettable” residue of the original trauma; 
Mangini (2010) suggests that the primal repression is the “first moment” of 
repression, “an original event that each time triggers a possible opening towards 
thinkability…avoiding the discharge of excitation and the experience of primal 
anxiety” (p. 54). Just as castration anxiety in the Oedipus complex is regarded by 
Freud as the origin of all neuroses, these readings take primal repression as the 
corresponding defence mechanism developed at the same time in the child’s 
psychosexual development. However, is this equation between primal repression 
and the “earliest” repression supported by Freud’s own writings? 
 
In his 1915 metapsychology papers entitled Repression and The Unconscious, Freud 
for the first time presents the idea of primal repression18, yet his explanation is brief 
and vague. In The Unconscious, primal repression is introduced to solve the 
dilemma Freud confronts when he tries to apply the energetic principle to the 
process of repression. In the case of repression (repression proper), an idea is 
                                                          
18 Frank and Muslin (1967) argue that Freud’s thinking on primal repression can be 
traced back to The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and Three Essays on Sexuality 
(1905), in which he proposes a number of general principles and specific 
characteristics that fit into his later formulation of primal repression. For example, 
Freud discusses “infantile memories” and “wishful impulses” that are inaccessible 
to the preconscious system, the repression of which has a powerful influence on 
other mental activities. However, in my opinion, the difference between Freud’s 
early view of some “primarily repressed instincts”, which is caused either by an 
inhibition in development or a fixation in an infantile state, and his notion of primal 
repression cannot be overlooked. While the former is speculated on from a 
developmental perspective, the latter is situated in a structural model. The 
conflation of these two different ideas may be a reason for the popular 
misunderstanding of primal repression.  
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denied entrance into the conscious through the withdrawal of the preconscious 
cathexis. For this to happen, the same idea must have been cathected by the 
preconscious before. However, as Freud realises: 
 
When it comes to describing primal repression, the mechanism just 
discussed of withdrawal of preconscious cathexis would fail to meet the 
case; for here we are dealing with an unconscious idea which has yet 
received no cathexis from the Pcs, and therefore cannot have that cathexis 
withdrawn from it (Freud, 1915c, pp.180–181). 
 
A different mechanism must be put forward to account for primal repression, which 
is designated by Freud as anticathexis. It “represents the permanent expenditure 
[of energy] of a primal repression” (ibid.). However, Freud does not demonstrate 
how this mechanism works in primal repression. It is unclear from where 
anticathexis acquires its energy since Freud’s following speculation that “the 
cathexis which is withdrawn from the idea is used for anticathexis” clearly does not 
apply to the case of primal repression, in which case no cathexis is withdrawn. 
Freud’s other paper Repression also offers little help, as in the only place where 
primal repression is defined, another obscure concept is put forward to designate 
the object of anticathexis: “We have reason to assume that there is a primal 
repression, a first phase of repression, which consists in the 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz of the instinct being denied entrance into the conscious” 
(Freud, 1915b, p.148). 
 
Therefore, clarifying the meaning of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz becomes the only 
entry for us to get valuable insights into the nature and mechanism of primal 
repression. The first issue concerns the translation of this concept. 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz consists of two individual parts: Vorstellung and 
Repräsentanz. In the philosophical and psychological sense, the former is 
traditionally translated as mental representation 19 , while the latter is the 
                                                          
19  Fayek in his paper (2002) argues that Vorstellung should be translated as 




corresponding term for representative. To Freud, the mental representation is the 
mental image of the intentional object in the external world. As we have already 
discussed in chapter two, Freud defines the conscious as the quality of these 
representations in the Project. Representative, on the other hand, can be 
understood in the sense of delegation. Now we can have a look at how these two 
individual parts are meaningfully combined in the available translations of this 
Freudian expression.  
 
In the standard edition, Vorstellungsrepräsentanz is translated as “ideational 
representative”. The popular Spanish translation is “representante-representativo” 
(representative-representative); while the Italian translation is “rappresentanza 
rappresentativa” (representative representation) or “rappresentanza data da una 
rappresentazione” (representative given by a representation). The Spanish one is 
clearly a mistake as the adjective “representante” is not derived from the noun 
“representación”, which is the corresponding Spanish word for Vorstellung. Despite 
all the formal differences, the other three translations mean more or less the same 
if we investigate the mechanism they attempt to describe. In his other writings, 
Freud has already used psychische Repräsentanz to describe the instinct (Freud, 
1905b, p.168, 1915a, p.122). According to Freud, the instinct as a somatic force cannot 
be represented in the psyche. Instead, it has a psychical representative that is 
knowable through the way the discharge of excitations at the level of the body 
affects the psyche. However, the question remains whether the representative of 
the instinct itself is a representation. This problem is further complicated since in 
the Unconscious, where Freud argues that “an instinct can never become an object 
of consciousness – only the idea [Vorstellung] that represents the instinct can. Even 
in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by 
an idea” (Freud, 1915c, p.177). This statement suggests that the instinct can be 
                                                          
Although the same concept in Brentano’s philosophy – which heavily influences 
Freud’s thinking – is often translated as ‘presentation’ not as ‘representation’, I 
prefer the term “representation” since the contemporary usage of “presentation” in 
philosophy and psychology minimises the difference between perception and 
presentation, which is not the intention when Freud and Brentano use Vorstellung. 
Both of them emphasise that the mental image bears the mark of a psychical rework 
or an attributive synthesis that can be understood as a re-presentation.   
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represented by an idea which contradicts the basic assumption of Freudian 
metapsychology that the instinct is unrepresentable, unless we reach a compromise 
that the representative of the instinct itself is a mental representation in the psyche. 
This is the basic idea embedded in the other three translations, that “the 
representative or delegate of the drive (instinct) in the psyche is one that is of the 
nature of a mental representation, which has the attribute of being itself a mental 
representation” (Herrera, 2010, p.797).  
 
In Seminar XI, Lacan provides his own reading of Freud’s primal repression through 
a discussion of different translations of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz. Although Lacan’s 
target is the standard French translation “représentant-représentatif” 
(representative-representative), which makes the same mistake as the Spanish 
translation, only a few readers have noticed that Lacan’s own translation – 
“représentatif de la représentation” (representative of the representation) - is also 
different from Strachey’s choice in the SE. Herrera, a supporter of the English 
translation of this term, believes that “Lacan has gone astray when he translates 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz as ‘représentatif de la représentation’”, which contains 
the definite article “la” (the) that is absent in Freud’s original formulation. Trivial 
as this problem appears at first glance, Herrera argues that in the same way “silk 
dress” is totally different from “the dress of the silk”: 
 
Lacan’s mistranslation of the Freudian compound inverts the relation 
which in German exists between both concepts: we no longer have a 
representative which is of the nature of the representation; now it is the 
representation itself which has a representative or a tenant-lieu (ibid., 
p.801). 
 
 But what if this is precisely Lacan’s intention? Translating 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz in terms of “ideational representative” or 
“representational representative” is too problematic to help us understand the 
mechanism of primal repression, because firstly, it is an awkward conflation that 
eliminates the essential difference between representation and representative; 
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secondly, it fails to separate primal repression from repression proper as both of 
them are repressions of the representation in the psyche; thirdly, it does not explain 
how anticathexis, without getting energy from the withdrawal of the preconscious 
cathexis, can be maintained in primal repression. By contrast, Lacan’s translation 
of Vorstellungsrepräsentanz is based on a clear distinction between representation 
and representative. Insofar as the representation is the mnemic-image of an 
external object in the conscious under the control of the ego, it is associated with 
signification. Meanwhile, the representative, which suggests a many-to-one 
relationship that finds its place in the Freudian condensation, can be substituted 
by what Lacan calls “metaphor” in the symbolic domain. When we use a phrase 
such as “the representative of France”, Lacan explains, we are referring to a 
diplomat who is “supposed to represent something whose signification, while 
constantly changing, is, beyond their own persons, France, Britain, etc. In the very 
exchange of views, each must record only what the other transmits in his pure 
function as signifier” (Lacan, 1998, p.220). Therefore, the essential point about 
Lacan’s “representative of the representation” is to move the entire mechanism 
from the individual psyche to the symbolic order in which the emergence of the 
subject is caught up in the signifying movement. As Lacan says: 
 
We can locate this Vorstellungsrepräsentanz in our schema of the original 
mechanisms of alienation in that first signifying coupling that enables us 
to conceive that the subject appears first in the Other, in so far as the first 
signifier, the unary signifier, emerges in the field of the Other and 
represents the subject for another signifier, which other signifier has as its 
effect the aphanisis of the subject. Hence the division of the subject – 
when the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested 
elsewhere as ‘fading’, as disappearance. There is, then, one might say, a 
matter of life and death between the unary signifier and the subject, qua 
binary signifier, cause of his disappearance. The Vorstellungsrepräsentanz 
is the binary signifier  (ibid., p.218). 
 
Lacan depicts Vorstellungsrepräsentanz as a two-stage mechanism. In the first 
stage, the unary signifier emerges in the field of the Other and is the representative 
of the subject as the being of desire. Since the Real dimension of the subject is 
unrepresentable, the unary signifier is nothing but the signifier of the lack in the 
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Other, yet the emptiness of its signifying value also suggests its uniqueness as a 
signifier of pure difference. In the second stage, the unary signifier is included in a 
signifying chain, in which the subject is represented by one signifier to another, 
maintaining the dialectical movement between appearing and fading. In this 
process, the unique link between the unary signifier and the subject as a Real 
presence is erased, and meaning is generated through the difference between 
signifiers. By symbolising the absence or the lack that is not present, the movement 
of the signifying chain marks the effacing of one’s connection to things in the 
external world and the beginning of the arbitrary relationship between signifier and 
signification.  
 
In Seminar XVII, Lacan rejects the chronological reduction of primal repression by 
defining the primary repressed as the absence of repression: “The enigmatic 
parentheses of the Urverdrängt means precisely what has not had to be repressed 
because it has been repressed from the start” (Lacan, 2007, p.90). Instead of taking 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz as a representing entity disguised as the representative 
and subject to repression in an early moment of the individual history, Lacan 
understands it as the binary signifier - the “signifier which takes the place of the 
signification” – that is present in every moment of psychic life and conditions the 
meaning-making process. The problem of the energy source of anticathexis is thus 
settled in Lacan’s reading, as we can see that in the case of primal repression, 
anticathexis is not a defence mechanism to push the representation out of the Pcs. 
/ Cs. System but an active force that invests the instinctual impulse in the signifier. 
In other words, what distinguishes primal repression from repression proper is that 
primal repression is not repression at all, but rather a “jump” from the instinctual 
process immersed in the bodily matrix to the signifying movement in the symbolic 
order. It is a binding mechanism through which the exchange between Real time 
and Symbolic time is made possible.  
 
We can better understand the unique temporal implication of Lacan’s idea of 
primal repression by revisiting Laplanche’s theorisation of the same concept.  
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Similar to Lacan, Laplanche in his reading of Freud criticises the tendency to 
assimilate primal repression, as “the creator of the unconscious as a place” 
(Laplanche, 1999a, p.87), to an exclusively biological or instinctual process. Yet, on 
the other hand, he rebuilds the theoretical connection between primal seduction 
and primal repression, not in the sense of confirming the fixation of an actual 
seduction or an early seduction fantasy as the core of the unconscious, but to 
introduce otherness in the formation of subjectivity. Unlike many commentators 
who take Freud’s self-critique of his early seduction theory as a necessary 
theoretical development, Laplanche suggests that Freud became even more 
“determinist” after his abandonment of the seduction theory because of the loss of 
the complex play between the external and the internal reality implied by the idea 
of seduction – “When Freud said, ‘Now I am abandoning the idea of external 
causality and turning to fantasy,’ he neglected this very dialectical theory he had 
between the external and the internal” (Caruth, 2001, p.2). To Laplanche, we shall 
not look for the origin as seduction in some form of abuse but understand it as the 
infant’s continuous enigmatic experience in its daily interactions with adults, more 
specifically, the mother. In the primal relationship between the child whose mental 
ability is limited and immature and the parent whose psyche is “richer”, it is 
inevitable that some messages from the parent cannot be processed or assimilated 
by the child but become aliens at the heart of the subject’s own internal psychic 
structure. These messages pertain to the satisfaction of the child’s needs but 
provide more than that. Laplanche uses the example of breastfeeding to argue that 
for the infant, the breast is not only an object, an organ for feeding, but also an 
erotic zone that is pregnant with the mother’s own unconscious desire. It is the 
otherness embedded in this enigmatic message that produces a destabilising effect 
on the infant’s subjective formation and thus becomes the object of primal 
repression. 
 
As we can see, in Laplanche’s theory, primal repression is a psychic response to the 
discrepancy between the complexity of adult communications and the immature 
psychic world of the infant. Seduction is not a singular event but as Hinton 
summarises, “a sense of provocation, charm, allure and stimulation” (Hinton, 2009, 
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p.642) that pertains to the whole period of the early stage of psychosexual 
development. It is not initiated by any specific adult in a blatantly sexual manner, 
but stands for the always-already sexualised world of adults that implants what 
Laplanche calls the “enigmatic signifier” into the childhood life as “another thing 
in me”.20  In this sense, by introducing the other’s desire, Laplanche moves away 
from Freud’s original “special theory of seduction”, which, according to him, “is 
restricted to the most obviously psychopathological level” (Laplanche, 1989, p.115), 
towards a “general theory of seduction” that takes seduction as the universal 
foundation of every subject’s psychic structure.  
 
We can find in Laplanche’s theory a certain alliance with Lacan’s understanding of 
primal repression, both of which reject the reduction of the present to a past that 
is constructed out of fixed contents and argue that infantile development is 
immersed in the symbolic world from the beginning. What is primarily repressed 
demands not a revelation but a re-imagination or re-translation that “would be 
open to all meanings, and from then on, any attribution of meaning would be 
purely arbitrary” (Laplanche, 1999b, p.236). More importantly, Laplanche’s reading 
also indicates the desynchrony between the symbolic pattern and the individual’s 
existing pattern, experienced in the form of “too late” and “too early”. As Žižek 
points out: “The child is originally helpless, thrown into the world when he is 
unable to take care of himself – that is, his or her survival skills develop too late; at 
the same time, the encounter with the sexualized Other always, by a structural 
necessity, comes ‘too soon’, as an unexpected shock which can never be properly 
symbolised, translated into the universe of meaning” (Žižek, 2009, p.20). However, 
several crucial differences between Laplanche and Lacan cannot be overlooked. 
While Laplanche emphasises the role of the other in the development of 
subjectivity, Lacan believes that it is the Other as the symbolic order that has the 
                                                          
20 Despite many theoretical nuances between them, Forrester’s interpretation of 
seduction follows the same logic as that of Laplanche. “It is not so much the 
presexual sexual shock or the fright induced in the child that is aetiologically 
significant,” he suggests, “rather, it is the implication of the child in a world that is 
foreign to it, a world which it is nonetheless destined, come puberty, to be obliged 
to make its own” (Forrester, 1991, p.80). 
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fundamental formative effect on subjectivity. Although Laplanche adopts the term 
“enigmatic signifier” from Lacan, he is reluctant to go as far as to say that the 
unconscious itself is structured like a language. To him, the unconscious is still an 
intrapsychic reservoir of unassimilated representations around which a series of 
attempts of meaning assignment throughout one’s life history is organised, yet in 
this case, the unconscious process is regarded as a hierarchised paradigm in which 
signifiers received earlier are prioritised. On the other hand, in Lacan’s theory, we 
cannot find the idea that the symbolic intervention will be more significant when 
the individual’s psyche is less mature. As I have discussed earlier, Lacan’s notion of 
prematuration designates an ongoing experience of temporal discord that extends 
to the Oedipal stage and later. In so doing, the linear notion of time is most radically 
eliminated and replaced by the absolute otherness of Symbolic time.  
 
Secondly, Lacan’s understanding of primal repression endows the subject with a 
more active role in one’s interaction with the symbolic world. In Laplanche’s case, 
although the infant is allowed to perform creative activities in response to the 
enigmatic signifier, it is only a passive subject that receives the message at the 
beginning, whose enigmatic, destabilising nucleus is totally determined by the 
other’s desire. This idea that primal repression is an unconscious process through 
which an external enigmatic signifier is repressed within the individual’s internal 
psychic life is rejected by Lacan, who argues, on the contrary, that at the very 
moment of primal repression: 
 
Something of the subject becomes detached in the very symbolic world 
that he is engaged in integrating. From then on, it will no longer be 
something belonging to the subject. The subject will no longer speak it, 
will no longer integrate it. Nevertheless, it will remain there, somewhere, 
spoken, if one can put it this way, by something the subject does not 
control (Lacan, 1988a, p.191). 
 
In Lacan’s reading, primal repression is not a moment of integration when the 
embodiment of the other’s desire becomes a part of one’s own but rather a moment 
of disintegration. Following Freud’s original account that the permanent 
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expenditure of energy of primal repression attaches itself to an idea in the form of 
anticathexis, the Lacanian primal repression is an active investment in a signifier 
that replaces the subject’s Real being with a symbolic existence. This signifier 
signifies not any particular object or event, but the very capacity of signification, 
the capacity of the subject “being signified”. Although the symbolic order in which 
the subject’s identity is defined is uncontrollable, functioning according to its own 
time, it is the nascent subject that initiates its own disintegration through the 
choice to “bind” its own living pattern with the symbolic movement. The idea of 
“determining one’s own determination” can once again be found in this unique 
model of subjectivity made possible by primal repression, which transcends the 
bodily reality itself and reaches beyond to its own alien and thereby constitutes a 
compelling ground for an ontological dualism of Real time and Symbolic Time.  
 
4.3 Mirror Stage, Alienation and Separation 
Lacan devotes a great deal of explicit text to the discussion of the Freudian origin, 
in which his understanding of the time of symptom-formation can be extracted, yet 
there is no better place to obtain full comprehension of Lacan’s thinking on this 
topic than his own narrative of the origin. In his 1949 essay, The Mirror Stage as 
Formative of the I Function, Lacan provides an original account of the birth of a 
conscious subjective life by illustrating a metaphorical scene in which the infant 
comes to see and recognise an external image of their own body in the mirror. As a 
theory concerning the very beginning of subjectivity, the theory of the mirror stage 
also marks the beginning of Lacan’s intellectual career. It has now become a tale of 
revenge that a young scholar whose debut at the International Psychoanalytical 
Association (IPA) Congress is not well accepted later finds his own path to 
becoming a worldwide renowned psychoanalyst and leads a strong anti-
institutional movement in the history of psychoanalysis. Although to some degree, 
the theory of the mirror stage can be seen as a developed version of the intrusion 
complex Lacan put forward in his 1938 paper, the ontological ground on which the 
problem of the origin is discussed has been changed. Lacan moves from the 
discussion of the origin of psychoneurotic symptoms in a strictly pathological sense 
towards an exploration of the actual process of subject-formation that is 
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symptomatic in a more general sense. Meanwhile, the idea of dual temporality 
remains the underlying principle throughout this theoretical transformation. The 
fact that Lacan’s own intellectual origin is accompanied by the Other’s 
misrecognition proves the key point he makes in the paper that the origin of 
subjectivity is characterised by a “primordial discord” between the individual 
existence and the surrounding world.  
 
Before discussing the psychic process involved in the mirror stage in detail, it will 
be helpful to first turn to the mirror experiments conducted by Henri Wallon, a 
French psychologist whose work is often considered as an important resource for 
Lacan’s thinking. In his book Les Origines du Caractère chez l’Enfant, Wallon 
documents a series of experiments that compare the developmental difference 
between human and chimpanzee infants. He notices that while the human infant 
is able to form a reciprocal relationship between the self and its reflection in the 
mirror, the animal, on the other hand, fails to identify with its image. Through this 
identification, Wallon argues that immediate experience and transitory 
impressions of the human infant become “fixed by images initially concrete and 
seemingly coextensive with their object, and then give way to symbolic 
transmutations of pure and stable representation”(Wallon, 1949, p.183). This idea 
clearly resonates in Lacan’s study of the mirror stage. Although Wallon’s name is 
not singled out for recognition in Lacan’s 1949 essay, his observation is mentioned 
as “a fact of comparative psychology”: “The human child, at an age when he is for a 
short while, but for a while nevertheless, outdone by the chimpanzee in 
instrumental intelligence, can already recognize his own image as such in a mirror” 
(Lacan, 2006k, p.75). To Lacan, the mirror stage provides the infant with the first 
experience of unity that subsumes the chaotic bodily sensations. The moment 
when the infant, “in a flutter of jubilant activity…take(s) in an instantaneous view 
of the image in order to fix it in mind” (ibid., p.76) marks the decisive 
transformation from an undifferentiated, narcissistic state to the emergence of self-




However, Lacan not only assimilates Wallon’s empirical experiments and 
conceptual paradigms, but he also radically reworks the latter to the extent that he 
can speak of the idea of the mirror stage as his own “invention”. In fact, it would be 
odd for Lacan, who is always sceptical of biologism, to make use of a biological 
experiment as his theoretical foundation without giving it a philosophical reading. 
The mirror mechanism Lacan presents in his essay parts company with Wallon’s 
description on several crucial points. Whereas to Wallon, the mirror image is 
indeed the true image of the infant, only located at a different point in space; Lacan 
sees it rather as an illusion that promises the infant whose body is fragmented 
because of man’s prematurity at birth a “total form of his body” (ibid., p.76). The 
imaginary mastery of one’s own body is achieved through a form of anticipation 
rather than recognition, and the ego-formation is not the result of self-maturation 
but the incorporation of the other at the expense of one’s primary self-being. It is 
an indication of an altered relationship between oneself and the other. Lacan 
follows Freud to define the ego as a bodily ego, but it is not simply a representation 
of reality but “the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid 
structure the subject’s entire mental development” (ibid.). Therefore, we can 
understand why the infant’s jubilant experience in Lacan’s account is reduced to a 
short moment. Far from being the ultimate harmony between the internal and the 
external envisioned by Wallon, Lacan’s mirror stage is characterised by a 
fundamental loss of being that prefigures the constituted subject’s alienating 
destination.  
 
The cause of the divergence between Wallon’s and Lacan’s theoretical formulations 
is a difference of the underlying logic. For Wallon, what matters in the mirror stage 
is the ability to experience oneself as spatial and to comprehend the spatial 
relationship between model and image. By recognising what is “there” is also what 
is “here”, the infant develops the spatial intuition to coordinate his own bodily 
existence with the environment. Lacan, on the other hand, introduces a temporal 
tension into this narrative. He makes this point clear in Seminar VIII that in the 
mirror stage, “There are not only spatial relationships that refer to the specular 
image it begins to come alive and become the other incarnate,” since “there is also 
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a temporal relationship” (Lacan, 2015, p.363). The infant not only perceives the 
unity of its body image from the outside but also “in an anticipated manner” (Lacan, 
1988b, p.166). Insofar as the infant’s psychic maturation is achieved “too late” while 
the total image is presented to him or her “too early”, “This development is 
experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the individual’s 
formation into history: the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes 
precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation” (Lacan, 2006k, p.78). The mirror 
image, as Lacan states in the Subversion of the Subject, “is the anticipated image – 
which had caught of himself in his mirror- coming to meet him” (Lacan, 2006m, 
p.684). It compresses the temporal state of human subjectivity into a spatial term. 
In this sense, the relationship between different positions in space is also temporal. 
The mirror image as something “there” is the very (imaginary) future of the 
individual’s bodily formation, something that I am not at this moment but 
anticipate becoming.  
 
If this is the case, we can argue that what is misrecognised in the mirror stage is not 
only one’s self-image but one’s bodily time. The body image is not the result of 
reflectively representing the unified whole of one’s own body but a condensation 
of the flow of bodily related experiences, a “momentary snapshot” that imposes 
limits on the movement of the body. The perpetual exteriority of the mirror image 
is also a form of the absolute impossibility that always postpones the completion of 
self-recognition. The ego that comes into being takes what has not been realised as 
the very present, from where inner time-consciousness is developed, yet the 
illusion of “having been there” only temporarily covers the gap between the Real 
body and its completed gestalt, a gap that always threatens to break down the 
subject’s familiar sense of self-identity as well as the conscious temporal order. 
Therefore, we can understand why Lacan’s mirror stage is not the final stage of 
subject-formation, nor is it a particular phase of early childhood in Wallon’s view 
of human teleological development. Instead, Lacan points out that identification 
with the self-image is the “rootstock of secondary identifications” (ibid, p.76) that 
initiates a permanent subjective movement through various stages of 
identification/alienation. The tension between disorganised Real time and 
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conscious time that is imaginarily synthesised will extend to the whole lifespan of 
the subject. 
 
Apart from Real time that stands for the primordial instability of human identity, 
against which the constituted ego performs its “libidinal normalisation functions” 
(ibid.), another temporal modality is required to make the mirror stage possible in 
the first place. If the mirror stage is considered as the birth of self- and other-
consciousness, one is left with the puzzle of “how is the infant able to differentiate 
his mirror image in an undifferentiated, self-absorbing state that is defined by 
Freud as primary narcissism?” In Freud’s account, primary narcissism refers to the 
libidinal state of an infant in which all libido is directed towards itself (Freud, 1914a). 
It is a continuation of the intrauterine life that lacks the distinction between the 
external and the internal. The mirror stage marks the end of this pre-subjective 
stage, but this seemingly natural process only makes sense if one examines it 
retrospectively. It is not clear how the infant leaves the undifferentiated state when 
one has yet to acquire a limited sense of self. Lacan himself realises this problem in 
Seminar VIII: 
 
Now, if one begins with a notion like that of an initially perfect narcissism 
as regards libidinal cathexis, and if one thinks that the primordial object 
is originally included in the subject in the narcissistic sphere – which is a 
primitive monad of jouissance, with which the infant is identified, in a way 
that is quite iffy – it is difficult to see what could lead to a subjective exit 
from it (Lacan, 2015, p.348). 
 
If the mirror stage is accomplished by the infant alone, we face the logical difficulty 
that an intentionality to see must be prior to the act of (mis)recognition; but given 
that the mirror stage is the very mechanism that creates self-consciousness and 
establishes the boundary between self and other, there appears to be no subject 
that can initiate the whole process. What becomes clear in this analysis is that on 
its own terms the mirror stage as a theory of the origin is inadequate, for its 
commitment to illustrating the self-creation of human consciousness always 
requires a primordial form of self before its own creation. Confronting this dilemma, 
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Lacan’s solution is not to presuppose some form of mysterious enlightenment in 
primary narcissism, such as “some ante-specular apprehension of the other, and of 
the ego” (Borch-Jacobsen, 1991, p.66), but to introduce the Other’s intervention 
from another temporal register that supplements the theory of the mirror stage 
with a narrative of the pre-subjective stage.  
 
To begin with, Lacan points out that what co-exists with the infant’s pre-subjective 
state is the “symbolic matrix”, “in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, 
prior to being objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other” (Lacan, 
2006k, p.76). The symbolic dimension is not developed after one’s imaginary 
fulfilment but presented as a constitutive background of the individual’s nascent 
existence against which the subject’s ego ideal is formed through primary 
identification.21  The idea of primary identification is a controversial concept in 
Freudian psychoanalysis. Its theoretical and empirical validity is often questioned 
for two main reasons. Firstly, Freud defines primary identification as “a direct and 
immediate identification (that) takes place earlier than any object-cathexis” (Freud, 
1923a, p.31), yet it is difficult to imagine an identification without any prior object-
choice. Secondly, Freud argues that primary identification is the “identification 
with the father in his own personal prehistory”, although the libidinous investment 
on the mother is dominant in the pre-Oedipal phase.22 In Seminar XVII, Lacan 
                                                          
21 Kristeva in Revolution in Poetic Language (1984) seems to misread Lacan, as she 
criticises Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage for a lack of explanation of the transition 
from the pre-symbolic to the symbolic. In fact, Lacan’s theory is consistent with her 
argument that for the infant to differentiate the other and identify oneself as a 
subject-self, the mirror stage must already appear to be symbolic.  
 
22 There is a large body of literature on the topic of “primary identification”. Post-
Freudian theorists coming from traditions of ego psychology and object relations 
theory find it hard to digest Freud’s original idea that the father is the object of 
primary identification. Some understand it as a bodily experience without an object. 
Joseph Sandler for example, restricts his discussion of primary identification as a 
sense of fusion between the self and the not-self. He dismisses the connection 
between primary identification and superego formation and attributes the later 
fully to secondary identification (Sandler, 1960). Simo Salonen, on the other hand, 
admits the importance of primary identification for the well-being of the individual, 




notices this “strange contradiction” in Freud’s description of primary identification: 
“one will speak about primary identification as what binds the child to the mother, 
and indeed this seems self-evident. However, if we refer to Freud, to his work of 
1921 called Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, it is quite precisely the 
identification with the father that is given as primary. This is certainly very odd” 
(Lacan, 2007, p.88). Yet instead of following the discourse of post-Freudian 
psychoanalysts “concerning the primacy of the child’s relationship with the 
mother”, Lacan introduces the symbolic dimension to defend Freudian discourse. 
Primary identification can take place before any object-cathexis only if it takes 
place in the stage of primary narcissism, when subject and object have not been 
differentiated; meanwhile, identification with “the father in his own personal 
prehistory” only makes sense if we understand the prehistory as a part of the 
signifying movement in the symbolic order, and thus take the father not as a real 
paternal figure but as the representative of the big Other: 
 
The single stroke (primary identification), in so far as the subject clings to 
it, is in the field of desire, which cannot in any sense be constituted other 
than in the reign of the signifier, other than at the level in which there is 
a relation of the subject to the Other. It is the field of the Other that 
determines the function of the single stroke, in so far as it is from it that a 
major stage of identification is established in the topography then 
developed by Freud – namely, idealization, the ego ideal (Lacan, 1998, 
p.256). 
 
The interplay between Real time and Symbolic time already exists in primary 
narcissism, as the pre-subjective infant is caught between the bodily experience of 
fragmentation and the uncertainty of the other’s desire. Thus, the primary 
                                                          
to form a representative space of the ego that guarantees the constancy of personal 
experience against unsheltered, traumatic circumstances. Understood in this way, 
primary identification only needs to be instituted through early contact with, 
vaguely, “another human similar to oneself” (Salonen, 1989, p.114). Others turn their 
attention to the mother. Jacobson substitutes primary identification with “primitive 
identification” in order to highlight the infant’s original union with the mother 
(Jacobson, 1964). Identification with the father thus becomes a secondary process, 
which requires a move of “dis-identifying” (Greenson, 1968) with the primary object 




identification with the Other is prior to the imaginary identification with one’s total 
image of the body. The emergence of the ego ideal is prior to the creation of the 
ideal ego in the mirror stage. In fact, the presence of the Other in the form of the 
ego ideal is a necessary precondition for Lacan’s mirror stage. Contra Wallon, Lacan 
argues that it is crucial for the infant standing in front of the mirror to be 
accompanied by an adult caretaker so that the mirror stage can be initiated 
successfully: “I have described elsewhere the sight in the mirror of the ego ideal, of 
that being that he first saw appearing in the form of the parent holding him up 
before the mirror” (ibid., p.257). He makes a similar argument in Some Reflections 
on the Ego: “One is all the more impressed when one realises that this behaviour 
occurs either in a babe in arms or in a child who is holding himself upright by one 
of those contrivances to help one to learn to walk without serious falls” (Lacan, 1953, 
p. 15). In this sense, instead of actively seeking its own image as an independent 
individual, the infant is “introduced” to the mirror by the Other, who recognises 
the infant as the object of desire. The infant’s self-(mis)recognition without self-
consciousness is possible because it is not the infant’s own intentionality but the 
Other’s gaze that gives substance to its mirror image (the ideal ego).23 “The gaze in 
itself not only terminates the movement, it freezes it” (Lacan, 1998, p.117).  
                                                          
23 A simplified optical model Lacan illustrates in Seminar VIII is a good example 
explaining what happens in the mirror stage. We can see that it is not the subject 




Figure 5. Graph of a simplified optical model. Reprinted from Lacan, J. (1961). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
Book VIII: Transference, 1960-1961. (p.139). Unpublished typescript. Translated by Cormac Gallagher from 
unedited French typescripts. Retrieved January 11, 2017, from http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/published-
works/seminars/ 
 
An additional point has to be made here that may further complicate the problem. 





The important argument that the infant’s body image is not merely an imaginary 
configuration of the Real but rather a result of the symbolic intervention can be 
worked through more clearly in Lacan’s Schema L, which is first introduced in his 
1955 seminar to “illustrate the problems raised by the ego and the other, language 
and speech” (Lacan, 1988b, p. 243). The schema appears in the form of several 
horizontal arrows and diagonal arrows that link together four algebraic variables: 
S, a, a’, A. Its main point, as commonly understood, is to demonstrate that the 
symbolic relationship between the Other (A) and the subject (S) is blocked by the 
imaginary axis a-a’ as the “wall of language”. Interpreting this schema from a spatial 
perspective, we can see how the opposition between the symbolic and the 
imaginary works in a single episode of human interaction. As Lacan illustrates: 
“Fundamentally, it is them (true Others, true subjects) I’m aiming at every time I 
utter true speech, but I always attain a’, a’’, through reflection. I always aim at true 
subjects, and I have to be content with shadows” (Lacan, 1988b, p.244): 
                                                          
image, we shall not take it for granted that a concrete (m)other’s presence is also 
reflected in the mirror. On the contrary, what appears in the mirror is always the 
“imago of one’s own body” (Lacan, 2006a, p.97, 2006k, p.77). For this reason, Lacan 
has been criticised for excluding the maternal role from the origin of the infant’s 
psychic life, since the mother is often expected to be the person that holds the infant 
in front of the mirror and helps it grasp the connection between the reflection and 
the real presence. As Shuli Barzilai complains, “the mirror is the mother of the ego. 
But the mother is not in the mirror” (Barzilai, 1999, p.4). However, as we see in the 
optical model above, if the gaze that initiates the process of recognition comes from 
the ego ideal, a symbolic place-holder without any substance, it certainly leaves no 
reflection in the mirror. The lack of mirroring on the part of the (m)other, therefore, 
can be seen as Lacan’s attempt to radically differentiate the Symbolic (m)Other from 
the imaginary (m)other. Insofar as the specular image is always an imaginary 
unification, the (m)Other whose role in the infant’s ego formation is purely 





Figure 6. Schema L. Reprinted from Lacan, J. (1988b). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in 
Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955. (p.243). (J.-A. Miller, Ed.). Translated by 
Sylvana Tomaselli. London & New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
However, Schema L also permits other possible readings which lead to a temporal 
process of coming-into-being rather than a static structure. Different agencies in 
the schema can take on a temporal logic that maps the trajectory of subject-
formation. According to Lacan, the imaginary axis a-a’ can be interpreted as the 
relationship between the ego and the body image in the mirror stage: “So there’s 
the plane of the mirror, the symmetrical world of the egos and of the homogeneous 
others.” (ibid.) As the arrows indicate, the ego is modelled on the total image of the 
other (a’) through the mediation of the Other (A). Yet it tells more than an iteration 
of the theory of the mirror stage. The top left part of the schema gives us a glimpse 
of the underlying process that will lay the foundation for the mirror stage. 
 
To explain this process, we will need to come to a full comprehension of the 
significance of each variable and the relationship one bears to another. When 
applying this schema to understanding different variations of narcissism, Raul 
Moncayo points out that “a limitation of this schema is that it does not have a way 
of differentiating the ego or a, as the thought of the breast, and the ego or a as the 
specular image”  (Moncayo, 2008, p.12). In other words, before being recognised in 
the form of a specular image, the bodily ego must already participate in the libidinal 
economy at the level of the Real. The same can be said for the a’. After Lacan 
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develops the notion of objet petit a in the late 1950s, it is the letter i(a’) that usually 
designates the image of the Other qua ideal-ego. The a’, on the other hand, is first 
and foremost a part-object of the inter-organismic mother-infant body when the 
individual’s capacity of spatial differentiation remains unformed, before becoming 
the specular image of the other’s total body in the mirror stage. By signifying the 
material basis and the imaginary dimension with the same letter, it is unclear how 
the body awareness becomes embedded in the real body. Therefore, following 
Moncayo’s solution, I divide Schema L into two parts to represent two parallel 
processes in different domains: 
 
 
Figure 7. Schema L Divided 
 
The triangle on the right side depicts the typical process in the mirror stage, in 
which the dual relation between i(a) and i(a’) is supported by the symbolic Other 
(A). However, it is the triangle on the left side that deserves our attention, which, 
in my opinion, depicts how the Symbolic Other directly influences the circulation 
of libidinal energy around the infant’s body. Starting from the upper left-hand 
corner of the triangle, we have the unbarred S situated at the beginning. It 
designates not a speaking subject within the symbolic order (S) but the existential 
subject or the bodily subject in the state of initial auto-eroticism, “the brute 
quantity of an affect (such as pain or anxiety) seizing hold of the subject’s body” 
(Robertson, 2015, p. 64). From here, the line leads directly to the upper right-hand 
corner, where we find the a’ as the part-object that causes the subject’ desire. Since 
auto-eroticism and primary narcissism is marked by an absence of object relations, 
this part-object (take the mother’s breast as an example) is not an external one but 
taken by the infant as something of his own, something that sustains the 
hallucination of wholeness and completeness. So how does the infant leave the self-
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closed psychic state and allow libidinal energy to be cathected to another object? 
The downward-tending diagonal line linking the a’ and the a provides an answer to 
this question. While the infant internalizes the part-object (a’) from the maternal 
body, he himself is singled out as the object of the other’s desire (a). In this 
dialectical relationship between the existential subject and the primary other, the 
objet petit a has two roles. It is what the subject identifies with, and also what the 
subject is identified as.  By presenting a void for the infant, the object a marks the 
end of the fantasy of the self/other fusion and introduces the infant to an alienating 
world in which he is expected to fill the other’s lack.  
 
The body interaction between the infant and the (m)other enables a process 
whereby the infant becomes a separate yet unified object for the Other. Using 
Lacan’s vocabulary, we shall understand this object in terms of objectality rather 
than objectivity. Lacan regards objectivity as a Western scientific idea that is 
“summed up by a logical formalism” (Lacan, 2014, p.214). Objectality, on the other 
hand, “is the correlate to a pathos of the cut” (ibid.) that the subject must endure 
in order to enter the Symbolic. At this stage, the Other’s recognition does not 
match the infant’s primitive experiences of the body as fragmented and 
uncoordinated. It is only during the mirror stage that the infant subjectivises the 
external perception of itself and develops a sense of bodily mastery as if the 
complete and unified image of the body is not something that is forced to be but 
the natural achievement of its own self-consciousness. In order to complete the 
transformation from the a as the object for the other to the i(a) as the image of an 
autonomous and self-determined ego, two different types of mirror are required, 
which can be represented in my reworked Schema L as two parallel diagonal lines 
a-a’, i(a)-i(a’). The mirror of the mirror stage in which the image of the Other is 
reflected is made possible only because of another mirror reflection in Symbolic 
time, when the infant encounters the Other without any imaginary mediation and 
finds itself to be the object a, the image of a cut, of a separation (a’): 
 
The Other puts me in question, it interrogates me at the very root of my 
desire as a, as cause of this desire and not as object. And because this is 
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what the Other targets, in a temporal relation of antecedence, I can do 
nothing to break this hold except to engage with it (Lacan, 2014, p.153). 
 
We find Lacan’s description of the mirror reflection in Symbolic time in Seminar X: 
 
I didn’t speak to you today about a mirror just for the sake of it, not the 
mirror of the mirror stage, of narcissistic experience of the body in its 
totality, but rather the mirror inasmuch as it is the field of the Other in 
which there must appear for the first time, if not the a itself, then as least 
its place (Lacan, 2014, p.229). 
 
This paragraph reveals several distinctive features of a more fundamental mirror 
reflection that lies beyond the locus in which the imaginary fulfilment is promised 
to be the destination of a linear temporal development. While the mirror of the 
mirror stage is situated within the field of the Other, the other mirror is the field of 
the Other, not only in the sense that the infant enjoys organismal totality by 
merging itself with the Other’s body, but also because the infant lives in Symbolic 
time when its independence relies on the Other’s recognition. Instead of reflecting 
the image of “the body in its totality” (i(a)–i(a’)), the other mirror represents the 
object a or its place for the subject (a–a’). This point is particularly interesting 
because during the mirror stage, the object a is precisely what is missing from the 
image. As Raul Moncayo points out, “the objet a, as an absence, can be visually 
represented in the image in the mirror with the metaphor of a blank spot or hole 
within the image. This hole or blank spot will represent the objet a that is missing 
in the ego and that the ego will look for in the other” (Moncayo, 2008, p.23). 
Therefore, if in the pre-mirror stage, the object a undertakes the affirmative 
function by being the residue of the Real against the total Symbolic determination 
(something the subject is), then in the mirror stage, it performs a negative function 
by introducing an emptiness into the certainty of the image and maintaining the 




By dividing Schema L into two triangle relationships, it becomes clear that the 
mirror stage is not the Lacanian origin of subject-formation but rather the end of a 
complicated negotiation between Symbolic time and Real time. Living in Symbolic 
time is to live in the field of the Other, where, Paul Verhaeghe writes, “the subject 
not only meets with its own unified image, but first of all encounters what the 
Other desires of this body” (Verhaeghe, 2013, p.68). It is a temporal dimension in 
which “we are objectal, which means we are only objects of desire as bodies” (Lacan, 
2014, p.215). The formations of different erogenous zones are not the outcome of 
linear biological maturation, but rather bodily responses to the Other’s demand 
that inscribes the signifier into the flesh. The body thus becomes a signified body 
subject to a chain of symbolic articulation. On the other hand, since the existential 
subject as an independent and separate being must first be libidinised by the object 
of the drive (the object a) before visually acquiring the unified specular image, the 
body has a completely different role as a Real organism, “characterised by its 
orifices and functioning by means of the drive” (Verhaeghe, 2013, p.72). Between 
the objectalisation of the infant and the imaginary creation of the ego, the Real 
body gives birth to the “consciousness without the ego”, which we discussed earlier 
in the chapter of Real time as the definition of the Real past. This consciousness, 
instead of being the ego’s function, is carried out by the organism itself and 
functions as another cause of the realisation of the mirror stage besides the 
symbolic determination. 
 
In Seminar XIV, when an audience asks Lacan “what need did you have to invent 
this little o-object?”, Lacan’s reply is that “taking from a broader horizon, it was 
about time” (Lacan, 1966, p.2). As we can see, Symbolic time and Real time run 
parallel against each other and provide different perspectives on the origin of the 
Lacanian subject, yet the object a is something that the subject encounters in both 
temporal registers. On the one hand, “the objet a is something from which the 
subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ.” (Lacan, 1998, 
p.103); on the other hand, “this portion of ourselves is what is caught in the 
(symbolic) machine, and it can never be retrieved” (Lacan, 2014, p.215). For this 
reason, we can understand how the missing of the object a in the mirror stage has 
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a significant impact on the subject’s psychic life: Insofar as the object a is a nodal 
point at which Symbolic time and Real time are anchored together, the mirror stage 
denies its existence and thus becomes a defensive elaboration through which the 
subject covers the fundamental discord that characterises man’s relation to the 
world with an imaginary consistency. Yet the Other’s guarantee is not permanent, 
and the gap between the Real and the Imaginary is only bridged temporarily. As 
Lacan reminds us: “There is a moment when this gaze that appears in the mirror 
starts not to look at us any more. There’s an initium, an aura, a dawning sense of 
uncanniness which  leaves the door open to anxiety” (Lacan, 2014, p.88). The mirror 
stage is an “origin without origin”, in the sense that it is the origin of inner time-
consciousness under the control of the ego at the expense of two temporal registers 
as the cornerstone of subjectivity. This unique “repression of time” defines the 
subject as a symptomatic being from the beginning and turns life into one 
elongated struggle between the never-ending Symbolic production and the 
movement of the impenetrable Real body.  
 
This struggle between two temporal registers that constitutes the human subject 
can be understood through Lacan’s notions of alienation and separation, which 
designate two basic operations required for the advent of the subject. From a 
temporal perspective, I argue that these two operations also correspond to the 
subject’s movement between two temporal registers. To begin with, there are two 
lacks that mark the limit of the subject’s experience in each temporal register, both 
of which are explicitly named by Lacan. In Symbolic time, the subject’s symbolic 
realisation in the field of the Other can never be completed due to a “central defect” 
(Lacan, 1998, p.205), meaning that the subject is devoid of substance and depends 
on the signifier to speak for itself. Apart from this symbolic lack, the subject also 
encounters another lack in Real time, a lack that literally means that the subject as 
a living being is not immortal: “The lack is real because it relates to something real, 
namely, that the living being, by being subject to sex, has fallen under the blow of 




In the case of alienation, the subject avoids the real lack by submitting to the Other. 
The signifier to which the subject attaches shields it from death, but it also 
introduces the symbolic lack: “This lack takes up the other lack, which is the real, 
earlier lack, to be situated at the advent of the living being” (ibid.). Living in 
Symbolic time, although the subject is able to express needs and desires through 
the medium of language, the experience of the Real body cannot be fully articulated 
in the signifying chain. In this sense, Lacan defines alienation by an either-or choice 
between being and meaning: “If we choose being, the subject disappears, it eludes 
us, it falls into non-meaning. If we choose meaning, the meaning survives only 
deprived of that part of non-meaning” (ibid., p.211).  
 
The part of non-meaning is the object a, which Lacan materialises in Seminar XI as 
lamella, meaning in Latin a small flake.  Lamella is not an object external to the 
subject. It is an organ that articulates itself on the real body. Meanwhile, Lacan also 
points out that “this organ is unreal”, not because it is imaginary (“Unreal is not 
imaginary” (ibid., p.205)), but because it is articulated in a way that eludes us, thus 
being perceived by the subject as the “missing part”. Lacan uses the tattoo as an 
example to explain two different functions of lamella: one is being for the Other, 
as the tattoo marks the subject “in the field of the group’s relations, between each 
individual and all the others” (ibid., p.206); the other is being for the body, since 
the tattoo also has an erotic function that condenses the subject’s sensual 
experience.  
 
As we have discussed earlier, the object a occupies a position where Real time and 
Symbolic time coincide. This is precisely what we find in Lacan’s writings on 
lamella during the process of alienation and separation. Lamella not only goes 
beyond the real lack during the process of alienation, but it also goes beyond the 
symbolic lack as an organ that cannot be symbolically exchanged.24 Therefore, if 
                                                          
24 Darian Leader points out another meaning of lamella that has not been revealed 
by Lacan but certainly contributes to the way Lacan uses this term: “Lamella were 




the sacrifice of lamella is a necessary step for the subject to be represented by a 
signifier for another signifier, then it is also through lamella that the subject 
initiates separation. The process of separation is a process in which the subject 
confronts the lack of the Other, realising the limitations of its own symbolic 
existence. The typical question the subject asks during this process, as Lacan points 
out, is “can he lose me?” (ibid., p.214), which directly challenges the 
overdetermination of the Other. But how does the subject move beyond the 
symbolic lack? Lacan’s answer is a Hegelian “negation of the negation”: the subject 
does not find any ultimate fulfilment but paradoxically, reintroduces the real lack. 
“It is a lack engendered from the previous time that serves to reply to the lack raised 
by the following time” (ibid., p.215).   
 
To make this point clear, Lacan suggests that we can define separation as another 
choice. In alienation, the choice between being and meaning can also be construed 
as a forced choice between freedom and life, since if I choose freedom (being), I 
lose both. If I choose life (meaning), I have life without freedom, a life deprived of 
something valuable. However, in the case of separation, the real lack is 
reintroduced into the choice, and it thus becomes “freedom or death!” According 
to Lacan, this changes everything: “Because death comes into play, there occurs an 
effect with a rather different structure. This is because, in both cases, I will have 
both” (ibid., p.213). The choice is no longer an “either-or” choice but a “both-and” 
one. If I choose freedom, I also choose freedom to die, a right that has been 
deprived by the symbolic order which demands the permanent existence of the 
subject as a signifier. If I choose death, it means that I also have freedom of choice, 
since the real freedom is precisely to choose something that has been rendered 
unthinkable by the Other who gets hold of the subject by taking advantage of the 
desire for survival. Acquiring freedom through returning to the death as the real 
lack does not mean that the subject abandons or retreats from the symbolic world. 
Instead, it is one step forward for the subject to be able to learn through Symbolic 
                                                          
passwords for use in the next world” (Leader, 2003, p.46). In this sense, Lamella can 
be regarded as a primitive form of symbolic expression that replace the finitude of 
individual life with the permanence of symbolic existence.  
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time that death is not the end of Real time, that subjectivity is not terminated by 
death but constantly reshaped by its relationship to death.  Only a being that is 
capable of opening up to one’s own death can achieve separation, so that its 
expression of subjectivity will not be determined only by the pursuit of the 
fulfilment of the Other’s desire.  
 
To recapitulate: this chapter on symptomatic time questions our immediate 
certainty of subjective temporal experience as the direct expression of self-
consciousness. What I have tried to show is that the linear sequence of time 
organised by the ego is inadequate to explain the process of subject-formation in 
Lacan’s theory. What Lacan demonstrates through the notion of prematuration, 
the mechanism of primal repression and the theory of the mirror stage is not only 
a difference in the timing, as the beginning of the subject’s social existence does 
not match the beginning of the organismic life that provides the proper 
embodiment for a self-conscious self, but also a difference of time between the 
automation of Real bodily movement and the complex chain of Symbolic 
articulation. In this sense, the Lacanian origin of subject-formation is not a 
repression of certain events but rather a “repression of time” through which the 
ego resynchronises two distinctive processes into one unified and continuous series 
of past, present and future. This results in a fragile self which struggles to maintain 
itself in relation to different temporal registers, taking the form of a back-and-forth 
negotiation between embodiment and language as we have seen in the operations 
of alienation and separation. The notion of symptomatic time confirms and 
develops Lacan’s understanding of the subject as decentred. Without “owning” 
time, we are thrown absolutely into a field of otherness from where there will be 
no end of the vacillation between defining oneself in terms of being-for-self and 




5. Sexed Time 
 
Lacan’s further development of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory leads to a radical 
understanding of time, which suggests the notion of desynchrony as the 
fundamental character of the relationship between two temporal registers that 
construct human subjectivity. This chapter will apply Lacan’s claims of time to 
sexuality, a topic that has been fundamental to psychoanalytic thinking since 
Freud’s time and continues to stimulate debates among psychoanalysts who live in 
contemporary societies and confront rapid social and cultural changes. The 
increased visibility of various sexual and gender presentations challenges not only 
traditional psychoanalytic knowledge of psychosexual development and sexual 
difference but also the epistemological approach psychoanalysis adopts to thinking 
of these issues. The idea of sexed subjectivity, namely the subject’s understanding 
and expression of sexuality as a sexed being, occupies a prominent position in 
Lacan’s writings that deserves our full attention, yet I argue that Lacan’s 
theorisation has not been interpreted in a way that can sufficiently respond to the 
changes sexuality undergoes in contemporary societies. To address this problem, I 
intend to provide a different reading of Lacan’s theory of sexuality in this chapter 
by incorporating the idea of dual temporality. The result of my interpretive work 
is not another truth-claim about what sexuality is, but “sexed time” as an 
epistemological framework through which we can understand sexed subjectivity 
during the construction of sexual identity.  
 
In the first section, I examine time, or rather the lack of time in the popular account 
of sexuality in the Freudian-Lacanian theory. It is shown that the Freudian 
proposal regarding the process of psychosexual development follows what I call a 
“linear-teleological model” while Lacan’s theory of sexuality is interpreted as a 
“structural-timeless model” that reduces sexual diversities to two transcendental 
structural positions. In both cases, time as an indicator of becoming does not 
contribute to the way a sexual identity is constituted. Instead, it is the space that 
matters since sexual difference is determined by the ownership of a physical object 
or a symbolic space. I argue that this logic of spatialisation limits the ways sexuality 
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can be theorised. The opposition between presence and absence offered by our 
spatial imagination of the penis/phallus makes it difficult to analyse the 
construction of sexual identity without falling into a mode of binary thinking. On 
the other hand, my analytic work shows that it is possible to temporalise the 
phallus by exploring Lacan’s writings. Through rereading key passages in Freud’s 
Oedipal narrative, I find sexual difference is first and foremost experienced as a 
sense of temporal desynchrony by the subject when the penis is perceived, an 
experience that can be explained differently by Freud’s idea of Nachträglichkeit 
and Lacan’s idea of the future anterior. In so doing, I understand the phallus not 
as a privileged signifier of spatial demarcation, but a temporal construction that is 
always envisioned by the subject in different temporal dimensions. This enables us 
to develop a new epistemological frame to theorise sexed subjectivity that rejects 
the binary logic. In the third section, I argue that the difference between 
Nachträglichkeit and the future anterior is not sexual difference per se but the 
difference between two epistemological approaches to understanding sexual 
difference. I criticise the feminist attempts to theorise women’s time that bind time 
and sexuality together in a direct yet problematic way. The idea of “sexed time” 
does not overgeneralise the individual’s temporal experience into a gendered 
category. Instead, it supports Lacan’s argument that sexual difference is Real, and 
cannot be fully assimilated by symbolic difference. I discuss how the idea of sexed 
time gives rise to a new epistemology that is able to account for the construction 
of sexual identity individually and accommodate various sexual expressions in 
contemporary societies.   
 
5.1 Sexual Difference as Spatial Difference: From Freud to Lacan 
Although Freud contributed enormous fresh ideas to the knowledge of sexuality, 
the theory of the Oedipus complex remains the meta-narrative of sexual 
identification and development in his writings. The hypothesis it provides that 
explains how sexual difference is realised when the individual is inserted into the 
culture is controversial, to which post-Freudian thinkers struggle to find an 
alternative, yet I argue that this theoretical framework is also crucial in 
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understanding the very logic that defines the limit of psychoanalytic thinking of 
sexuality.  
 
As a centrepiece of Freud’s theory that has been carefully scrutinised and heavily 
discussed, the Oedipus complex is named after the story of Oedipus from Greek 
mythology, which Freud uses as a metaphor to explain the process of psychosexual 
development in boys and girls. In Freud’s reading, the tragedy of Oedipus, who 
killed his father Laius and married his mother Jocasta, does not merely iterate the 
contrast between the gods’ mighty will and humankind’s inability to escape the 
fate, but also shows “the fulfilment of our childhood wishes” (Freud, 1900, p.261). 
Although Freud did not publicly use this term until 1910 (Freud, 1910), he 
discovered the family triangle of love and jealousy towards different-sex parents 
through his self-analysis in the late 1890’s, which contributed to the final 
abandonment of the seduction theory. Freud believed in the universality of this 
complex from the beginning. In his letter to Fliess, he described Oedipus Rex as 
having “riveting power”, of which everyone feels its existence within himself (Freud, 
1897a, p.265), yet it takes years for Freud to fully develop this hypothesis into a 
theory that accounts for the transformation from perverse-polymorphous infantile 
sexuality to the formation of a socially acceptable sexual identity. The Oedipal 
narrative is saturated with time, as it describes a temporal movement involving 
different stages and different moments of the development of sexual desire. To 
Freud, “both sexes seem to pass through the early phases of libidinal development 
in the same manner” (Freud, 1933, p.117). The infant begins with an intense 
affection towards the maternal body, maintaining a state of primary narcissism in 
which the mother’s breast “is the prototype of an object-choice on the anaclitic 
model” (Freud, 1923a, p.31). By immersing oneself in love towards the mother, not 
as a separate person but as an organic part of a unity, the child enjoys an integrative 
experience without differentiation. However, this child/mother dyad is intruded 
by the father, who symbolically forbids the child’s incestuous wishes. This loss of 
the object of desire (the mother) takes place in the phallic stage when the penis - 
the male genital organ - gets recognised as the indicator of sexual difference. On 
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the boy’s side, he perceives the lack of the penis as castration in the girl. It leads to 
castration anxiety which marks the resolution of the male Oedipus complex: 
 
Along with the demolition of the Oedipus complex, the boy's object-
cathexis of his mother must be given up. Its place may be filled by one of 
two things: either an identification with his mother or an intensification 
of his identification with his father. We are accustomed to regard the latter 
outcome as the more normal (Freud, 1923a, p.32). 
 
On the girl’s side, the perception of female genitals is interpreted as a lack (of the 
penis), which opens up to different routes she may take in order to become a 
woman: The first one is fully accepting the lack but refusing to desire it. “The little 
girl, frightened by the comparison with boys, grows dissatisfied with her clitoris, 
and gives up her phallic activity and with it her sexuality in general as well as a 
good part of her masculinity in other fields”. The second one is the opposite, 
refusing to accept the lack of the phallus and pretending to still have it: “The 
second line leads her to cling with defiant self-assertiveness to her threatened 
masculinity. To an incredibly late age she clings to the hope of getting a penis some 
time. That hope becomes her life's aim; and the phantasy of being a man in spite 
of everything often persists as a formative factor over long periods” (Freud, 1931, 
pp.229–30). The third one, which Freud believes to be the normal resolution of 
female Oedipus complex, is accepting the lack by identifying herself with the 
mother, as both of them are castrated, and taking the father as the object-choice 
in the hope that she may get a baby from another man as a substitute for the penis.  
 
By presenting the Oedipus complex, Freud proposes that sexual identity is not 
innate but acquired. The infant must go through a process of conflict and 
resolution during the early years in order to achieve mature sexuality at puberty. 
On the other hand, the Oedipus complex is equally a definite proof of Freud’s 
famous dictum that “anatomy is destiny”. In Freud’s description, the Oedipal 
process is guided either by castration anxiety or by penis envy, both of which takes 
the penis as the privileged genital organ that holds ultimate meaning for both sexes. 
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As he claims in The Infantile Genital Organization: “For both sexes, only one genital, 
namely the male one, comes into account. What is present, therefore, is not a 
primacy of the genitals, but a primacy of the phallus” (Freud, 1923b, p.142). Access 
to sexual difference, therefore, is predetermined by a biological fact that can be 
observed at birth but only draws the infant’s attention when the right moment 
comes. Sexual difference reflects physical difference. There appears to be no 
development needed since sexual differentiation is already given by nature. The 
mixture of these two contradictory hypotheses results in a history of psychosexual 
development that contains an eternal teleology within itself, a long psycho-
libidinal journey that is not open-ended but carefully categorised into several ideal 
developmental pathways, all of which include a biologically determined transition 
from the oral stage through the anal stage to the phallic stage.  
 
This “linear-teleological model” that defines the time of Freud’s Oedipus complex 
becomes the primary target of post-Freudian critiques. His attempt to elevate the 
penis to a privileged status that accounts for all sexual identities is questionable 
even for psychoanalysts who are Freud’s disciples. It leads one to question if the 
Oedipal narrative only explains the girl’s psychosexual development from a 
masculine point of view, and thus excludes any possible development of female 
sexuality that is not mediated by penis envy. To Ernest Jones, the penis/phallus has 
a direct correspondence with phallocentrism that maintains the empowerment of 
men (Jones, 1942). If the penis is not an imaginary object whose definitive status 
can be substituted by any other object, at least an equivalent principle of male 
womb envy (Horney, 1926; Klein, 1975) should be inserted to alleviate the 
outgrowth of the patriarchal bias in Freud’s theory under the influence of 
prevailing gender attitudes in his times.  
 
The biological underpinnings and the sexist assumptions of Freud’s Oedipal 
narrative have been extensively exposed by feminist critiques, notably in the work 
of Nancy Chodorow and Luce Irigaray (Chodorow, 1974, 2012; Irigaray, 1985). On 
the other hand, there is another voice that calls for appreciation of the complexity 
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of Freud’s thinking instead of reducing the Oedipus complex to a misogynistic 
caricature (Mitchell, 2000). A careful reading of Freud’s texts reveals many ideas 
that contrast normativity and support a more nuanced understanding of sexed 
subjectivity. One example is his acknowledgement of the discordance between the 
infant’s polymorphous perversity and the normalised heterosexual resolution in 
Three Essays on Sexuality (1905). Another can be found in The Psychogenesis of a 
Case of Homosexuality in a Woman, where Freud points out the futility of 
psychoanalysis to ‘convert’ homosexuals since, as he states elsewhere, 
homosexuality is “no vice, no degradation; it cannot be classified as an illness” 
(Freud, 1960, p.423). These progressive ideas in Freud’s thinking should certainly 
be acknowledged. Yet it is also important to insist that the Oedipus complex 
remains a linear-teleological model that is directed towards a particular 
destination. Permission of certain variations does not change the fact that there is 
no place in the Oedipal framework to represent the subject without referring to 
sexual difference as a binary opposition. As we see in the previously mentioned 
paper, Freud’s analysis of the female patient, “a beautiful and clever girl of eighteen” 
who pursued a strong homosexual desire while also displaying heterosexual 
affection for a small boy, is restricted to an analysis of the psychical pathway from 
“the normal Oedipus attitude into that of homosexuality”: 
 
These presages of later homosexuality had always occupied her conscious 
life, while the attitude arising from the Oedipus complex had remained 
unconscious and had appeared only in such signs as her tender behaviour 
to the little boy. (Freud, 1920b, p.168). 
 
The coexistence of heterosexual and homosexual desire, for Freud, could only be 
explained by the classification between conscious and unconscious, since the 
possibility of both maintaining conscious status without contradiction is 
unthinkable for the Oedipal narrative in which concepts of identification and 
repudiation are central. Bisexuality as a possible outcome of personal development, 
a sexual identity and a lifestyle remains outside of Freud’s thinking. In this sense, 
Freud’s theory of the universal bisexuality of human beings, which has long been 
credited for its radical potential, actually renders the bisexual as an actual living 
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being invisible. Putting bisexuality in the past (of the individual and the species) 
becomes a way to erase bisexuality in the present tense (Angelides, 2001, p.69). It 
enhances rather than challenges the linear-teleological development of human 
sexuality that ends up with an either/or formation. 
 
From the start of his teaching, Lacan developed the Freudian theory of sexuality to 
a new destination, as an essential operation of his “returning to Freud” in early 
seminars is his reinterpretation of the Oedipal narrative through the symbolic-
real-imaginary triad. To Lacan, the Oedipus complex is a process that aims at the 
symbolic integration of the subject. It is “a law of symbolisation” through which 
human sexuality must realise itself (Lacan, 1993, p.83). Unlike Freud, who equates 
the physical reality of the body with inner psychic reality in which sexual identity 
is constituted, Lacan argues that the complicated triangle relationships in the 
Oedipus complex must be disassembled and analysed on different levels: 
 
You are aware of the profoundly dissymmetrical character, right from the 
start, of each of the dual relations included within the Oedipal structure. 
The relation linking the subject to the mother is distinct from that linking 
him to the father, the narcissistic or imaginary relation to the father is 
distinct from the symbolic relation, and also from the relation that we 
really do have to call real - which is residual with respect to the edifice 
which commands our attention in analysis (Lacan, 1988a, p.66). 
 
Two most important layers of Lacan’s reconstruction of the Oedipus complex are 
the infant-mother symbiotic entity on the imaginary axis and the paternal function 
on the symbolic axis. The state of primary narcissism that characterises the infant’s 
earliest interaction with the mother belongs to the Imaginary order that offers a 
sense of sameness and wholeness. To Lacan, the key issue of this relationship is 
not the availability of the mother to the desire of the child, which in Freud’s theory 
is the cause of the infant’s anxiety that leads to separation, but the position of the 
child in relation to the desire of the mother. The infant’s incestuous desire for the 
mother is preceded by the mother’s desire which is fundamentally unsatisfiable. 
The tension contained within the over-intimate infant-mother relationship calls 
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for the father’s intervention. In Freud’s Oedipal theory, the father is the real being 
in the family who is assumed to hold the phallic power and is thus able to impose 
prohibition. Lacan, on the other hand, “distinguishes the paternal presence in the 
conflict under the triple headings of the symbolic father, the imaginary father and 
the real father” (Lacan, 1957, p.229). He traces the origin of the paternal power to 
the myth of the primal father that Freud himself introduces in Totem and Taboo 
(1913) and further elaborates in Moses and Monotheism (1939). This almighty father 
figure, writes Freud, owns every woman in the horde and forbids his sons’ craving 
for sexual enjoyment, yet his power is even greater after being murdered by his 
sons, who, because of their guilt about patricide, submit to the law of the father 
(Freud, 1913, p.149). The symbolic father, therefore, is precisely this ‘dead father’, 
the name of the father which bears a structural function. The symbolic father is 
deprived of any positive representation of paternity. It is not only a “an essential 
signifier within the other” that signifies nothing except the fact that “the signifier 
exists” (Lacan, 1958, p.104), but also “the signifier of the Other qua locus of the law” 
that supports the entire symbolic system for the subject (Lacan, 2006c, p.485).  
 
The distinction between the real father and the symbolic father is Lacan’s attempt 
to distance himself from traditional patriarchy as found in Freud’s theory, which is 
necessary in the context of the modern family, where the decline of the paternal 
function intensifies the discordance between the real father and the almighty 
figure he is supposed to be. On the other hand, the distinction Lacan maintains 
between the penis and the phallus is another important step in overcoming Freud’s 
biological determinism. Lacan argues that the phallus does not refer to the body 
part and the biological organ (the penis). It is the “privileged signifier in which the 
role of Logos is wedded to the advent of desire” (Lacan, 2006l, p.581). While the 
problem of sexual difference cannot be answered by the presence/absence of the 
penis, the phallus as a fundamental signifier of desire continues to play a central 




In Seminar V, Lacan discusses “three moments” of the Oedipus complex, all of 
which involve the phallus as the only currency of the libidinal economy between 
different desiring subjects. The first moment is the pre-Oedipal stage, which Lacan 
renames as the “primitive phallic stage” in the sense that “the paternal metaphor 
acts of itself…already in the world” and “the primacy of the phallus is established 
by the existence of the symbol, of discourse and of the law” (Lacan, 1958, p.137). 
The mother’s love towards her child is always-already influenced by her desire for 
the phallus, which leads to an unavoidable intrusion of otherness: 
 
If the mother’s desire is for the phallus, the child wants to be the phallus 
in order to satisfy her desire. Thus the division immanent in desire already 
make itself felt by virtue of being experienced in the Other’s desire, in that 
this division already stands in the way of the subject being satisfied with 
presenting to the Other the real [organ] he may have that corresponds to 
the phallus (Lacan, 2006l, p.582).  
 
The child, who has no idea of the phallus, has already been forced to identify with 
it and thus to satisfy the mother’s desire. Lacan’s theory stresses that it is the 
infant’s primary anxiety about being reduced to an object of the mother’s 
enjoyment that initiates the process of separation. In the second moment, “on the 
imaginary plane, the father intervenes well and truly as one who deprives the 
mother” (Lacan, 1958, p.137). It is the moment when the infant comes to realise the 
significance of the phallus as an imaginary object “that the other has or does not 
have” (ibid., p.138). Not until the third moment will the infant recognise that the 
phallic power does not depend on the possession or non-possession of the 
imaginary phallus since the father is only the bearer of the law. To Lacan, the case 
of Little Hans is a fine example that demonstrates how the missing of the third 
moment, or the failure of the transition from the imaginary phallus to the symbolic 
phallus, leads to the phobic experience.  
 
By introducing the symbolic phallus, Lacan disentangles the close link between 
sexual difference and anatomical difference in Freud’s theory and regards the 
former as different ways to access a symbolic register of difference. The subject can 
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define itself in relation to the phallus either in the mode of “having” (masculine 
structure) or in the mode of “being” (feminine structure), regardless of biological 
sex. Sexual identity is not established through having or not having a penis, since 
both boys and girls undergo castration, which “symbolically cuts the subject off 
from something imaginary” (Lacan, 1958, p.201), to enter the symbolic world and 
accept their phallic incompleteness. However, it is questionable whether this 
theory of sexuality is able to escape the accusation of phallocentrism. Insofar as the 
structures that govern the relations between the sexes continue to be indicated “by 
referring simply to the phallus’ function” (Lacan, 2006l, p.582), the seemingly 
neutral process of symbolisation in which language mediates the body remains a 
phallocentric account. As many feminist authors point out, the phallus, as a 
signifier at its purest that is only articulated at the symbolic level, cannot be 
completely dissociated from the penis and its biological function (K. Campbell, 
2004; Gallop, 1987; Grosz, 1990). Even Lacan himself acknowledges this fact when 
he says that “this signifier is chosen as the most salient of what can be grasped in 
sexual intercourse as real…By virtue of its turgidity, it is the image of the vital flow 
as it is transmitted in generation” (Lacan, 2006l, p.581). In his reading of Lacan, 
Richard Boothby also points out that many symbolic features of the phallus should 
be attributed to the penis’ very physiology: “The penis is especially well suited both 
to represent the breakdown of an imaginary Gestalt and to anticipate the structure 
of the linguistic signifier……Aside from the mother's breast, the penis is the only 
bodily appendage unsupported by bone and the only appendage incapable of 
voluntary movement. It is sensitive and easily hurt” (Boothby, 1991, p.153). The 
inevitable slide from the phallus as a signifier to the penis as the male organ returns 
us to Freud’s original Oedipal narrative that privileges masculinity, since what is 
the difference between a sexual identity that only takes the penis as the object-
choice and one that only structures desire around a male signifier? The position of 
the phallus as the fundamental signifier “by which the subject binds himself for life 
to the Law” (Lacan, 2006c, p.464) further phallicises the entire symbolic order and 
excludes any positive representation of the feminine position. The Lacanian 
Oedipus complex, therefore, may only serve as the symbolisation of anatomical 




Lacan himself may have been aware of this problem. In Seminar XVII, Lacan 
surprisingly provides a critique of the Oedipus complex. In the chapter entitled 
“Beyond the Oedipus complex”, Lacan dismisses the structural importance of the 
Freudian family romance and names the Oedipus complex as “Freud’s dream” 
(Lacan, 2007, p.137) that reveals something about Freud’s own unconscious desire. 
He further points out that the Oedipus complex is “strictly unusable” in the 
treatment of hysteria since “the Oedipus complex plays the role of knowledge with 
a claim to truth” (ibid., p.99). By questioning the historically and culturally specific 
way in which Freud theorises the Oedipus complex, Lacan targets not the theory 
itself but the epistemology underlying Freud’s approach to the issue of sexuality.  
In Lacan’s reading, Oedipus in the Greek myth already occupies the position of the 
master, who, by solving the Sphinx’s riddle, is “capable of uniting society and 
protecting it against danger with his knowledge” (Haute & Geyskens, 2016, p.53). 
The Oedipal narrative in psychoanalysis continues to concern the incarnation of 
the master as a paternal figure, who regulates desire and jouissance by the law. By 
comparison, in the theory of four discourses Lacan puts forward in the same 
seminar, the hysteric’s discourse is characterised by a permanent split between 
truth (occupied by the object a) and knowledge produced by the master-who-
knows with respect to sexual difference: “The experience with the 
hysteric…suggests that at the level of analysis itself, everything is to be put back 
into question concerning what is necessary from knowledge, in order for this 
knowledge to be called into question in the site of truth” (Lacan, 2007, p.101). What 
needs “to be called into question” certainly includes the phallocentric answer to the 
problem of sexual difference offered by Lacan’s early reading of the Oedipus 
complex, an answer that is based on the shared belief in certain socio-symbolic 
contexts yet functions as the master’s discourse that accounts for the universal 
formation of masculinity and femininity. In this way, as Haute and Geyskens 
suggest, “Lacan seems to take a much more ‘constructivist’ stance than before with 
regard to the problem of sexual identity” (Haute & Geyskens, 2016, p.57). 
 
However, the formulas of sexuation Lacan puts forward in Seminar XX leave the 
reader a first impression that the process of de-Oedipalisation is suspended. If we 
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read sexuation as “the outcome of a subject’s interpretation of sexual difference” 
(Ragland, 2012, p.91), it seems that the ways sexual difference can be interpreted are 
very limited. By introducing predicate logic, Lacan puts forward four propositions 
to define the masculine structure and the feminine structure respectively. On the 
one hand, men, a category regardless of sex or gender, are defined as a universal 
group subject to castration except for the father of the primal horde, who stands 
for the fantasy of an absolute phallic jouissance; on the other hand, not all women 
are organised by the phallic signifier, and not all women are freed from it either. 
Women, despite being attracted by the phallic jouissance, also have access to a 
“supplementary jouissance” (Lacan, 1999, p.73) not designated by the phallic 
function. As Colette Soler admits: “The logical formulas of sexuation, produced in 
1972, do not object at all to the phallocentrism of the unconscious” (Soler, 2006, 
p.27). The phallus remains the master signifier around which all four formulas 
revolve. If “man” and “woman” are “nothing but signifiers” (Lacan, 1999, p.39), one 
may wonder why the meaning of these signifiers is not defined by the difference in 
relation to other signifiers in a signifying chain, but differentiated and fixed only by 
the phallic function. Defining femininity as a position not completely determined 
by the phallic function does not alter the fact that the only signifier of sexual 
difference is masculine, since the phallus has no corresponding feminine signifier. 
The idea that “there’s no such thing as Woman” (ibid., p.73) or “Woman cannot be 
said” (ibid., p.81) can hardly be seen as something radical that challenges the 
masculine hegemony since making the feminine position the equivalent of 
otherness and the unrepresentable has heavily permeated Western culture since 
the Greeks (Fiorini, 2017, p.4).  
 
In our above examination, we rarely find reference to time in Lacan’s theorisation 
of sexual difference. It has drawn critics’ attention that although Lacan’s theory of 
sexuality departs from the Freudian “linear-teleological model”, it nevertheless 
adopts a “structural-timeless model” that continues to restrict the possibilities of 
sexed subjectivity. In Derrida’s view, underneath Lacan’s symbolic system lies the 
phallus as a transcendental element which grounds meaning and resists historical 
modification. The process of symbolisation is supposed to mobilise the subject in 
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the signifying chain, yet the phallus denies the time of symbolic formation by being 
“the condition, origin, and destination of the entire circulation, as of the entire logic 
of the signifier” (Derrida, 1987, p.437). This view is echoed by Judith Butler, who 
questions if Lacan’s phallic account of sexual difference stands as “a quasi-
transcendental limitation on all possible subject-formation” (Butler, Laclau, & 
Žižek, 2011, p.5) and fails to explain the meaning of a particular sexual identity that 
is historically constituted. We have also heard the Lacanian responses to this 
critique, that Lacan only provides a limited number of sexual positions because he 
is concerned with “structurations of desire that join mind to body, not pathologies 
or descriptions of varying sexual behaviours” (Ragland, 2012, p.1); that the phallus 
is associated with its corporeal roots because it not only produces a symbolic reality 
but also opens up the Real dimension (Zupančič, 2012); that the phallus as a 
signifier of the lack does not guarantee the symbolic totality but indicates precisely 
its inherent failure, in the same sense that “sexual difference is thus ultimately not 
the difference between the sexes, but the difference which cuts across the very heart 
of the identity of each sex, stigmatizing it with the mark of impossibility” (Žižek, 
2012, p.760).  
 
However, these defences fail to reach the core problem that troubles the popular 
reading of Lacan’s theory of sexuation, namely the implicit logic with which to 
think about sexual difference. In Freud’s Oedipal narrative, it is through the 
presence or absence of the penis that sexual difference is apprehended by the child. 
Lacan’s work of symbolisation may introduce a dialectical factor to counter this 
biological determinism to the extent that one can argue “not having is also a form 
of having” (Moncayo, 2008, p.51) or “the absence of a feature also counts as a 
positive feature” (Žižek, 2012, p.769), but it does not change the fact that the 
opposition between presence and absence, be it real or symbolic, remains the only 
axis along which sexual difference can be thought. Defining the phallus as the 
signifier of the lack and emphasising its negative character does not constitute a 
radical innovation, nor does it, as some Lacanian psychoanalysts believe 
(Verhaeghe, 2011, p.204), make Lacan’s theory go beyond the supposedly 
patriarchal stance. The way Lacan’s theory of sexuation is understood may not 
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privilege the masculine sexual organ as a desired form of presence. It nevertheless 
defines the very idea of presence in a masculine way. As Jan Campbell points out, 
“The fiction of the phallus makes little difference as Oedipal authority becomes 
relayed and reiterated in a very real way” (J. Campbell, 2000, p.81). One may wonder 
whether each subject adopts either a masculine or a feminine position in its 
unconscious because there are only two ways of structuring desire, or because the 
spatial imagination of the penis/phallus does not offer a third option. If in Freud’s 
“linear-teleological model”, we deal with the penis as a concrete object, the 
characteristics of which must be considered in relation to the physical space it 
occupies, then in Lacan’s “structural-timeless model”, we have the phallus as a 
privileged signifier of spatial difference at the symbolic level, which, writes 
Elizabeth Grosz, “can be seen to represent some of the ways in which subjects are 
positioned in different locations within a hierarchized social geography” (Grosz, 
1990, p.121). Sexual difference is merely transformed from the difference of physical 
space to the difference of symbolic space, in the sense that the symbolic universe is 
the phallic universe, supported by the signifier of the masculine position, while a 
woman, despite partially subscribing to the phallic order, has no place to live as 
Woman. The idea that sexual identity can have either masculine or feminine 
structure regardless of one’s biological sex only promises a false sense of sexual 
liberation since the socio-symbolic field which assigns masculinity and femininity 
to different bodies is already the production of biased sexual differentiation.   
 
To prevent the reinscription of Freud’s Oedipal scenario on the linguistic and 
symbolic level, one may choose to displace the term “phallus”. Other body parts 
such as the breast, the anus and the clitoris should also be given social significance 
so that the sexed body can have alternative representations (Butler, 2011; 
Hocquenghem, 1993). In Beyond Sexuality, Tim Dean suggests substituting the 
phallus with the objet a as a “neutral object” and thus eliminating even a 
metaphorical presence of the penis: “Since ‘the phallus’ names various functions 
and structural elements that may be substituted with alternative conceptual terms, 
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it may be time to retire the phallus” (Dean, 2000, p.83).25 However, the feminist 
debate over the status of the phallus has made it evident that displacing the phallus 
with the aim of arguing for a positive feminine presence risks the danger of 
constructing an ontology of “genuine femininity” and returning to essentialist 
claims of sexuality (Butler, 2006). Meanwhile, maintaining the alternative bodily 
configuration unsymbolised, as Butler does with the lesbian phallus, “limits the 
notion of performativity to a reiteration of an imaginary or ‘fantasy’ that is 
predicated in the work of Freud and Lacan on a male body” (Campbell, 2000, p.151).  
 
In this sense, the phallus per se is not as much of a problem as the logic of presence 
and absence it stands for, and the deconstruction of the phallic arrangement of 
space requires much more work than discarding a signifier belonging to the realm 
of patriarchal language. The introduction of the phallus does not necessarily mean 
that sexual difference and sexual identification must be thought in terms of 
presence and absence. The real problem is the logic of spatialisation that remains 
implicit in our conceptualisation of the penis/phallus. In the next section, I will 
demonstrate that if we dissociate the penis/phallus from the spatial structure and 
position it alongside a temporal axis, it is possible for the penis/phallus to set the 
proliferation of various sexual arrangements in motion without implying a 
determinate characterisation of sexual difference. 
 
5.2 When Did You Find It? Nachträglichkeit and the Perfect Anterior 
I want to present my argument by first returning to Freud’s Oedipal narrative. In 
Freud’s paper Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between 
the Sexes, there is a passage concerning the discovery of sexual difference, whose 
significance has not been fully appreciated by critics: 
                                                          
25 However, I shall mention that in The Signification of the Phallus, Lacan opposes 
the attempt to reduce the phallus to a partial object and he blames the object 
relations school for this view: “For on this subject they have no other reference than 
the approximate notion of part-object, which has never been subjected to criticism 
since Karl Abraham introduced it. This is unfortunate given the comfort it offers 




There is an interesting contrast between the behaviours of the two sexes. 
In the analogous situation, when a little boy first catches sight of a girl's 
genital region, he begins by showing irresolution and lack of interest; he 
sees nothing or disavows what he has seen, he softens it down or looks 
about for expedients for bringing it into line with his expectations. It is 
not until later, when some threat of castration has obtained a hold upon 
him, that the observation becomes important to him: if he then recollects 
or repeats it, it arouses a terrible storm of emotion in him and forces him 
to believe in the reality of the threat which he has hitherto laughed at. This 
combination of circumstances leads to two reactions, which may become 
fixed and will in that case, whether separately or together or in 
conjunction with other factors, permanently determine the boy's relations 
to women: horror of the mutilated creature or triumphant contempt for 
her. These developments, however, belong to the future, though not to a 
very remote one. 
 
A little girl behaves differently. She makes her judgement and her decision 
in a flash. She has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants to 
have it (Freud, 1925, p.252). 
 
The text is significant because it not only shows that there is a temporal difference 
between the boy’s and the girl’s discovery of anatomical difference, but more 
importantly, it points out that after the infant-mother symbiotic unity as the first 
stage of psychosexual development, which every subject goes through in the same 
manner, this temporal difference is indeed the first difference that can be witnessed 
between sexes. In other words, access to sexual difference as spatial difference 
(having or not having the penis) itself is preceded and defined by the temporal 
difference of perceiving sexual difference as such. Moreover, Freud tells us that this 
temporal difference takes place not only between two sexes but also within each sex, 
since both the boy and the girl experience a sense of temporal desynchrony 
regarding the penis, only in different ways. On the boy’s side, the moment he 
confronts a bodily self-representation is earlier than the moment he symbolises 
anatomical difference as sexual difference. We find the explanation of this temporal 




Among different forms that the issue of time assumes in Freudian psychoanalysis, 
Nachträglichkeit is regarded as a particularly unique one. Marion believes that it 
forms the basis of Freud’s view of memory, causality and time (Marion, 2011). The 
dominant role it plays in the complexity of the various notions of time in Freud’s 
work leads Perelberg to think of Nachträglichkeit as a “general illumination”: as a 
central idea in Freud, it illuminates everything else (Perelberg, 2008). The way this 
concept is developed by Freud indicates not only a descriptive account of time, 
namely, what a specific temporal feature may look like, but it also introduces a 
temporal logic through which different temporal dimensions are connected.  
 
In Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), the term “Nachträglichkeit” was 
formally introduced to explain the delay Freud noticed between the formation of 
memory and the experience of trauma. In this text and his subsequent letters to 
Fliess, Freud develops the seduction theory which takes traumatic incidents of 
seduction (sexual abuse) in early life as the cause of all neuroses, but there is a 
theoretical detour before he arrives at this conclusion. In Studies on Hysteria, where 
the method developed by Freud and Breuer was still “abreaction”, the process 
through which the individual discharges affects which are attached to a repressed 
memory of trauma, the mechanism of Nachträglichkeit had already been taken into 
consideration. But it was only put into descriptive use when Freud discussed what 
he then called “retention hysteria”, a hysteria not caused by childhood sexual 
trauma but born from a particular situation, in which an individual fails to deal 
with the overwhelming tasks of sick-nursing thus adopting “a habit of suppressing 
every sign of his own emotion”. As a result, “he will accumulate a mass of 
impressions which are capable of affect” but were not sufficiently perceived at that 
moment, and only after the person he nursed had died would the hysteria, “whose 
seeds were sown during the time of nursing, breaks out” (Freud, 1895b, p.162). Here, 





However, soon after, Freud found that the therapeutic effect of the abreaction of 
trauma in speech was not as satisfactory as Breuer suggested. In many cases, various 
fairly recent memories recollected from patients did not explain their symptoms, 
and often lacked “a determinant and traumatic force” to do so: 
 
When our procedure leads, as in the cases described above, to findings 
which are insufficient as an explanation both in respect to their suitability 
as determinants and to their traumatic effectiveness, we also fail to secure 
any therapeutic gain; the patient retains his symptoms unaltered, in spite 
of the initial result yielded by the analysis (Freud, 1896, p.195). 
 
If new symptoms continue to emerge after the abreaction of the original one, then, 
as Paul Verhaeghe suggests, “it seems that a first moment is lacking, one which 
logically precedes” (Verhaeghe, 1999, p.129). To solve this problem, Freud 
introduced a temporal delay between cause and effect: “if the memory which we 
have uncovered does not answer our expectations, it may be that we ought to 
pursue the same path a little further”; and “If the first discovered scene is 
unsatisfactory, we tell our patient that this experience explains nothing, but that 
behind it there must be hidden a more significant, earlier, experience” (ibid.). In 
terms of the causal relationship, we now have two different causes, “one that has 
been discovered and the one that has still to be discovered”. Although the earlier 
event contains the traumatic force, it can only find its way into consciousness 
through the later event that provides the determining effect. The interval of a 
period of time between these two events forms the basis on which a psychoanalytic 
theory of hysteria is built, as Freud writes that “it is highly noteworthy that it (the 
sexual release) was not linked to the assault when this was experienced”, instead, 
“We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma 
by Nachträglichkeit. The cause of this state of things is the retardation of puberty 
as compared with the rest of the individual's development” (Freud, 1895a, p.356). 
 
At first sight, the German word “Nachträglichkeit” is used here simply to designate 
the delayed effect of early trauma or a delayed discharge of libidinal energy that 
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fails to find its way into release in the beginning. In this sense, Strachey’s translation 
of Nachträglichkeit as “deferred action” in the Standard Edition is accurate. 
However, the conceptual ambiguity of Nachträglichkeit is already embedded in this 
first reference, since alongside his psychodynamic explanation of the original 
traumatic experience in terms of delayed release of energy, Freud also provides a 
more hermeneutic reading of Nachträglichkeit which focuses on the meaning-
making process: “Here we have the case of a memory arousing an affect which it 
did not arouse as an experience, because in the meantime the change in puberty 
had made possible a different understanding of what was remembered” (ibid.). This 
“different understanding reappeared in Freud’s letter to Fliess one year later, in 
which he suggests that “the material present in the shape of memory traces being 
subjected from time to time to a re-arrangement in accordance with fresh 
circumstance – to a re-transcription” (Freud, 1896a, p.1). If deferred action stands 
for a compulsive tendency to repeat the original unpleasure experience with the 
arrival of puberty, then the work of re-arrangement and re-transcription suggests 
that the individual’s assimilation of new experiences and meanings into one’s living 
world at present does not provide conditions for the “repetition” of original trauma, 
but becomes the cause of trauma that is produced later than the event but 
nevertheless makes the earlier event possible. The original event is either imaginary, 
or insignificant in its own right. Therefore, two different definitions of 
Nachträglichkeit are presented from the very beginning in correspondence with 
this term’s two meanings in German: “later-subsequent” and “supplementary” 
(Marion, 2011, p.25). Whereas Freud finds psychoanalytic implications for each 
meaning – “later-subsequent” suggests that the past event would bring about 
subsequent pathological consequence, while “supplementary” means that the 
trauma is only ‘completed’ at a later point in time - he does little to reconcile the 
contradiction between the progressive temporal direction on the one hand, which 
moves from past to present to convey the permanent influence of earlier 
experiences upon the present, and the retrogressive temporal direction on the 





Freud’s lack of clarification makes Nachträglichkeit a focal point around which 
different psychoanalytic theories oppose one another. “Deferred action” has often 
been criticised by analysts who focus on the “supplementary’ aspect of 
Nachträglichkeit. To Laplanche and Pontalis, it would be a serious simplification 
to understand Nachträglichkeit “in terms of a variable time-lapse, due to some kind 
of storing procedure, between stimuli and response”. Translating it as deferred 
action encourages a reading that reduces the complex process of symptom-
formation to a narrowly economic theory of abreaction (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, 
p.114). Analysts influenced by ego psychology and object relations theory favour 
subjective construction in the here-and-now. Faimberg, for instance, calls for a 
broader conceptualisation of Nachträglichkeit not even in terms of re-transcription 
but “the giving of retroactive meaning for a first time” (Faimberg, 2007, p.1227). It 
is argued that there is no event as such whose memory trace is waiting to be grasped, 
“but only the belated context-dependent allocation of meaning” (Eickhoff, 2006, 
p.1461). However, a purely hermeneutic understanding of Nachträglichkeit may 
confuse Freud’s viewpoint with Jung’s idea of “retroactive fantasy” which he 
publicly rejects. In his discussion of screen memory, Freud makes a statement that 
“mental work is linked to some current impression, some provoking occasion in the 
present which has been able to arouse one of the subject's major wishes. From there 
it harks back to a memory of an earlier experience (usually an infantile one) in 
which this wish was fulfilled” (Freud, 1908, p.147). By emphasising the priority 
attached to the significance of the earlier experience, Freud continues to give those 
past events a foundation in reality even after his abandonment of the seduction 
theory. 
 
Returning to our present case, I argue that the boy’s temporal experience of sexual 
difference in Freud’s Oedipal narrative is a perfect example that demonstrates how 
two meanings of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit can supplement rather than contradict 
each other. From the perspective of deferred action, the perception of the female 
genital region is too traumatic to be made sense of at once. The boy’s ignorance 
can, therefore, be interpreted as an unconscious defence against an absolute 
impossibility that shatters the psychic reality. On the other hand, the boy does not 
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passively “wait” for this repressed memory to be activated by chance. He 
retrospectively understands this original moment only through the lens of his 
current phallic situation in which the paternal power defines the meaning of lack. 
The progressive direction of the objective causal relation and the retrogressive 
direction of meaning-attribution are compatible because they are two processes 
taking place in different temporal registers. Borrowing terminology from Thoma 
and Cheshire’s work on the causality of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit (Thoma & 
Cheshire, 1991), I argue that the boy’s perception of sexual difference is the outcome 
of “empirical causation” of the body process which takes place in Real time. As 
Freud admits, “We are not accustomed to the notion of powers emanating from a 
mnemic image which was absent from the real impression” (Freud, 1896b, p.213). 
The boy’s original impression is indeed real, in the sense that it concerns the 
materiality of the body as something unthematised and unactualised, which resists 
but at the same time conditions every figuration and symbolisation. Meanwhile, 
this perception also reflects “logical causation” of symbolic articulation which takes 
place in Symbolic time. The Symbolic has a constituting and formative effect on 
the realisation of sexual difference. Yet it does not replace the bodily cause but 
rather provides a rational-cognitive consistency so that the subject can finally 
perceive the already-existed cause as the cause. In other words, the direction from 
cause to effect is forward, but the direction from cause to the actualisation of cause 
is metaphorically “in retrospect”. 
 
Freud’s Nachträglichkeit provides a model to contemplate the articulation of sexual 
difference between a determinant past and a retrospective present. However, the 
girl’s temporal experience of sexual difference described by Freud in the Oedipal 
narrative is totally different. From the perspective of biological determinism, it is 
easy to understand how the girl, by witnessing the male genital organ, “makes her 
judgement and her decision in a flash” and instantly positions herself as a subject 
that lacks, but I want to examine this statement following the Lacanian logic that 
the penis cannot be the indicator of sexual difference without symbolisation, a logic, 
I argue, that does not render Freud’s original statement invalid but only reveals its 
radical potential. If the elevation of the penis to the signifier of the lack is only 
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possible after the intervention of the symbolic father, as we have witnessed in the 
boy’s case, then the decision the girl makes “in a flash” shall not be based on an 
empirical fact of presence and absence, since she does not have the phallic object 
for sure, but also does not not-have it at that moment. Therefore, I provide an 
alternative to explain how the girl processes sexual difference: The statement is 
made by her in the future anterior tense, not “I lack (a penis)” but “I will have 
lacked”.  
 
The future anterior, or the future perfect, is a tense that supposes a past anterior 
not to the present but to a future, a past that is also future in relation to the present 
of enunciation.  Lacan uses this tense to describe how the historicity of the subject 
is delineated by the symbolic order. As he announces in The Function and Field of 
Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis: 
 
What is realised in my history is neither the past definite as what was, 
since it is no more, nor even the perfect as what has been in what I am, 
but the future anterior as what I will have been, given what I am in the 
process of becoming (Lacan, 2006j, p.247). 
 
In Seminar VI, Lacan points out “the necessity of using the future perfect” (Lacan, 
1959, p. 63) to highlight the split nature of the subject in speech. From a spatial 
perspective, Lacan’s distinction between the subject of the enunciated and the 
subject of the enunciation (or the subject of the statement) can be understood 
through the division of psychic layers. The former, which is identified with the 
personal pronoun “I” in the statement, corresponds to the speaker’s ego; whereas 
the latter, emerging in a discursive structure and produced by the chain of signifiers, 
is equivalent to the subject of the unconscious. However, the irreparable gap 
between the enunciated content conveyed consciously by the speaker and the 
content of enunciation that disrupts the literal meaning of the sentence is also a 
temporal one. As Lacan suggests, there are two reference points to time when a 
subject speaks. Using the statement “by that date I will have become her husband” 
as an example, Lacan points out that the subject of the enunciated is located at the 
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future, the time “concerning the act that is going to be in question” (ibid.). The 
subject of the enunciation, on the other hand, exists in the present, since “it is the 
present point from which you speak from the act of enunciating which locates you”.  
 
At first sight, the duplicity of the subject’s temporal location in the symbolic order 
simply reaffirms the double directionality of time suggested by Freud’s 
Nachträglichkeit. In the same way that the unassimilated cause of trauma precedes 
the moment of its investment with meaning and significance, “the subject finds his 
signifying place in a way that is logically prior to any awakening of the signified” 
(Lacan, 2006l, p.579). Both ideas reject the progressive and linear-teleological 
course of events and regard the constitution of the subject as a result of the twofold 
movement of anticipation and retrospection. However, I disagree with the 
argument held by some commentators that Lacan merely deciphers 
Nachträglichkeit of the trauma grammatically as the future anterior (Kober, 2006, 
p.26; Milesi, 1999, p.190). To begin with, there is a subtle difference of the reference 
point to the future envisaged by Freud and Lacan: to Freud, the mechanism of 
Nachträglichkeit requires a moment X, in the future, when revision and reworking 
of memory traces to give the past a new meaning is made possible. Using Lacan’s 
vocabulary, we may say this moment X functions as the “last word” without which 
a sentence cannot be completed (Lacan, 2006f, p.711). It is at this moment that the 
subject’s signifying chain takes on a relatively fixed meaning. Yet what is missing 
from Lacan’s future anterior is precisely this moment X. What will have happened 
is distinguished from what will happen by adding a second event further into the 
future in relation to which the first event in the future becomes past. In other words, 
the defining moment X cannot be precisely located in the future anterior since the 
anticipated subject is constituted at a future point posterior to X. As Bruce Fink 
points out, “Lacan never pinpoints the subject’s chronological appearance on the 
scene: he or she is always either about to arrive – is on the verge of arriving – or will 
have already arrived by some later moment in time” (Fink, 1996b, p.63). The future 
anterior tells us the after-effect of an event if it will actually take place, “without 
specifying exactly when” (ibid.). The very moment of arrival, namely a moment 
when the meaningless pronoun ‘I’ is turned into a subject proper by the uttered 
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signifiers, remains elusive. Using Lacan’s example “by that date I will have become 
her husband” again, we can present the temporal relation in the future anterior 
graphically as such: 
 
 
Figure 8. Graph of Lacan’s Example of the Future Anterior 
 
The moment X is when the subject of the enunciated is supposed to be constituted. 
However, to Lacan, the ego remains an imaginary projection that cannot claim an 
exact place in the future. By leaving the moment X in suspense, Lacan’s future 
anterior posits a temporal trajectory of the subject’s symbolisation of sexual 
difference that is distinguished from the Freudian notion of Nachträglichkeit, a 
difference that becomes obvious when we introduce the notion of dual temporality. 
In Freud’s framework, anticipation and retrospection are two ends of the same 
process that presents itself differently in Real time and Symbolic time. It is a process 
through which the meaning of the original trauma will eventually realise at the 
moment X in the future. To argue whether this meaning is deferred to be 
understood at this later point or given back retrospectively does not change the fact 
that confirmation of meaning will only come in the future. This principle guides 
the here-and-now model of interpretation that awaits the arrival of the moment X 
by making use of the present experience to produce explicit reconstruction. The 
workings of the psyche can also be explained at the level of language. In the same 
way that the essentially undefined pronoun “I” as the first word of a sentence lies 
in expectation of the final word that will confer meaning upon all the words that 
precede it, the moment X is anticipated as the point of completion, certainty and 
security from the beginning of the process of symbolisation. In this sense, Freud’s 
Nachträglichkeit constructs a closed temporal loop in which retrospection is both 




Lacan’s future anterior is a significant departure from this model in the sense that 
it involves two different processes. The first process takes place in Symbolic time 
that links the undefined subject at the time of the utterance with the after-effect of 
a constituted symbolic identity at a future moment. However, one does not know 
the exact time when the master signifier marks the constitution of identity, a 
symbolic event that potentially takes place in-between. As I have demonstrated in 
the chapter on Symbolic time, the signifying chain runs automatically and throws 
the subject into the time of the Other. The subject confronts the impossibility of 
recognition in the first process because the constitution of symbolic identity is the 
work of the symbolic order in its own time that cannot be imaginarily anticipated. 
On the other hand, there is also a second process in the future anterior that is 
backward-oriented. It is not a retrospection that merely confirms the subject’s 
anticipation at present, but an unexpected return of a future moment that claims 
its own actuality in spite of the fact that the very existence of an in-between 
symbolic event that makes it possible remains in question. This return of the future 
is the Real future I name in the chapter on Real time, a future that is impossible to 
imagine but realises its radical difference in the present. Therefore, what has been 
deferred in the future anterior is not the realisation of meaning, as Freud’s 
Nachträglichkeit implies, but the very closure of meaning since the subject leaps 
into an unknown future when the determination of the symbolic signifier has 
become the past. While Nachträglichkeit offers a temporal loop that contains the 
future in the past, what Lacan’s future anterior achieves is giving the character of 
openness and unpredictability back to the future. As Samuel Weber explains well 
in his book: 
 
In invoking the future anterior, Lacan troubles the perfected closure of the 
always-already-having-been by inscribing it in the inconclusive futurity of 
what will-always-already-having-been, a “time” which can never be 
entirely remembered, since it will never have fully taken place. It is an 
irreducible remainder or remnant that will continually prevent the subject 




How past and future are constructed differently in Nachträglichkeit and the future 
anterior can be further examined if we return to Freud’s description of sexual 
difference as temporal difference. On the masculine side, the penis/phallus, as an 
object that requires the real or symbolic space, designates two different things: at 
the moment of the original traumatic encounter, it reveals a lack of the signifier in 
the pre-existent symbolic universe to signify the lived, Real body of the infant, as 
the subject of the enunciation fails to name whatever “it” is; then at the moment of 
symbolisation made possible by the name-of-the-father, it is a signifier of the lack 
that, instead of challenging a substantive sexual identity, becomes the symbolic 
ground on which the imaginary ego (the subject of the enunciated) comes to 
depend.  Paternal identification designates the destination of the process of 
becoming a masculine subject, an end permitting no exception or surprise other 
than the mastery and self-sufficiency of the phallic imago. In this sense, 
Nachträglichkeit opens the past to constant reworking and reorganisation, but it 
closes the future by inserting a master-signifier as the ultimate guarantee of 
meaning. The future for the masculine subject, therefore, is not future at all. It is 
an illusion of the future attached to a particular object (penis/phallus) that affirms 
the singular truth of normativity.  
 
On the feminine side, we observe the opposite result: instead of waiting uncertainly, 
the girl “makes her judgement and her decision in a flash”. However, it is difficult 
to make sense of the judgement that “she lacks a penis” since the penis, as the 
biological organ, does not exist for the girl. If the penis is not an object the subject 
once had in the past, how can one speak of its “lacking” in the present?  In response 
to this question, I argue that the girl’s judgement should be understood from the 
perspective of the future anterior. Her judgement of lacking a penis is certainly not 
a description of anatomical reality, but a claim oriented towards the future that “I 
will have lacked a penis”. 
 
This claim should be understood in two ways. To say that “I will have lacked a penis” 
in Symbolic time means that one accepts the symbolic determination as a necessity 
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that is impending in the symbolic future. Although the subject can never foresee 
when this determination will take place, it is a necessity imposed upon the feminine 
subject by the symbolic reality and pronounced through her as if it is her fate. This 
temporal manoeuvre that turns the unknown future into a sense of certainty in the 
present is an important feature of the future anterior. According to Geoffrey 
Bennington’s interpretation, the future anterior is not a prediction, “at least in so 
far as the future perfect has always-already been contained in the past” (Bennington, 
1990, p.20). Since what the subject speaks of at the time of the utterance is the after-
effect of another event, something that is complete, the future anterior becomes 
equivalent to a repetition of the present perfect. In our case, the very present in 
which the girl makes an instant judgement is contextualised by the symbolic order 
that sends a message back from the future, so that she can experience the Real body 
as calling upon her to fix its significance and accept what will have been offered by 
the symbolic future in which the phallus as the sign of symbolic determination 
marks the lack of being for each individual.  
 
However, “I will have lacked a penis” is also pronounced in Real time. There is a 
crucial difference between the masculine anticipation of “I will lack the penis (as 
the result of castration)” and this feminine conviction. The former, as we have 
discussed, demonstrates a certain narrowness that will take hold of the subject. The 
subject’s lack is compensated by the phallus as a signifier of lack that symbolises 
sexual difference and completes sexual identity. Yet what guides the future anterior, 
Derrida writes in Of Grammatology, is “the future (that) can only be anticipated in 
the form of an absolute danger. It is that which breaks absolutely with constituted 
normality and can only be proclaimed, presented, as a sort of monstrosity” (Derrida, 
1998b, p.5). To accept the forthcoming symbolic determination does not mean that 
the process of becoming a sexed subject must stop at this moment X. The future 
anterior opens the Real future for the subject by positing a “future beyond future” 
that coincides with the present in the form of eternal return. While castration 
marks the end of the Oedipus complex as a definitive future for the masculine 
subject, we can understand Freud’s argument that it is only the beginning of the 
Oedipus complex for girls in the sense that the feminine subject has already 
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positioned herself further into the future when the moment of being determined 
as lacking becomes the past. The future anterior creates a new temporal dimension 
for the expression of sexed subjectivity that resists the very constraint of meaning 
embodied by the phallic future. It moves beyond the fantasy of self-realisation that 
only forecloses the futurism and maintains the void around which new sexual 
identities are both partly constituted and dislocated. 
 
Lacan’s future anterior offers a possibility of thinking of sexed subjectivity without 
resorting to the spatial logic of presence and absence. In the Oedipal narrative of 
the process of masculine symbolisation, the boy certainly experiences both the 
absence (in the past) and the presence (in the future) of a signifier for sexual 
difference. However, for the feminine subject, “I lack a penis” at the present cannot 
be taken as a guarantee of an authoritative self-possession of one’s bodily 
experience or identity, since this claim exceeds the moment of the Now and 
attaches itself to an untenable future in which the subordination to the phallic 
power is taken for granted. The claim that “I will have lacked a penis” means 
precisely that such a lack has not yet taken place in the present. The subject can 
thus express itself as freely as it will do in the “future beyond future” when the lack 
already becomes the past. In the future anterior, the penis/phallus fails to prove 
itself as a privileged signifier of spatial demarcation in determining the subject’s 
symbolic status. Instead, it will have been reduced to an undefinable reminder of 
symbolic negativity in the past future. If the girl truly lacks a penis, the penis is not 
an object but a moment: The subject lacks a moment in Real time to think through 
the enigma of sexual difference, since the supposed immediate presence of the Real 
body to the subject has been hijacked by the symbolic order that grounds its 
knowledge claim on an uncompleted articulation of signifiers; She also lacks a 
determinate moment in Symbolic time, a moment concluding the process of 




5.3 Towards a New Epistemology of Sexed Subjectivity  
By using Freud’s Nachträglichkeit and Lacan’s future anterior as two different ways 
that explain the child’s first perception of sexual difference in the Oedipal narrative, 
I intend to deconstruct the logic of spatialisation that reduces sexual difference to 
spatial difference. However, this does not mean that I will construct sexual 
difference as temporal difference correspondingly, namely that man’s time is 
Nachträglichkeit and woman’s time is the future anterior. Such an argument 
returns to a dualistic, binary thinking that offers little to our understanding of 
sexuality in contemporary societies. The fact that we have found two different ways 
to perceive sexual difference in the Oedipal narrative indicates not two kinds of 
sexed being but rather two types of epistemology. It is the opposition between a 
traditional epistemology that adopts a masculine perspective and privileges a 
phallocentric arrangement of sexual identity through a teleological development, 
and a new epistemology that deconstructs the spatial importance of the 
penis/phallus and embraces more possible sexual expressions by opening itself to 
the unpredictable future. Lacan’s idea of the future anterior, I suggest, does not 
show how one kind of sexed identity is constructed. The way we understand how 
the girl in Freud’s writings perceives sexual difference can be applied to every 
construction of sexual identity.  
 
I want first to explain why it is problematic to characterise sexed subjectivity by a 
specific kind of temporal experience. This idea is associated with the issue of 
women’s time in feminist writings that has been discussed from multiple 
viewpoints. Firstly, there are some attempts to associate women’s biology with a 
distinct temporal experience. The menstrual cycle or the biological cycle of birth, 
pregnancy and death are taken as important sources of a time consciousness 
collectively shared by all women (Griffiths, 1999; Martin, 1992; O’Brien, 1981). 
Secondly, some theorists also pay attention to the social system of contemporary 
capitalism which shapes and disciplines the lives of women and approach women’s 
time from a structured set of living patterns and ways of being that are consolidated 
over time through socialisation. While the temporal logic of capitalist production 
requires a linear time that is fast-speed, forward-moving and commercially 
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dividable, Rita Felski points out that women are often placed outside of the time of 
work in the public sphere. The result is that women’s time is closely linked to 
repetition and cyclicality, since “they are primarily responsible for the repetitive 
tasks of social reproduction: cleaning, preparing meals, caring for children…in the 
domestic sphere (that) is deemed to exist outside the dynamic of history and 
change” (Felski, 2000, p.82). However, women’s everyday practice of “doing time” 
does not only reaffirm the gendered temporal norms. Some indicate that it also 
contains possibilities to resist the dominant time culture. Nurturing and 
attachment that are important themes of the emotional and physical labour of 
women may give rise to “caring time”, a temporal model that involves “caring about” 
and “caring for” other people (Davies, 1989, 1994). In Valerie Bryson’s examination, 
caring time in many feminist writings has been taken as essentially relational time 
in contrast to capitalist time that promotes individualisation (Bryson, 2007, p.135). 
Since the very idea of caring involves a concern for well-being in the future, it 
changes women’s devalued, repetitive domestic work into a meaningful flow of 
time without participating in the future of capitalist time driven by the imperatives 
of profit maximisation.  
 
Julia Kristeva’s essay “Women’s Time” provides a comprehensive and influential 
discussion about this topic that summarises many points we have mentioned above. 
It theorises women’s temporal experience in relation to biology, culture and the 
symbolic order. On the one hand, Kristeva’s argument is grounded in women’s 
embodiment and “naturalness”, as she argues that “cycles, gestation, the eternal 
recurrence of a biological rhythm which conforms to that of nature” (Kristeva, 1981, 
p.16) are closely linked to a cyclical and monumental time that retains the essential 
characters of repetition and eternity. On the other hand, the constitution of female 
subjectivity is also “the result of a sociohistorical conjuncture” (ibid., p.15). Sexual 
difference as difference between women’s time and men’s teleological, linear, 
prospective unfolding time may at once be “biological, physiological, and relative 
to reproduction”, but it has been translated by “a difference in the relationship of 
subjects to the symbolic contract which is the social contract: a difference, then in 
relationship to power, language and meaning” (ibid., p.21). After examining how 
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different generations of feminism have reacted to the dominant time norm, as they 
either seek to gain a place in the time of history or radically reject it and celebrate 
women’s difference, Kristeva argues that the challenge for a new generation of 
women is to find a satisfactory balance between women’s time that originates from 
their bodily experience and historical time of the symbolic order that shapes 
women’s living.  
 
Sophisticated as it is, Kristeva’s essay is also an excellent example that demonstrates 
the problematic nature of the attempts to speak of women’s time. Although 
Kristeva is aware of the danger of recreating binary oppositions of sexual difference, 
as she criticises the logic of inclusion and exclusion that guides the strategies 
adopted by former generations of feminism and tries to move beyond the 
dichotomy between masculinity and femininity, her own arguments are still built 
upon binary categorisation such as nature vs civilisation, private vs public and 
cyclicity vs linearity. The talk of women’s time in the first place inscribes an 
assumption that “woman” can be homogenised into “women” as a unitary category, 
yet the meaning of woman is constructed in varying ways according to the 
particular sociohistorical context in which this notion is perceived. Not all women 
share the same biological rhythm or social experience of repetition and caring that 
gives rise to a common temporal consciousness. Therefore, defining women’s time 
in either way suppresses different temporalities available to the individual woman 
and denies some men’s temporal experience outside conventional forms.  
 
However, the real problem that concerns me in relation to the topic of this chapter 
is not whether there is a radical difference between “masculine” and “feminine” 
time that makes a separate women’s time possible, since phenomenologically 
speaking, we may admit that women’s physical and social experiences are loosely 
linked to a range of temporal perceptions different from men’s. From a political 
point of view, women’s time can also be a useful concept to mobilise collective 
actions on wider economic and social issues and thus “links campaigns around time 
to other dimensions of inequality and resistance” (Bryson, 2007, p.142). The 
207 
 
limitation of the idea of women’s time, I argue, is epistemological, since it sexualises 
temporal difference while leaving the enigma of sexual difference untouched. The 
theorisation of the difference between men’s time and women’s time does not 
provide a new perspective to reevaluate sexual difference since “men” and “women” 
are already implicitly differentiated before the theorisation. In some cases, it is 
merely an extension of those spatially binary oppositions to the temporal 
dimension, so that “nature vs civilisation” becomes “biological time vs historical 
time”. These differences are not temporal at all but differences between space-like 
qualities, attributes or characters of time that can only be retrieved by an observer 
standing outside time. The idea of women’s time resists the way male-dominated 
society organises time into a “single streamlined story” (Felski, 2000, p.2) with a 
coherent goal or direction, yet its very existence is another version of this grand 
narrative that ignores the individual’s fragmented temporal experience in favour of 
rational summarisation and overgeneralised apprehension. It is not surprising to 
see that Kristeva’s Women’s Time ends with an imagination of “another space” that 
balances women’s symbolic and biological existence, since the idea of women’s 
time serves to carve out a space in which femininity can be categorised. It is not a 
temporalisation of sexual difference but rather a spatialisation of time that converts 
the chaotic flux of time into an atemporal concept of non-linearity.  
 
Therefore, by comparing Lacan’s future anterior with Freud’s Nachträglichkeit, I 
have no intention of providing another version of women’s time that continues to 
maintain the ontological opposition between two gendered categories. The 
difference between Nachträglichkeit and the future anterior should not be regarded 
as a determinate characterisation of sexual difference. The future anterior itself 
does not define the temporal experience of women, nor does it represent one side 
of sexual difference. Instead, it designates a new epistemology to understand how 
sexed subjectivity is expressed in a temporal process that leads to the construction 




Epistemology is a framework concerned with the production and generation of 
knowledge. A given epistemological framework, Liz Stanley and Sue Wise write, 
“specifies not only what ‘knowledge’ is and how to recognise it, but who are 
‘knowers’ and by what means someone becomes one, and also the means by which 
competing knowledge-claims are adjudicated, and some rejected in favour of 
another/others” (Stanley & Wise, 2002, pp.188–89). All of these objectives are 
highly relevant to our investigation of sexual difference. So far, by examining 
Freud’s “linear-teleological model”, Lacan’s “structural-timeless model” and 
feminist constructions of women’s time, we have encountered various truth-claims 
of sexual difference. What these accounts have in common is that they all presume 
the existence of a knower able to describe the norm of sexual difference while 
remaining independent of embodied experience. Yet knowledge of sexual 
difference cannot be objective since the knowing subject is not external to sexual 
difference but is constituted by it. Freud’s notion of  Nachträglichkeit, for example, 
is an epistemology that grounds sexual difference on a masculine cognitive style, 
not only because it promotes the penis as a valued object of desire, but also because 
in the self-closed process of symbolising sexual difference, it pursues the ultimate 
realisation of a phallic future in which the penis as “the epistemological object par 
excellence” guarantees knowledge to be conceptualised as whole, rounded and 
finished (Moi, 1981, p.72). Similarly, theorising the ontology of sexual difference in 
binary terms such as lacking vs not lacking the symbolic phallus or men’s time vs 
women’s time also implies a masculinist epistemology that is modelled on 
Cartesian dualism. 26  These binary categories contain an implicit hierarchy of 
difference and unavoidably lead to the valuation of one side over the other, thus 
recreating inequalities embedded in social and institutional practices. Even though 
one may attempt to promote femininity against male dominance through the 
binary opposition, it will more likely fail since to champion the feminine value 
means accepting the problematic definition of masculine and feminine, as well as 
the masculinist epistemology that leads to this definition. Moreover, by recognising 
                                                          
26 Bordo explains that Cartesian dualism is a masculine response to the loss of social 
unity in the seventeenth century. It initiates the masculine orientation toward 
knowledge whose objectivity depends on “a clear and distinct determination of the 
boundaries between self and world” (Bordo, 1986, p.451). 
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sexual difference only as oppositional and dualistic, these accounts are unable to 
address the fluidity and metamorphism of sexual identity that become more visible 
in contemporary societies.  
 
By contrast, Lacan’s future anterior contributes to a new epistemology of sexed 
subjectivity that rejects the dominant masculinist model. Sexual difference is not 
understood as a binary opposition since difference in the future anterior is vertical 
rather than horizontal. It is not a difference between two gendered categories that 
is enclosed within a limited symbolic space, but a difference within a process of 
becoming that runs through time. The future anterior also works against the 
teleological narrative that completes the knowledge of sexual difference in the end. 
Instead, it puts the very ending in question and marks it as a “past future” that does 
not retrospectively determine the subject’s life trajectory.  
 
Using the future anterior to describe the process of the construction of sexual 
identity provides us with a different approach to understanding Lacan’s formulas 
of sexuation. As I discussed earlier, the usual way of reading formulas of sexuation 
follows the logic of spatialisation that theorises difference alongside the axis of 
presence and absence. It reduces a multitude of sexes and sexual identities to two 
generalised categories. Each one designates a specific arrangement of space for the 
sexed subject. Men, apart from one “outsider” that stands for the fantasy of 
uncastrated satisfaction, occupy the symbolic space within the limit of the phallic 
law and thus are sexually representable by phallic signification; on the other side, 
women are not fully submitted to the phallic norm but nevertheless defined in 
relation to the phallic function. There is no signifier of femininity, and therefore 
women have to adopt the position of the exception. The epistemology underlying 
such a reading presents the knower as someone outside the field of sexual 
difference, yet a closer look shows that the knowing subject is clearly masculine, 
who uncritically preserves the centrality of the phallus in determining desire. 
Moreover, this reading fails to explain why there are only two types of sexed 
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subjectivity and thus reduces sexual difference to some simplistic drawings of “man” 
and “woman”.  
 
As Žižek points out, in order to defend the construction of sexual difference as a 
binary opposition, one has to follow Hegel’s philosophy which defines the essential 
difference as the difference between the genus itself and its species “as such”. 
Therefore, “sexual difference is not simply the difference between the two species 
of the human genus but the difference between one term (man) that stands for the 
genus as such and the other term (woman) that stands for the Difference within 
the genus as such, for its specifying, particular moment” (Žižek, 2002, p.75). Here, 
Žižek distances himself from most Lacanian commentators whose interpretations 
of Lacan’s formulas of sexuation depend on a taken-for-granted ontological 
assumption, namely that two separate columns of Lacan’s graph designate two 
kinds of being, or at least two symbolic positions that must be adopted by the 
individual in one way or another. Instead of providing an either-or choice for an 
individual to be recognised as a “man” or “woman” in relation to the phallic signifier, 
four propositions of Lacan’s formulas of sexuation, in Žižek’s reading, are meant to 
be applied to the construction and differentiation of each sexual identity as such. 
It is precisely this line of thinking that I will develop by introducing the time of the 
future anterior, as I argue that sexual difference should be understood not as the 
spatial difference between two subject positions, but as the difference within one 





Figure 9. Graph of Sexuation. Reprinted from Lacan, J. (1999). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On 
Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973. (p.78). (J. Miller, Ed.). Translated by Bruce 
Fink. London & New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
According to this reading, the left column of Lacan’s graph of sexuation consists of 
two propositions that theorise the formation of sexual identity as such. As subjects, 
we are always located in this column regardless of our sexual identities. The top-
left proposition means that every sexual identity is subjected to symbolic 
determination. It is only within the symbolic order that one can experience one’s 
sexual identity as something discursively constructed from socially and culturally 
contingent traits. However, this does not mean that every identity is already fixed 
in the present. The time of symbolic determination is always the moment X in the 
unknown future, which leaves the subject’s current sexual identity uncompleted 
and open to further change. I read the phallic sign Φ as a neutral indicator of the 
future symbolic determination, which has no immediate effect on the way one 
understands sexuality at present. Like all other identities, sexual identity is fully 
articulated in Symbolic time, a temporal register in which different signifying 
temporal chains interact with each other so that the subject’s sexual identifications 
are connected to parental desire, social discourse and cultural influence. 
Meanwhile, the bottom-left proposition points out that there exists one sexual 
identity that escapes symbolic determination. The subject experiences the process 
of symbolisation as foreign and responds with its own construction of the perfect 
sexual identity (an “ideal man” or “ideal woman” for example) which is expected to 
reveal the essence of one’s being. This perfect sexual identity incarnates the fantasy 
of becoming a subject “outside-the-symbolic-order” and covers the fact that 
subjectivity is characterised by a fundamental lack of being. It is the tension caused 
by the unpredictability of symbolic formation that demands the existence of such 
an imaginary future, which gives a sense of coherence and consistency back to the 
subject even though it will never come true.  
 
Correspondingly, the right column of Lacan’s graph of sexuation does not represent 
a feminine being but theorises sexual difference within each identity. The top-right 
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proposition should be read as “there is no sexual difference which is not submitted 
to the symbolic articulation”. Sexual identity is fundamentally relational in the 
sense that its construction relies on the subject’s constant interchange with both 
the imaginary other and the Symbolic Other, represented by social discourses and 
norms. My examination of literature in this chapter has demonstrated how the 
term “sexual difference” has become a site where various discourses contest each 
other. It is impossible to speak of sexual difference without referring to social 
difference, psychic difference or anatomical difference, all of which stand for 
different ways of symbolisation. For the subject, it is only through the 
symbolisation of difference that one is able to give meaning to its own sexual 
identity. This explains why Lacan links La, the sign of sexual difference on the right 
side, with Φ, the indicator of symbolic determination on the left side. In this sense, 
Lacan should not be the target of Judith Butler’s critique that questions the 
psychoanalytic assumption which affirms the primacy of sexual difference over 
other differences and overlooks “the convergent modalities of power by which 
sexual difference is articulated and assumed” (Butler, 2011, p.123). However, sexual 
difference cannot be understood only at the symbolic level, as we read the bottom-
right proposition: “not-all sexual difference is subjected to the symbolic 
articulation”. That leads to an important argument in Lacan’s writings that sexual 
difference is Real, against which every attempt at symbolisation always fails.  
 
In Seminar XIV, Lacan pointed out that “there is no sexual act” that connects the 
subject of each sex (Lacan, 1966, p.166), yet the famous claim he makes in Seminar 
XX - “I state that analytic discourse is premised solely on the statement that there 
is no such thing, that it is impossible to found a sexual relationship” (Lacan, 1999, 
p.9) – is still a theoretical breakthrough because it is the first time Lacan grounds 
the idea of the non-existent sexual relationship on a new epistemological 
framework, namely the formulas of sexuation. There is no sexual relationship not 
because “man” and “woman” are defined in asymmetrical ways, each desiring 
something different from the other. Such a reading is another version of 
phallocentric dualism that fails to capture the plurality of sexual identifications. 
Instead, it is the lack of a signifier of sexual difference in the symbolic order that 
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situates every relationship between the sexes against the background of a 
fundamental impossibility. To Lacan, no matter how sexuality is symbolically 
representable, it is fundamentally an expression of the Real body’s demand and 
thus linked to what he calls “jouissance of the body”. Different from phallic 
jouissance as the enjoyment of an organ that is rendered desirable only by the 
symbolic articulation and thus “serves as a mere extension or instrument of the 
signifier” (Fink, 1996b, pp.106–7), jouissance of the body is situated outside the 
symbolic order and therefore cannot be articulated by language and speech. In 
Lacan’s graph of sexuation, this jouissance is represented by the sign S(A) in the 
right column and directly linked to La, the unrepresentable sexual difference. In 
contrast to the formation of sexual identity on the left side, sexual difference is 
generated in Real time that describes the changing intensities of the Real body. By 
marking the difference between unprocessed real drives of the body and sexual 
desires produced by the symbolic articulations of the demand of the Other, sexual 
difference becomes what Žižek calls “Real-impossible”, which is “impossible to 
symbolise, to formulate as a symbolic norm” (Žižek, 1998, p.82).27  
 
My reading of Lacan’s graph of sexuation shows sexed subjectivity as the way an 
individual confronts the Real sexual difference during the construction of sexual 
identity. As we have discussed in the previous section, there are two ways of 
perceiving sexual difference. Lacan’s formalisation clearly does not fit into the 
Freudian model of Nachträglichkeit, which anticipates the phallic determination 
that will retrospectively symbolise the Real difference. In Lacan’s theory, the 
construction of sexual identity is never completed for two reasons. One is that such 
a process takes place in the Symbolic time which the subject experiences as foreign. 
                                                          
27 The idea that sexual difference is Real once again proves why we should not read 
the formulas of sexuation as a logical formalisation of two binary subjective 
positions, since how can sexual difference be Real if it is only a difference between 
two opposed series of symbolic features and still consists of narrowed definitions of 
“man” and “woman”? If “sexual difference is that bedrock of impossibility on 
account of which every formalisation of sexual difference fails” (Žižek, 2002, p.71), 
there is no need for us to add Lacan’s formulas of sexuation into these doomed-to-




The individual cannot be sure how the signifying chain affects its body, desire, 
identification, object-choice and fantasy, leading to a diversity of sexual 
representations far more than any dualistic classification is able to cover. The other 
is that the body process in Real time resists signification. Any phallic jouissance the 
individual enjoys within the symbolic universe is always disrupted by jouissance of 
the body as a certain excess that cannot be adequately contained. Therefore, as 
Žižek writes, “sexuality does not designate a particular ontic sphere of human 
reality” but rather stands for a certain displacement, distortion or a gap “out of joint” 
(Žižek, 2012, pp.739–40).  
 
To accommodate both the unpredictability of the symbolic determination and the 
resistance of the Real body that characterise the process of becoming a sexed 
subject, the construction of sexual identity needs to be interpreted in terms of the 
future anterior. It is not determined by the symbolic order in the present or the 
future, but equivalent to what the subject will have been. By rendering the moment 
of symbolic determination unrepresentable, the future anterior puts the sexed 
subject in a process of becoming as it constantly encounters new perspectives to 
symbolise the Real sexual difference. However, this does not mean that the 
individual can only be a fragmented subject lost in the movement of indefinite self-
difference since every moment of difference is also a moment of some identity that 
contextualises a new act of symbolisation. In fact, the future anterior never excludes 
a moment of resolution from Symbolic time. This distinguishes it from the simple 
future tense in which the individual speaks confidently of its sexual identity by 
virtue of fantasy and refuses to accept the fact that self-identity is not self-
determined but mediated by the Other. On the contrary, to claim “what I will have 
been” is to make a decision about which past one needs to return to in the future 
in order to go beyond it, so that this “future beyond future” can manifest itself in 
the subject’s embodied present and guides the way one experiences sexual 
difference within its sexual identity. In other words, the future anterior makes the 
present a site where a determinate Symbolic future coincides with an all-embracing 
Real future, a moment when my passive undergoing of the Symbolic is also my 
active engagement with the Real.  
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By reading Lacan’s formulas of sexuation as a general theory that describes the 
construction of sexual identity in the future anterior, I develop “sexed time” as a 
new epistemology of sexed subjectivity that radically rejects the phallocentric 
understanding of sexuality. Its radicalness is demonstrated by the elimination of 
what I call “symbolic dualism”, namely the way to think of symbolic difference in 
binary terms. The fact that such a binary thinking permeates culture and language, 
I argue, does not mean that a psychoanalytic epistemology should endorse it to 
understand sexual difference. The oppositions between “man” and “woman”, 
“masculinity” and “femininity”, hardly contribute to contemporary debates on 
sexual and gender pluralities. These different forms of dualism in each case 
precludes a theory of sexuality from explaining the expression of sexed subjectivity 
individually to which it has a constitutive commitment. Sexual identities are 
heterogeneous rather than oppositional, and every attempt at symbolisation in the 
form of translating sexual difference into binary opposition is merely a desperate 
effort to “compensate for the lack of the founding binary signifying couple that 
would directly stand for sexual difference” (Žižek, 2012, p.746).  
 
Meanwhile, sexed time also counters a standard postmodern answer to the problem 
of sexual difference, which merely replaces binary oppositions with a multitude of 
sexual identities. As Žižek points out, understanding sexual difference purely on 
the symbolic level is inadequate, since the thriving of symbolic differences “relies 
on an underlying One, that is, on the radical obliteration of Difference, of the 
antagonistic gap” (Žižek, 2002, p.73). To address this problem, sexed time 
introduces the idea of dual temporality to defend Lacan’s important argument that 
sexual difference is Real, which undermines every construction of sexual identity 
in the process of becoming. My reading of Lacan’s formulas of sexuation excludes 
“Symbolic dualism” but contains “Real dualism”. It is not a dualistic categorisation 
of subjective positions but a theorisation of the fundamental contradiction between 
sexual identity and sexual difference as such. According to this reading, women are 
no longer placed at the place of otherness in the classical masculine-feminine 
dichotomy. The notion of the “enigma of women” that has persisted in 
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psychoanalysis since Freud’s reference to feminine sexuality as the “dark continent” 
is replaced by the Real of sexual difference that does not devalue one sex. As an 
epistemology, sexed time explains not what sexed subjectivity is or should be, but 
the way it can be understood: as a subjective response to the tension between the 
articulation of sexual identity in Symbolic time and the body experience of sexual 






This thesis set out to examine how the notion of time is conceptualised in Jacques 
Lacan’s work. To achieve this aim, I proposed a detailed analysis of various 
presentations of time in Lacan’s writings and brought different segments of Lacan’s 
arguments together to work out the larger implication of Lacan’s theory of time as 
a whole. I started with a close reading of the “Logical Time” essay, one of Lacan’s 
earliest attempts to explore the meaning of time. My reading revealed some 
contradictions associated with the idea that the experience of time can be 
incorporated into a logical structure, an idea uncritically accepted by major 
commentators of Lacan who take his account of reasoning at face value. It turned 
out that there is a tension between the logical process articulated at the symbolic 
level and the instinctual temporal experience, to which I responded by introducing 
a new theoretical assumption that regards time as fundamentally split from the 
outset. The validity of this assumption has been further confirmed by two lines of 
thought extracted from Lacan’s texts, concerning the relationship between time 
and the Real body on the one hand, and time and the Symbolic order on the other. 
After examining the way Lacan handles the problem of origin, I argued that the 
acknowledgement of the co-existence of two independent temporal registers in 
Lacan’s work is essential to our comprehension of Lacan’s construction of subject-
formation. In the case of sexed subjectivity, I highlighted the significance of using 
this new temporal perspective to think about the concept of sexual difference and 
thus to produce a positive response to the phenomenon of sexual and gender 
diversity in contemporary societies. I want to now briefly review several important 
propositions I have developed throughout this thesis.  
 
My first proposition is to think of the notion of time in Lacan’s work beyond a one-
dimensional, unitary category. In other words, we cannot reduce time either to a 
merely subjective matter, correlated only to one’s intentionality; or to an objective 
measurement of movement pertaining to the non-living physical world. Such a 
singular ontological ground on which the conception of time can be theorised does 
not exist in Lacan’s work. Instead, we are able to differentiate two independent 
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temporal registers, both of which have determining effects on the presence of 
being. My thesis detected the idea of dual temporality first in the “Logical Time” 
essay, in which Lacan describes a process of logical articulation underlying three 
prisoners’ interpersonal interactions that gives rise to different temporal 
modulations. Logical time consists of three key moments – the instant of the glance, 
the time for comprehending, and the moment of concluding – that chronologically 
follow each other. Through the prisoner’s speculation on the thoughts of the others, 
all three moments are objectified as necessary logical steps that ultimately lead to 
his final assertion: “I am white”, a conclusion marking the subject’s symbolic 
identification with structural authority. In my opinion, this account of reasoning 
is flawed because it presupposes an absolute reciprocity between three prisoners, 
which oversimplifies the complex nature of human interaction. By assuming that 
each prisoner is able to think what the other is thinking, participants of this logical 
game have been reduced to identical machines that run by themselves according 
to preassigned scripts, whose fates depend purely on the unknowable Other. Such 
a scenario excludes any genuine temporal experience. For example, how can we 
explain the appearance of the “second moment of hesitation”, a moment of 
uncertainty experienced by the subject when its identity has already been 
guaranteed by the symbolic Other?  
 
However, this does not mean that the “Logical Time” essay offers no valuable 
insight into the relationship between time and subjectivity. A close reading of 
Lacan’s text revealed other lines of thinking that exceed the naïve imagination of 
intersubjectivity. I paid attention to the moment of concluding, when the prisoner 
makes a subjective assertion on his own behalf. By giving the final voice not to the 
symbolic Other but to the singular “I”, it is clear that the time in which the subject’s 
self-determination is expressed has not been entirely erased by the Other’s 
overreaching control. If the three-prisoner game is played out according to 
Symbolic time, a temporal register deprived of subjectivity, then Lacan’s essay also 
reserves a place for another time, which I name as Real time. It is the time that 
accounts for the bizarre experience of urgency and hesitation, of uncertainty about 
the symbolic arrangement of one’s life trajectory as well as identity. Living in the 
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Real time is the reason the prisoner can speak of who he is by the end of the game. 
In so doing, he stands for his own desire at the moment of subjectivisation and 
breaks away from the subjective process determined by the Other.  
 
My second proposition is that the notion of time in Lacan’s work is characterised 
by a radical sense of otherness. As I have mentioned in the Introduction, 
continental philosophy of time has become more interested in the time of lived 
experience since the late nineteenth century. This tendency is represented by 
Bergson’s idea of duration as a continuous flux of our own consciousness without 
beginnings and endings (Bergson, 1910), and Husserl’s idea of time-consciousness 
that conditions the possible disclosure of temporal objects (Husserl, 1964). In both 
cases, consciousness, as a sensory state and intentional experience, is taken as an 
absolute point of orientation without which objects cannot appear to the subject 
as temporal. By comparison, what distinguishes the conception of time I find in 
Lacan’s work from these philosophical enquiries is a dissociation of time from the 
conscious ego. In his famous critique of the Cartesian cogito, Lacan points out that 
a pre-given, self-integrated and transparent substance of consciousness that 
unifies thinking and being does not exist. Instead, the conscious ego is merely an 
imaginary construction that covers up the subject’s permanent state of splitting. If, 
as the title of Lacan’s speech at the Johns Hopkins Humanities Centre (Lacan, 1966) 
suggests, an inmixing of an Otherness is a prerequisite to any subject whatever, 
there is certainly a need to understand the temporal constitution of the subject in 
the same way.  
 
Apart from the imaginary small other, there are two types of otherness in Lacan’s 
theory that correspond to the domain of the Real and the Symbolic. Therefore, it 
is not a coincidence that my reading was able to identify two unrepresentable 
temporal registers with distinct ontological grounds in Lacan’s writings, both of 
which are free from a dependence upon the conscious ego as a faculty of 
representation. The idea of Real time designates time of the Real body. It is a 
temporal field produced out of the unrepresentable rhythm of the organism. I used 
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the notion of the body-machine as my point of entry into my study of the 
connection between Real time in Lacan’s work and a Freudian understanding of 
bodily time, the latter of which is built upon the theory of energetics. To Lacan, 
principles of energetics Freud puts forward to regulate the flux of the body process 
should not be judged from the perspective of modern biology. Instead, they apply 
to the body as a machine, whose dynamic import and export of energy demonstrate 
a radical sense of autonomy that transcends various imaginary body-images. From 
my reading of Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology, I developed the Freudian 
metaphysics of time which has a structure similar to that of Kant’s threefold 
synthesis. Both of them attempt to explain the transition from sensation to 
understanding that makes the temporal consciousness of the past, the present and 
the future possible. However, differently from Kant’s philosophy that privileges a 
transcendental “I” as the initiator of all three syntheses, Freud’s Project indicates 
that there is a prior, passive synthesis of time as the result of the neuronal activity 
of the organism. This idea will later be picked up and further developed by Lacan, 
in whose work we find that the Real body is capable of constituting all three 
temporal dimensions (past-present-future).   
 
My reading explained that the way Lacan theorises time as a body process is 
accompanied by a critique of Freud’s misunderstanding of the ego’s synthetic 
function. The distinction Lacan makes between a passive, bodily consciousness 
and the conscious ego in Seminar II challenges the transcendental time-
constituting status held by the latter. Following Lacan’s thinking, I suggested that 
a recollection of mnemic images at the level of the conscious ego does not 
constitute our sense of the past. It is rather a cognitive behaviour conditioned by 
the organism’s passive acceptance and distribution of differences in intensity. The 
Real past defines the past as a general element that preserves every living present 
within itself, and memory as the “past of the present” is conditioned by this “past 
in the present” as the result of the passive synthesis of the body. Similarly, I 
demonstrated that not only does a passive synthesis of the future exist, but it is 
also achieved through the undoing and unbinding of the ego. In Freud’s theory, 
the secondary process postpones the process of energy discharge and thus creates 
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a sense of the future. However, this conscious future as a “deferred present” 
synthesised by the ego is undermined by the idea of the Real future I developed 
from Lacan’s work. The latter presents itself as an indeterminate diversity at the 
bodily level, made possible by the death drive as a traumatic intrusion of the 
Symbolic into the Real body that returns the organism to its original “unbound” 
state.  
 
Regarding the idea of Symbolic time, I looked into the mechanism of the Symbolic 
order. It is well known that to Lacan, the space of the Symbolic order is the domain 
of language, in which every signifier is devoid of positive meaning and constituted 
purely by the difference between itself and the other. Yet one cannot ignore the 
time of the Symbolic order, in which the unconscious is produced through the 
metaphoric and metonymic processes. I traced the idea of Symbolic time back to 
Freud’s claim that the unconscious is timeless. My reading suggested that the 
notion of timelessness does not mean a negation of time but rather implies an 
unrepresentable temporal register radically different from the individual’s 
perception of chronological time. It is a time foreign to the conscious ego that 
questions the individual’s self-ownership of its identity. But how can we approach 
this temporal register if its existence cannot be experienced as “my time”? Bringing 
the theory of cybernetics into consideration, I argued that Lacan has provided an 
answer to this question. The Lacanian symbolic order is not a static structure 
governed by the principle of synchronicity. It is rather a machine (to be more 
specific, a symbol-processing computer), whose autonomous articulation produces 
the subject’s unconscious desire in its “own” time. The subject, therefore, is caught 
up in a process of symbolic formation that does not fall into its grasp. In this 
context, I read Hamlet as a typical Lacanian subject who lives in Symbolic time. 
His inability to fulfil the duty to avenge his father’s murder can be explained by the 
overwhelming determination of the time of the Symbolic other. One may say that 
Hamlet is not only troubled by the question “Che vuoi?” (What do you want?) 
when confronting the Other’s impenetrable, enigmatic presence, he is also 
paralysed by the question “What time am I living in?”, a question fundamental to 




It is clear that to Lacan, a study of the structure of consciousness that conditions 
the perception of temporal objects is inadequate to the task of understanding the 
subject’s temporal existence, or what Heidegger means by “being-in-the-world”. 
Time that is reduced to temporal consciousness cannot fully encompass the very 
existence of the human being and its engagement with the world. By highlighting 
a radical sense of otherness as the common characteristic shared by Lacan’s 
implicit theorisation of Real time and Symbolic time, I argued that a theory of time 
developed from Lacan’s work is a non-representational account of time. It moves 
beyond a narrow view of temporal being built upon the transcendental ground of 
“I think”, and thus theorises the constitution of subjectivity on a greater level of 
complexity.  
 
My third proposition is that the notion of time in Lacan’s work offers a genuine 
appreciation of subjectivity in a process of becoming that goes against the logic of 
spatialisation. While time is fundamental to the existence of human beings, 
without which we cannot experience and understand the world, we often fail to 
think about time in its own terms, a problem that is apparent not only in everyday 
life but also in philosophical contemplations. As Bergson points out: “We set out 
states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them 
simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a word, 
we project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and 
succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which 
touch without penetrating one another” (Bergson, 2002, p.60). By mapping time 
onto a measurable grid, this mode of thinking does not simply put things in space 
or explicitly privilege space over time, but conceives and thinks of time in a space-
like manner. In so doing, time becomes no more than a stock of experience and 
every moment becomes the culmination of all moments that have passed. Such a 
logic of spatialisation, Milic Capek asserts, “is one of the most persistent features 
of our intellectual tradition” (Capek, 1976, p.xxvi) and “a vicious distortion of the 
true nature of time” (ibid., p.xxx). It deprives time of moving, changing and 
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becoming as its essential characters that matter most to our understanding of 
subjectivity.  
 
The co-existence of Real time and Symbolic time in Lacan’s work can already be 
seen as an attempt to penetrate an obstacle for thought represented by the logic of 
spatialisation. Lacan’s attention to the unrepresentable registers of time 
undermines the ego’s arrangement of conscious time that geometrically separates 
the past, the present and the future as different points on a line. Furthermore, I 
argued that Lacan’s critique becomes more evident when it comes to the problem 
of subject-formation. I first addressed the problematic temporal underpinning 
fundamental to the famous Freud-Rank debate over the problem of the origin of 
the neuroses. Be it the trauma of birth or the Oedipal fantasy, the common root of 
both Freud’s and Rank’s arguments is a logic of spatialisation upon which a linear 
history is erected. To think of the origin as what happened in history is to accept 
the assumption that time unfolds itself moment by moment in an extended space. 
By contrast, I argued that Lacan’s understanding of the origin of the individual’s 
psychic development does not follow the same logic. Although Lacan in Les 
Complexes Familiaux summarised different complexes in a linear sequence, the 
idea of prematuration persists throughout all three stages and works as the core 
mechanism that initiates change and development. The human organism – as a 
“thing” in the Real – is not only premature in relation to the environment at birth, 
but it also remains in a permanent premature state in relation to the symbolic 
order that “comes too early.” In this sense, I suggested that prematuration should 
not be understood as a one-time occurrence incorporated into a linear timeline. 
Instead, it designates the fundamental desynchrony that characterises the 
relationship between Real time and Symbolic time. By introducing the lack on both 
the biological and the symbolic planes, prematuration is the true origin in-between 
times that conditions the process of becoming.  
 
My reading also pointed out Lacan’s departure from the logic of spatialisation in 
his reinterpretation of Freud’s idea of primal repression. As a key concept in 
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Freud’s theory of the unconscious, primal repression is only vaguely described and 
thus becomes one of the Freudian myths of origin, attracting various 
interpretations from later psychoanalysts. To Lacan, primal repression is not the 
“first and earliest” repression, nor shall its relationship to the repression proper be 
understood in terms of “before” and “after”. These misunderstandings common in 
psychoanalytic literature are caused by contemplating the temporal process in a 
spatial diagram. By translating Freud’s Vorstellungsrepräsentanz as “representative 
of the representation”, Lacan theorises primal repression as a mechanism of 
temporal binding in which the lack of presentation of the Real body in the 
Symbolic meets the representative (signifier) of the lack invested by the instinctual 
impulse. Once again, primal repression in Lacan’s work takes place in-between 
times. It accompanies and contributes to the unfolding of the individual’s history 
by being outside of one’s conscious time. Comparing it with Laplanche’s 
theorisation of the same concept, I pointed out that although Laplanche also sees 
primal repression as the result of the child’s premature encounter with the 
enigmatic signifier of the other, he fails to situate the signifier in its own time but 
records its presence at a point-like moment in the child’s life history. As a result, 
his theory implicitly lends deterministic force to the past and defends a 
hierarchised paradigm of time.  
 
My reading suggested that a rejection of the logic of spatialisation is required if we 
want to fully comprehend Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage. As a narrative that 
accounts for the origin of the “I”, the mirror stage cannot be described alongside a 
linear time axis from the past to the future. Otherwise one faces the contradiction 
that the very mechanism that produces self-consciousness is also initiated by an 
intentional act coming from a primordial form of self. Regarding this problem, I 
argued that the epistemological leap from a self-closing, undifferentiated state of 
primary narcissism to a specular apprehension of the other (ego) is possible only if 
we apply the idea of dual temporality to the mirror stage. In brief, an imaginary 
configuration of what the body in Real time is anticipated to be during the mirror 
stage is preceded and conditioned by the primary identification of the pre-
subjective infant with the Other. The latter, as a more fundamental mirror 
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reflection that takes place in Symbolic time, prior to the mirror stage, can be 
illustrated through my dissection of Lacan’s Schema L. I divided Schema L into two 
triangular relationships, one of which depicts the direct impact of the Symbolic 
Other on libidinal flux of the Real body. The result is the production of the object 
a, something the pre-subject identifies with in Real time and is identified as in 
Symbolic time.  
 
My discussion of Lacan’s theory of subject-formation from three different angles 
demonstrates that there is a persistent critique of the logic of spatialisation in 
Lacan’s work. I named the time of the Lacanian subject-formation as “symptomatic 
time” because its process is symptomatic at the core. The way we experience time 
as a succession of moments and understand coming-into-being as linear and 
progressive is the result of a repression of two unrepresentable temporal registers 
that determine our existential condition. We take comfort in the thought of a 
historically definable origin, as if its existence can give a sense of coherence to the 
fragile self. Such a veil of illusion is penetrated by the notion of time in Lacan’s 
work that reaffirms the unpredictability and alienation of the living present, a 
present in which the origin of the decentred subject truly lies.  
 
My fourth proposition is that the notion of time in Lacan’s work contributes to a 
new epistemology of sexed subjectivity. Lacan’s theory of sexuation includes some 
of his most original ideas on the complicated relationship between the body and 
the psyche. However, these ideas have not been thoroughly investigated to respond 
to challenges posed by the gender and sexual diversity that is increasingly 
widespread in contemporary societies. In the first part of Chapter Five, I reviewed 
problems arising from the mainstream reading of sexual development and sexual 
difference in both Freud’s and Lacan’s work. I pointed out a lack of attention to the 
relationship between sexuality and time caused by the logic of spatialisation. The 
Freudian proposal delineates a linear, teleological process through which boys and 
girls are differentiated. Time in this narrative is a neutral background since what 
matters to the constitution of sexual identity is having or not-having the penis as 
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the most valued indicator of difference. Lacan’s theory of sexuation, as commonly 
understood, falls into the same trap. The replacement of the biological penis with 
the symbolic phallus does not eliminate binary polarities such as masculine-
feminine, presence-absence, universality- particularity, nor does it change the way 
sexual difference is theorised in terms of spatial difference. Sexed subjectivity is 
not truly considered in movement when a set of symbolic positions is already 
prepared as its destination. The phallus as a signifier determines who is included 
in and excluded from the symbolic space, but the reason for its privileged status is 
hardly convincing. I questioned the way Lacanian psychoanalysts uncritically 
accept the classical equation between woman and otherness, situate feminine 
jouissance outside the symbolic order and reduce a gender category to a plane of 
abjection, even though these operations are often claimed to serve an anti-
patriarchal and anti-heteronormative purpose.  After analysing the “linear-
teleological model” of Freud’s theory of sexuality and the “structural-timeless 
model” in which Lacan’s theory of sexuation is often put, I came to the conclusion 
that without surpassing the logic of spatialisation, a theorisation of sexuality will 
inevitably fail to embrace a broad field of differences that characterises sexed 
subjectivity.  
 
In the second part of Chapter Five, I re-examined Freud’s and Lacan’s writings on 
sexuality from a temporal perspective and looked for possibilities of understanding 
sexed subjectivity in an ongoing process of becoming. I identified two different 
ways to perceive sexual difference in the Oedipal narrative with regard to time. 
One can be explained by Freud’s idea of Nachträglichkeit, which sees sexual 
difference as retrospectively actualised by the symbolic arrangement waiting in the 
future; the other can be explained by Lacan’s idea of the future anterior, which 
regards the moment of determination as “what will have come” and thus leaves the 
present in an indeterminate state, full of possibilities. I argued that from the idea 
of the future anterior, it is possible to develop a new epistemology that more 
generously accepts a diversity of sexual difference and various ways to construct 
sexual identity. In the temporal perspective I proposed, Lacan’s formulas of 
sexuation no longer designate two sexual positions alongside the axis of presence 
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and absence. By articulating the relation between sexual difference and sexual 
identity as such, it rather corresponds to the new epistemology of sexed 
subjectivity, through which we understand sexual difference not as a difference 
between one sexed being and another, but as a difference within oneself, taking 
place between the resistance of the Real body on one hand, and the 
unpredictability of the Symbolic determination on the other. The constitution of 
sexual identity depends on how this sexual difference is interpreted in terms of the 
future anterior, where one surpasses the Symbolic future as what-will-have-been, 
and realises the Real future of infinite differences in the living present.  
 
So far, I have outlined important characteristics and implications of the notion of 
time in Lacan’s work. Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to demonstrate 
how these characteristics of time reaffirm Lacan’s argument that the subject is 
alienated from itself, struggle to find its place between the Real and the Symbolic, 
and how these implications of time shed new light on Lacan’s ideas and themes 
that remain controversial. I hope my reading is able to open up an extended 
understanding of subjectivity and the way a temporal being engages with the world, 
an understanding that will be a starting point for more appreciation of the richness 
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